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The French colonizer from 1912–1956 brought not only the French language 
to Morocco but also a colonial administration that reinforced divisions between 
various indigenous social groups.  European, Jewish, Muslim, and Berber 
communities were segregated into separate schools providing different levels of 
French-language education.  As a result, French linguistic dominance and economic 
opportunity were assured among some groups more thoroughly than others.  
Acquisition of the French language for European and Jewish communities through 
advanced educational opportunities at the European lycées and Jewish Alliance 
Israélite Universelle granted certain higher educational, economic, and administrative 
privileges within the colonial administration and workforce.  Meanwhile, those 
attending schools created for Muslim and Berber Moroccans where curricula insisted 
on rudimentary French skills were unable to seek advanced educational or economic 
opportunity.   
This research describes the different types of access to the French language 
that were intended for the diverse European, Jewish, Berber, and Arab speech 
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communities through the various educational institutions created by the French 
government during the French protectorate in Morocco.  Through the application of 
Bourdieu’s language market theory, this dissertation examines the ways that access 
became linked to the job market and the attainment of symbolic, economic, and 
cultural capital.  This research offers explanations of how language shift occurred 
among European and Jews in Morocco and how French continued to confer 
socioeconomic value long after independence, despite efforts to oust the “colonizer’s 
language” for all Moroccans.  Furthermore, in contradiction to Bourdieu’s language 
market theory, this research exposes how multiple language markets in Morocco 
emerged for Muslim and Berber communities as a result of access to different kinds 
of instruction and how both French and Arabic became legitimate languages with 
very different social functions.   
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CHAPTER 1: THE SPREAD OF FRENCH IN MOROCCO 
 
 Morocco has historically offered a rich heritage of language options for many 
speakers: Moroccan Arabic (MA), Classical Arabic (CA), Modern Standard Arabic 
(MSA), Berber languages, Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish, and more recently Spanish 
and French.  Yet after the departure of the colonizer in 1956, the linguistic policies of 
the newly independent nation tended to focus attention on establishing a unified 
language through the process of Arabization.  Despite efforts to increase the use of 
Arabic after independence from France, the number of French speakers throughout 
the Maghreb, paradoxically in the eyes of many, increased from the number of French 
speakers under the French protectorate (Grandguillaume, 1983).  Much research to 
date in explaining this phenomenon has focused on determining language preference 
or language attitudes and has neglected the sociohistorical context that over time 
produced those current attitudes and preference.  What is missing in the linguistic 
research of Morocco is an understanding of the historical events among the different 
speech communities present in Morocco, which produced the results witnessed today 
(Dakhilia, 2004). 
Before the installation of the French Protectorate in 1912, the influence of the 
French language was minimal in Morocco (Heath, 1989).  However, after 
independence in 1956, French became the most widely spoken foreign language 
throughout unified Morocco, especially among minority communities.  National 
statistics for unified, independent Morocco in 1960 indicated that an overwhelming 
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60.9% of Jewish Moroccans and 70% of Europeans from different nationalities spoke 
French, though combined, these groups only comprised 10% of the population.  In 
comparison, of the remaining 90% of Moroccan Arabs and Berbers, only 7% spoke 
French.  These statistics demonstrate that during the protectorate, the Jewish and 
European minority populations of Morocco underwent French language acquisition at 
very different rates than other Moroccans, exposing the existence of other kinds of 
social disparities between these communities. 
More recently, as of 2007, the total number of French speakers increased in 
Morocco, with an estimated 41.5% of all Moroccans speaking French, out of an entire 
population of over 33 million, a considerable growth since 1956 (France Diplomatie, 
2012).  In contrast to the statistics in 1960, where virtually the entire number of 
French speakers in Morocco were European or Jewish, nearly all the French speakers 
are Muslim Moroccans, since the combined population of Jews and Europeans 
account for less than 1% of all Moroccans today (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).  
Based on the increased number of French speakers during the protectorate and after 
independence, the importance of learning French had become recognized by all 
communities before the departure of the French and accelerated after 1956.  However, 
each of the various speech communities of Morocco, those identified in colonial 
records as European, Jewish, Berber and Arab, sought this language at very different 
rates because of differences in access to colonial institutions, most especially the 
French school system. 
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1.1 French Colonial Influence: Educational Institutions and Social Divisions 
 
To understand how the French language gained status and why different 
communities acquired French earlier and more thoroughly than others, this research 
investigates the origins of the French language in Morocco through one of the most 
powerful institutions to inculcate language and language preferences during the 
Moroccan protectorate, the colonial education system, using the sociolinguistic theory 
developed by Pierre Bourdieu.  Such scholarship on linguistic markets has 
demonstrated that schools selectively indoctrinate and reproduce dominant, or 
legitimate, languages.  Those who master this linguistic resource acquire cultural, 
economic, and symbolic capital that accompanies this legitimate language and, 
consequently, gain access to positions of power, social prestige, cultural legitimacy, 
and other forms of social distinction.  French protectorate officials segregated 
European, Jewish, Arab, Berber, and elite Arab and Berber Moroccan communities 
into different colonial schools, and socioeconomic opportunity was determined by 
access to these institutions.  Thus, this investigation identifies which social group had 
optimal access to this language, which group was most able to assimilate French, and 
which speech community was able to profit most from its acquisition and distinction 
during the protectorate, 1912–1956.   
French as a dominant language in Morocco was assured by the linking of the 
job market with the French instruction disseminated at the best colonial schools.  
Acquisition of the French language among a minority through selective enrollment at 
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the schools for European, Jewish, and elite Moroccan communities granted certain 
higher educational, economic, and administrative privileges within the colonial 
administration and workforce.  French schools simultaneously recruited highly 
deserving students from less privileged groups by rewarding them with entry to the 
competitive schools in an effort to induce cooperation among other segments of the 
Moroccan population.  Only those educated in the dominant language at these best 
French schools were able to become part of the future Francophone elite.  In contrast, 
the schools created for the majority of Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans from 
lower socioeconomic backgrounds presented only rudimentary linguistic skills, 
limiting opportunities to find suitable employment so that they did not seek jobs 
outside of their social milieu.  By restricting who was able to attend the schools with 
the highest degree of French instruction, French colonial schools reinstated, or 
reproduced, privilege among the already privileged, as predicted by the principles of 
Bourdieu’s (1991/2001) language market theory.   
 
1.2 French Dominance After the Protectorate in Morocco 
As the statistics from 2007 demonstrated, French continued to rise in 
significance in Morocco after independence among Muslim Moroccans.  
Explanations for this are generally seen as pragmatic, largely due to a greater increase 
in access to schools that still employed French teachers and pedagogical materials and 
the need to fill modernizing posts, which continued to require French.  French had to 
be maintained for decades after independence while a new generation was also 
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educated in MSA, the language of education in Morocco after the 1960 creation of 
the Bureau of Coordination of Arabisation (Ennaji, 2005).  Yet, after introducing 
MSA into the school system at the earliest levels of primary education, French was 
still required the further one pursued studies, producing a generation of French-
speaking professionals minimally educated in MSA. 
French had to be maintained alongside Arabic as a medium of instruction … 
[and] bilingualism would be necessary for some time in the interests of 
modernization, economic development and generalization of education.  … 
As for higher education, French would remain indispensable. (Bentahila, 
1983, p. 12)   
After Morocco gained independence, French remained necessary for those seeking to 
advance professionally, especially in the most lucrative administrative or commercial 
positions, jobs vacated by French-speaking Europeans.  As late as 1968, Gallagher 
noted, 
The non-French speaking candidate has no chance of getting a good 
government job or advancing himself in … Foreign Affairs, Commerce and 
Industry, Planning, Public Health, Defense, and Agriculture, … offices 
dealing with production and technical matters … [and] important commercial 
or industrial enterprises in private business. (p. 143)  
 French remained the language of administration and economy after 1956 and 
even achieved greater widespread acceptance and prestige than had been the case 
during the protectorate. 
[After 1956] with the increasing number of native Moroccans employed in 
government bureaucracies, and in clerical and other white-collar jobs, there 
was a great demand for persons with knowledge of French.  … French 
achieved far greater currency in post-colonial Morocco than it had in the 
colonial period itself, even though the native French population declined.  … 
The French language gradually lost some of its stigma as a language of 
colonial oppression and became an avenue for socioeconomic advancement 
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… [as well as] an important language among the new Moroccan middle class. 
(Heath, 1989, pp. 12–13) 
As French came to index education, economic success, and social status, it 
also became the esteemed prestigious language, in contrast to the vernacular 
languages, receiving some of the highest forms of social capital as a language of the 
elite in Morocco.  Even after Moroccan independence, those who spoke French 
belonged to the urban elite and advanced to the most privileged careers in the public 
services and as teachers and scientists (Boukous, 1996).  French became highly 
venerated by most Moroccans as an indispensable language of culture, civilization, 
education, and access to employment, even among those who were unable to speak it.  
In this way, French became a preferred language in terms of internalized affect or 
motivation after independence.   
Moroccan students in a study by Bentahila (1983) often reported that their 
motivation to learn French was due to their desire to access modernity and the West 
because of its association with higher social status and economic opportunity.1  Some 
high-level civil servants stated that they preferred French because, as the language of 
modernity and science, it “contributes to the development of Morocco” (Ennaji, 2005, 
p. 194).  At the same time, young, educated Moroccan women preferred French 
because it symbolized for them “modernity and liberation” (Ennaji, 2005, p. 194).  
For most Moroccans, French represented modernity, the West, and improved social 
conditions, and by speaking it, individuals demonstrated a positive association with 
                                                 
1 Bentahila (1983) asked Moroccan subjects, “What language do you find the most modern/the most 
useful for studies?” (p. 33).  French was the response 70% of the time as the most modern language 
and 71% as the most useful language for studies.  
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this language as well as their own personal aspirations to improve their social status. 
Ennaji (2005) documented,  
For most Moroccans, French is synonymous with the Western way of life and 
modernity.  In fact, as a language of universal culture, modernity and 
upper/middle class, French continues to attract the attention and interest of 
most Moroccans.  In addition, French allows those who do not belong to a 
socio-economically rich class to value themselves socially; it can be used to 
affirm one’s socio-cultural status and impress one’s interlocutors.  … On the 
whole, the majority of recent studies in the field … confirm the positive 
attitude generally held by people and officials toward French. (pp. 193–194) 
At the same time that French became increasingly important in Morocco, CA 
and MSA also had gained greater currency after independence, because of their 
association with religion, traditional disciplines, and notions of national identity and 
the national independence movement.  However, because neither CA nor MSA was 
unable to guarantee economic opportunities for its speakers, CA and MSA were 
granted very different kinds of social or cultural prestige and could not easily displace 
the prestige and influence of French.  Although CA and MSA became the official 
languages of the country after independence, French remained the language of 
socioeconomic opportunity in business, government, economics, diplomacy, and in 
many sectors of higher education.  Besides evaluating the different types of access to 
the French language that were intended for the diverse European, Berber, Jewish, and 
Arab communities through the various educational institutions created by the French 
government, I will explain how French, CA, and MSA became dominant languages in 
Morocco but for different reasons, French as an economic language and both CA and 
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MSA as culturally symbolic ones.  I also will analyze how Bourdieu’s linguistic 
market theory fails to predict how these languages became dominant in Morocco. 
 
1.3 Outline of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 reviews the pertinent sociolinguistic research that enables an 
understanding of multilingualism in Morocco.  I outline the multilingual communities 
of Morocco, as discussed in the French archives as Jewish, European, Muslim, and 
Berber, and the difficulties of defining these communities as diglossic.  I present the 
theoretical framework developed by Bourdieu to show how language as social 
practice was indoctrinated inequitably by the school system among different linguistic 
communities.  I include definitions of applicable terms used by Bourdieu; the role 
schools play in determining legitimate language; and how schools then reproduce 
legitimate language as economic, cultural, and symbolic capital.  This section also 
includes a brief history of the research on language in Morocco from the beginning of 
the protectorate into independence.  Finally, I present an overview of various 
competing discourses to influence the development of the colonial school system, 
including the Arabization policy, and the most important prior research from 
sociological, historical, political, and ethnographic disciplines regarding education, 
languages, and the diverse communities of Morocco. 
Chapter 3 discusses the real and imagined social, ethnic, and religious 
divisions in Morocco that influenced colonial policy.  I begin with historical evidence 
preceding the arrival of the French in Morocco and how different kinds of beliefs 
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about Moroccan communities laid the groundwork for colonial divisions in Morocco 
on the basis of religious differences.  Next, I examine the legacy of previous colonial 
ideologies regarding Berbers that originated in Algeria and how these beliefs led to 
real-world, institutionalized differences in protectorate Morocco.  Moroccan Berbers 
were considered by the French to be similar to the Algerian Kabyles and a chosen 
people who would be the most receptive and deserving of French civilization, adding 
an additional layer to the already ideologically segregated society based on religious 
divisions.  As a result, differences between Moroccan communities became 
institutionalized in terms of differences in legal status under colonial policy.   
Therefore, Chapter 3 outlines the specific historical, social, and regional factors that 
contributed to ideologies about divisions between Moroccan communities and how 
the segregation of those speech communities became institutionalized under the 
divide-and-rule strategy. 
Chapter 4 presents the different scholastic systems created for the various 
imagined communities—schools for Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers—and how 
such differences led to socioeconomic disparity and differential access to elite 
opportunities.  This chapter begins the discussion on divisions in the colonial 
education system with the review of the mission civilisatrice, the idea that the French 
were obligated to “civilize” segments of the population.  Then, I discuss how the 
disparate colonial educational system created inequity in the qualifications of the 
workforce and how the instruction of the French language became acceptable and 
sought by all within Moroccan society, even if at different rates, thus examining the 
 
10 
relationship between successful French language education and economic potential in 
the colonial workforce. 
After demonstrating how economic capital was assured through French 
education, in Chapter 5 I investigate how some communities who lacked French 
education and dominant cultural knowledge, the dispossessed, were distanced from 
this knowledge.  This section also demonstrates how the colonial educational system 
reproduced these communities’ nonparticipation within colonial society.  Then, I 
examine how some Arab and Berber communities chose to resist French education 
and whether this resistance was merely a form of solidarity, as predicted by 
Bourdieu’s theory, or the beginning of a new form of symbolic domination coinciding 
with the emerging nationalist movement.  This section illustrates how the economic 
and educational divisions separating Moroccan Arabs and Berbers from Europeans, 
Jews, and elite Arabs and Berbers led to the expansion of symbolic capital for Arabic 
speakers alongside the continuation of economic capital for French speakers and how 
both languages were able to coexist for different markets.   
Although the French protectorate lasted less than half a century, the 
installation of French institutions and the French language had long-lasting 
repercussions on the Moroccan patrimony.  The French colonizer from 1912–1956 
brought not only the French language to Morocco but also a colonial administration 
that reinforced divisions between various indigenous social groups.  With the 
incorporation of a French regime came the implementation of a military and judicial 
bureaucracy; expansion of economic, administrative, and industrial endeavors; as 
 
11 
well as educational institutions that reinforced social divisions while simultaneously 
creating newer kinds of divisions.  These educational institutions were designed to 
reproduce public servants for the new French government to fill these crucial 
administrative posts.  In so doing, access to the best French education was reserved 
for those deemed most capable of serving the French regime.  Restricted access to 
these institutions developed by the French authorities, and thus restricted access to the 
French language, accelerated social differentiation between speech communities in 
terms of social, and later linguistic, hierarchies.  This restricted access at one level of 
institutionalization then granted entry into other institutions of higher education and 
resulted in selective administrative and economic privileges where competence in 




CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND MULTILINGUAL 
MOROCCO 
 
Chapter 1 explained how French remained a dominant language in Morocco 
after independence from France and that French language education was associated 
with greater socioeconomic opportunity.  This chapter presents information about 
which languages coexisted in colonial Morocco before the arrival of French and 
examines the relationships between these languages.  I evaluate each of the linguistic 
communities in colonial Morocco in terms of two different definitions of diglossia, 
that of Ferguson and the other of Fishman.  Second, I present Bourdieu’s theory on 
the linguistic market, outlining the role of institutions in spreading French, the 
dominant language in protectorate Morocco.  This theory demonstrates how schools 
foster social division and socioeconomic disparity through mastery of the dominant 
language.  I define the relevant concepts for this theory and show how educational 
institutions, socioeconomic opportunity, and the spread of French as dominant 
language became linked in Morocco and, alternatively, how symbolic violence 
resulted when individuals did not acquire this dominant language.  To complement 
Bourdieu’s theory on the linguistic market and social reproduction, I review the 
notion of resistance and agency as explored by Willis (1977), Scott (1990), and Reed-
Danahay (1996) and argue that domination, in this case linguistic domination, can be 
mitigated by community- or individual-level resistance.  Finally, I briefly summarize 
the previous research on education and French in protectorate Morocco and 
 
13 
summarize the ideologies of both the colonial officials and nationalists who proposed 
alternate constructions of nationhood through the symbolic representation of language 
and identity. 
 
2.1 Multilingualism and Diglossia in Morocco 
Before the French protectorate, Morocco was home to many diverse speech 
communities.  At least three geographically distinct Berber-speaking languages were 
distinguishable from each other: Tarafit was spoken in the northern zones in the Rif 
mountains, Tamazight in the central Atlas Mountains, and Tachelhit in the southern 
zones.  These communities shared a common social and linguistic history but 
diverged linguistically over the course of several centuries due to geographical 
isolation.  Abassi (1977) confirmed that Berbers were the indigenous population of 
Morocco and that Arab conquests in the seventh century “pushed the native 
populations out of the plains of the Gharb, the Sais, the Chaouia, the Doukkala, and 
the Abda, into the Rif and the Atlas mountains” (p. 13).  These first Arab inhabitants 
in Morocco were from stock that was historically largely sedentary and urban, 
whereas subsequent arrivals were increasingly nomadic Bedouins who were similar in 
many cultural respects to Berber communities.  Though very little is known about 
these early inhabitants of Morocco, the presence of Jewish communities before the 
arrival of Arab populations has been documented by some (Schroeter, 1997, 2003).  
Later, a third arrival of Andalusian Arabic-speaking Muslims and Jews came to 
Morocco from Spain in the late 15th century.  Whereas the Arab conquest brought 
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Arabic and Islam to Morocco, the later arrivals brought the Spanish language, 
Andalusian culture, as well as other Judaic populations.  Though the first Arab 
invasion forced Berbers into geographic isolation, the second facilitated assimilation 
and, as a result, some Berbers came to adopt Islam and the Arabic language (Abassi, 
1977, p. 16).  Bentahila (1983) observed that acquisition of Arabic by Moroccans and 
their conversion to Islam differed according to geographic and historical 
circumstances:  “In the mountains, the only contact between [Arabs and Berbers] was 
that made by the Muslim Arab missionaries, who converted most of the Berbers” 
through CA texts of the Qur’an (p. 2).  Berbers in other regions became bilingual in 
the local variety of Berber and colloquial Arabic after commercial interaction with 
Arabic-speaking Moroccans because they were “obliged to learn Arabic in order to 
trade” (Bentahila, 1983, p. 2).   
However, Islamization did not necessarily entail Arabization, the acquisition 
of either the dialect or the CA variety, since many Berbers maintained their native 
language and some did not acquire Arabic at all.  Pennell (2003) acknowledged that 
Arabization proceeded at a slower pace than did Islamization and that neither 
Arabization nor Islamization was complete among Berber communities.  Heterodoxy, 
in the form of “a Berber rather than an Arab expression of Islam” (Pennell, 2003, p. 
30), was not uncommon, in the same way that Judaism was maintained among some 
Berber communities.  By the beginning of the protectorate in 1912, Berber speakers 
comprised 40–60% of all Moroccans, half of whom were bilingual in colloquial 
Arabic and half of whom were monolingual Berber speakers.  Figure 1 demonstrates 
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the geographic distribution of both monolingual and bilingual Arabic and Berber 
speakers in early protectorate Morocco.   
 
Figure 1. Map representing the distribution of Arabic, Berber, and bilingual Berber-
Arabic speakers in early 20th-century Morocco. Source: The Berbers: Their Social 
and Political Organization, by R. Montagne, 1973, London, England: Frank Cass.  
Before the arrival of the French, a relatively peaceful linguistic cohabitation 
had existed over a period of several centuries between Berber-speaking and Arabic-
speaking communities, despite the fact that the legitimated language of the power 
source, the Makhzen, and Islam, the dominant religion, was CA or fuSHa.  CA was 
the written language of the Qur’an and taught in traditional schools through 
memorization of scripture.  Few ever acquired this language because few Moroccans 
spent more than a couple of years at schools that taught it.  Because of the association 
with learnedness and Islam as “a sacred language used by God to give his message to 
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the Prophet,” CA was considered “so much superior to [colloquial] Moroccan Arabic 
that some Moroccans claim that not to know Classical Arabic is not to know Arabic 
at all” (Bentahila, 1983, p. 5).  In fact, the association of CA with Islam ensured the 
supremacy of CA among all communities.  In 1912, very few Moroccans were able to 
speak or write CA, and most were only able to recite a few, select, memorized 
phrases from the Qur’an.  Yet, by 1956, more Moroccans were able to do so, because 
renovated traditional schools and free schools had reintroduced this language into the 
curriculum along with modern subjects.  After independence in 1956, CA and MSA, 
the unified and modernized standard variety based on CA that was intended to 
facilitate communication between Moroccan’s Arab-speaking neighbors, were 
instituted as official languages of the country.  Today, CA and MSA are considered 
by most speakers to be essentially the same language. 
Since the time of the protectorate, MA has been the colloquial form of Arabic 
spoken, or unwritten, language in Morocco used by the majority of Moroccans, that 
is, the Arabic-speaking Moroccans.  It derived from the language of the different 
Arab groups who settled Morocco, non-Bedouin, Bedouin, and Andalusian (Ennaji, 
2005).  Though MA had differing urban and rural varieties, it was the language that 
enabled greater communication between most members of different speech 
communities.  It was a native language for a majority of Moroccans but became a 
second language to many Berber-speaking Moroccans by the end of the protectorate.  
Only about half of all Berber speakers spoke MA as a second language by 1956.  
However, most Moroccan Jews, who before 1912 spoke Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Spanish 
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(also referred to as Ladino or Hahitia), or any of the Berber varieties as maternal 
languages, acquired MA before acquiring other foreign languages like French or 
Spanish. 
At the beginning of the protectorate, as many as 110,000 Jewish Moroccans 
lived throughout northern and southern Morocco, and by 1952, they numbered 
240,000, or 210,000 in the French zone alone, in contrast to the only 30,000 Jews 
inhabiting the much smaller Spanish zone located in the north of Morocco.  Jews 
throughout Morocco spoke one of the Berber varieties, Judeo-Arabic, or Judeo-
Spanish as their native language.  Judeo-Arabic derived from Arabic and Hebrew 
(Chouraqui, 1952), whereas Judeo-Spanish derived from Hebrew, Arabic, and 
Spanish and was the vernacular originating with Castilian-speaking Jews, who were 
later expelled from Spain.  These languages were used to communicate among other 
Jews within their communities and in semireligious services, whereas Hebrew was 
maintained for religious matters and as the language of instruction in the Jewish 
traditional schools.  However, the use of Hebrew as a language of education 
progressively declined after 1862 with the arrival of the French-speaking Alliance 
Israélite Universelle (AIU) schools.  At the same time that Jews used MA to 
communicate with Arab Moroccans, the Judeo-Arabic and Judeo-Spanish vernaculars 
purposefully marked Jews as distinct from Arabic-speaking communities.  “The 
adoption of their own vernacular was a deliberate self-segregation” (Laskier, 1983, p. 
13).  By 1939, the use of Judeo-Arabic and Judeo-Spanish had declined, as did the 
use of MA, because French had become more prevalent among Jewish Moroccans. 
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When the French arrived in Morocco in the late 19th century, MA was the 
lingua franca.  Moroccans, therefore, spoke MA, Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish, or 
one of three varieties of Berber as their native language2 before the arrival of French 
in Morocco.  None of the languages in Morocco was homogeneous, and each variety 
was used for different social functions.  MA heard on the streets varied in form and 
function from CA utilized in the mosque.  CA, the language of the Qur’an not widely 
understood by Moroccans, remained the legitimate language of religion and power by 
its association with the legitimacy of the monarchy and Makhzen, the governing elite.  
However, it was spoken or written only by highly educated Islamic scholars.  By 
contrast, MA was used in daily informal interaction.  Berber varieties, predominately 
unwritten, differed according to region in the same way that Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-
Spanish languages differentiated Jews based on origin.  Therefore, MA was the lingua 
franca of most speech communities in Morocco and the native language to most 
Moroccans, whereas Berber, Judeo-Arabic, or Judeo-Spanish were native languages 
with restricted use.   
After 1912, French became an important language associated with European 
privilege and power in Morocco.  French institutions replaced many formerly Arabic-
speaking ones as the French implemented French-language schools, modern industry 
with newer kinds of economic opportunities for French-speakers, and new political 
and judicial reforms.  These changes quickly led to the decline of former, local 
                                                 
2I use the term native language synonymously with the terms maternal language and first language, 
though I acknowledge the differences that Davis and Bentahila (1988) examined in their article, “On 
Mother and Other Tongues.”  
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political allegiances.  French soon dominated political, economic, and social life in 
French Morocco, more so than other European languages, due to French schools and 
economic migration of local populations into the cities.  By the 1930s, numerous 
Berber speakers had increasingly become bilingual in MA and a few were bilingual in 
French, due to both increased contacts with Arabophones or Francophones in rural 
French-Berber schools and economic migration to the urban zones in the 1920s.  
Among Jewish communities, Judeo-Spanish, Judeo-Arabic, and MA were receding in 
favor of French, since nearly all urban and a number of rural Moroccan Jewish youth 
had been successfully educated in French at the AIU.  Lastly, for those who were able 
to master it, French offered better access to education, social privilege, and the world 
outside Morocco.  French became a language of importance in education, industry, 
finance, technology, commerce, and access to modernity.  The use of MA, like Berber 
and Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish, was restricted to employment in customary 
craftsmanship and agriculture, in addition to communicating with other Moroccans.  
CA remained important in the traditional scholarly disciplines of jurisprudence, 
religion, and Qur’anic education.  Though each of these languages existed within 
many of the same communities, each maintained different social functions in 
protectorate Morocco.   
The multilingual situation in Morocco has been characterized differently 
based on two different definitions of diglossia, the original version conceived by 
Ferguson (1959) and the revised version by Fishman (1967).  Speakers of Arabic 
understand the relationship between MA and CA varieties in Morocco in the sense of 
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Ferguson’s definition, whereas others in Morocco have labeled the multilingual 
context in Morocco diglossic because of the additional presence of French.  In 1959, 
Ferguson first defined diglossia as a relatively stable coexistence of two genetically 
related languages with very different social functions within a single speech 
community.  According to this definition, a diglossic situation contains high and low 
varieties of a single language (e.g., French, German, or Greek) within a community. 
Diglossia is a relatively stable language situation in which… there is a very 
divergent, highly codified, superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and 
respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another 
speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used 
for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of 
the community for ordinary conversation. (Ferguson, 1959, p. 336) 
Ferguson (1959) demonstrated these properties of language coexistence based 
on the examples of Romance and Latin, French and Haitian Creole, Swiss and high 
German, Classical and Modern Greek, and Classical and Arabic dialects.  Ferguson 
identified nine distinguishing traits of diglossia:  
1. Each variety must maintain clearly defined social function.  
2. One variety has high and the other low social prestige.  
3. The high variety is associated with a strong literary heritage but not so with 
the low variety.  
4. There are no native speakers of the high variety.  
5. The high variety is standardized and codified, whereas the low variety is 
distinguished by great variation.  
6. Both varieties have been in contact over a long and stable coexistence.  
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7. The grammar of the high variety is more complex than that of the low 
variety.  
8. Though they share a great deal of similar lexical items, each variety 
maintains separate lexical items for many similar notions.  
9. Similarly, although each shares a similar phonological system, the high 
variety maintains phonological features that are not present in the low 
variety.   
According to Ferguson’s (1959) definition, the different forms of Arabic used 
in Morocco at the time of the protectorate are considered to be in a diglossic 
relationship because CA was used for specific social functions, was granted more 
overt social prestige, and had a literary heritage in contrast to MA.  MA was acquired 
at home before CA, was not standardized, and was less complex grammatically and 
phonologically.  Complexity, in this case, refers to the number of grammatical 
elements that are present in CA that are not present in MA.  For example, CA has a 
larger inventory of personal pronouns, phonemes, and morphological verb markers 
than MA.  Lexically, CA offers many more terms or phrases to designate items than 
MA, which borrows many terms from Berber, French, or other languages.  Lexically, 
CA did not come to express matters of daily life that MA, the native language, was 
able to do.  The distinct uses of CA and MA for separate social functions were 
maintained over a period of several centuries.   
Expanding Ferguson’s definition of diglossia, Fishman’s (1967) distinction 
between diglossia and bilingualism applied the notion of bilingual speech 
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communities.  Fishman posited that diglossia should include almost any scenario in 
which more than one language coexists.  Fishman’s (1999) definition stated that 
diglossia is “a long-term and widespread complementary distribution of functions 
between the languages of a speech-and-writing community” (p. 156).  This definition 
differs considerably from that of Ferguson (1959) in that it accepts any linguistic 
situation where at least two languages coexist within the same community.  In other 
words, Fishman’s definition emphasized the set of functional boundaries between 
language varieties identifiable by community members, regardless of the historical 
linguistic relationships between the two varieties or the lack thereof.  For Fishman, as 
long as complementarity of linguistic function exists, any genetically unrelated 
languages within a speech community can lead to diglossia, since it merely 
emphasizes the social functions that created such linguistic differentiation.  Fishman’s 
definition relies on factors of social function of language within a speech community 
and a continuum of individual linguistic behaviors against widespread institutional 
ones.  Fishman broadened the definition of what constitutes a language so that 
different registers of the same language could be included in the notion of diglossia.  
Therefore, this definition obscured the relationship between languages in Morocco 
since, according to Fishman, any of the languages present in Morocco would be 
considered in a diglossic relationship: CA and MA; any of the Berber languages and 
MA or CA; either Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish and Berber languages; Judeo-
Arabic or Judeo-Spanish and MA or CA; French and MA or CA; and any 
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differentiation between registers of these same languages and even Spanish and 
French.   
The import of Fishman’s (1967, 1999) definition for this dissertation is not the 
notion of broad diglossia per se but the intersection of bilingualism and diglossia, the 
idea that bilingualism could be analyzed at both the level of the community and the 
individual.  In other words, diglossia is conceived of in terms of the entire speech 
community, whereas bilingualism may be viewed as an individual’s ability to speak 
more than one language.  Fishman (1967) described a two-by-two matrix examining 
the possible combinations of bilingualism and diglossia, as demonstrated in Figure 2.   
The first scenario Fishman (1967) described is one in which both widespread 
diglossia and bilingualism are present, as in the case of highly literate, postcolonial 
societies like Paraguay, where nearly all speech-community members speak both 
Spanish, the high variety, and Guaraní, the low variety, two genetically unrelated 
languages.  Stable diglossia presupposes “the existence of a fairly large and complex 
speech community in which the members have available to them both a range of 
compartmentalized roles as well as ready access to those roles” (Fishman, 1967, p. 
32).  As long as these roles remain separated, Fishman (1967) argued, diglossia and 
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Figure 2. Representation of Fishman’s bilingualism and diglossia diagram.  
Based on “Bilingualism With and Without Diglossia; Diglossia With and  
Without Bilingualism,” by J. Fishman, 1967, Journal of Social Issues, 32(2),  
p. 30. 
 
Another scenario is one in which diglossia is present but with few bilinguals, 
such as in Tsarist Russia, where the nobles spoke French and Russian while the 
majority only spoke Russian (Calvet, 2005).  “Since the majority … never interacted 
with one another they did not form a single speech community.  … Thus, the 
existence of national diglossia does not imply widespread bilingualism” (Fishman, 
1967, pp. 33–34).   
An alternative to this scenario is one in which large-scale bilingualism exists 
without widespread diglossia, as in the case where bilinguals replaced German with 
French in a previously German-speaking area of Belgium (Calvet, 2005).  Fishman 
(1967) claimed that bilingualism without diglossia was characteristic of “rapid and 
massive industrialization and urbanization [where] members of the speech 
community providing productive manpower rapidly abandoned their traditional socio-
cultural patterns and learned … the language of the means of production” (p. 35). 
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Finally, communities may be neither diglossic nor bilingual, or monolingual.  
These hypothesized or mythical communities are limited to 
only very small, isolated, and undifferentiated speech communities.  … Such 
factors as exogamy, warfare, expansion of the population, economic growth, 
and contact with others all lead to internal diversification and, consequently, 
to repertoire diversification.  Such diversification is the beginning of 
bilingualism.  Its societal normification is the hallmark of diglossia. (Fishman, 
1967, p. 36) 
Although the definitions of diglossia by Fishman (1967) and Ferguson (1959) both 
identify the maintenance of MA and CA in Morocco as diglossic, the import from 
Fishman’s definition to this work is his reference to how individual linguistic abilities 
are distinct from the linguistic behaviors of the community and how individual 
bilingualism arises from or impacts societal diglossia.   
In this research, the term diglossia refers to the distinction between CA and 
MA according to the definition by Ferguson (1959).  Meanwhile, bilingualism refers 
to the acquisition of more than one linguistic variety by an individual.  Thus, in the 
context of protectorate Morocco, bilingualism refers to the acquisition of French, 
Berber, CA, or any other language by MA speakers; the acquisition of CA, MA, 
French, or any other language by Berber speakers; and the acquisition of French, 
Berber, CA, MA, or any other language by Jewish communities not speaking MA or 
Berber as a native language.  With this distinction between diglossia and 
bilingualism, I now examine why I have chosen to explore language spread in 
Morocco according to Bourdieu’s theory on the linguistic market. 
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2.2 Applying Bourdieu’s Theory to Language Spread in Protectorate Morocco  
Like the importance of widespread social norms in perpetuating diglossia, the 
role of institutions in society is primordial to language change or language 
maintenance in society.  As a theoretical explanation for how the French language 
spread in Morocco, I will adopt the framework developed by Pierre Bourdieu, who 
argued that legitimated language, like other forms of cultural knowledge, is an 
embodied cultural practice inculcated through social institutions where the culture of 
the dominant class is reproduced.  Schools, he claimed, are the sites of language 
inculcation par excellence.  The installation of metropolitan French schools in 
Morocco, which provided the largest exposure for Moroccans to the French language 
beyond any political measures the colonial authorities enacted, fostered the use of the 
French language throughout Morocco in unprecedented ways.  Bourdieu’s 
(1991/2001) work described how the highly standardized French education system 
acted as a gatekeeper to opportunity in France, and the educational system developed 
for Morocco was based on the same French model.  Therefore, an understanding of 
Bourdieu’s theory of how schools disseminate dominant cultural knowledge is crucial 
to uncovering how the French language similarly spread throughout Morocco.   
Second, Bourdieu conducted much ethnographic and sociological research in 
Kabyle Berber Algeria in the 1960s, and his sociological experience among colonial 
North African cultures offers familiarity and applicability to like ethnological 
communities and colonial contexts.  Apart from his early works, which documented 
Algerian social history, some of his other contributions to Algerian ethnography 
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investigated the resettlement of Berber communities from war-torn communities.  
Bourdieu and Sayad (1964) argued that from the moment the French arrived in 
Algeria, all Algerians had endured an unprecedented rupture of historical, social, 
economic, and cultural practices, a notion that laid the groundwork for future work in 
his social reproduction theory.  Such an emphasis on rupture, clash of civilizations3, 
and social divisions is characteristic of former colonial societies more generally.  In 
this way, Morocco, shares many similarities with Algeria and offers an interesting 
case study on the applicability of Bourdieu’s theory to non-Westernized societies. 
Lastly, Bourdieu proposed that education acts as both a liberator for a few and 
a machine of constraint for the majority in his theories on social reproduction and 
linguistic markets.  Earlier in his career, he had endorsed the idea that education in 
Algeria and similar communities has the potential to liberate (Bourdieu & Sayad, 
1964).  In 1964, he suggested that education was a possible source of optimism and 
access to new kinds of opportunity after more than a century of colonial domination.  
Reed-Danahay (2005) noted in her review of Bourdieu’s work, 
In … reference to schooling, Bourdieu [along with coauthor Sayad] used an 
almost utopian-sounding tone in order to stress the important role of education 
in the future of Algeria.  … It seems clear … that Bourdieu was proposing a 
system of education in Algeria that, if developed from the start in order to 
avoid the ways it operated in France, could be a liberating and empowering 
institution rather than a hegemonic force working to reproduce the power of 
the dominance. (pp. 67–68) 
                                                 
3 The term clash of civilizations was translated by Silverstein and Goodman (2009) from choc des 
civilizations (p. 14) and does not, they argued, refer to Samuel Huntington’s use of the term. 
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 Bourdieu viewed civilizations like Kabylia, “pre-industrial, ‘traditional’ 
peasant society” (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 71), very differently than modern societies 
like France.  He proposed that nonoppressive educational institutions in cases like 
Algeria should not “arbitrarily propose demands” like the one in France but should 
instead calibrate “to the aptitudes and desires of those it seeks to nurture and 
transform” (Bourdieu & Sayad, as cited in Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 67).  Yet, inherent 
in the formulation of all educational policy is the relationship of educational 
institutions to political institutions that reinforce their power and dominance through 
mandating educational objectives.  A decade after his collaboration with Sayad, 
Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1977/2000) social reproduction theory stressed the 
hegemonic and structuring nature of the educational institution, where individuals 
must conform to the dominant culture, with the highest price being paid by the 
subjugated groups.  Individuals from these dominated groups must alienate 
themselves from their roots in order to advance educationally, economically, and 
socially.  With opposing views of the role of educational institutions in two very 
different contexts, Bourdieu’s perspective remains unclear as to why education 
functions as a force of constraint in one situation but as a liberator in another.  Such 
conflicting views of educational systems as either a machine of constraint or a force 




2.3 Language in Bourdieu’s Theories  
Pierre Bourdieu’s work in sociology emphasized the central influence of 
educational institutions in developing cultural uniformity and how these institutions 
also reproduce marginalization of difference within society.  In Reproduction in 
Education, Society, and Culture, Bourdieu and Passeron (1977/2000) argued that the 
role of schools is to reproduce the culture of the dominant class and that those who do 
not acquire this cultural knowledge are subjected to symbolic violence.  Then, in 
Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu (1991/2001) contended that language, as 
the resource through which all other academic subjects are taught, is the instrument 
by which social institutions reinforce dominance in everyday occurrences.  As a result 
of long-term inculcation of dominant culture through linguistic exchanges in 
educational settings, language comes to reveal evidence of situated social encounters 
between interlocutors. 
Everyday linguistic exchanges [are] situated encounters between agents 
endowed with socially structured resources and competencies, in such a way 
that every linguistic interaction, however personal and insignificant it may 
seem, bears the traces of the social structure that it both expresses and helps to 
reproduce. (Thompson, 2001, p. 2) 
Language becomes embedded with cultural knowledge of hierarchical social structure 
in such a way that speakers within a community intuitively know or think they know 
correct, preferred, or socially appropriate language in contrast to inappropriate 




The highest levels of socially appropriate language are taught only in 
educational institutions, which are also instruments of the dominant political 
authority.  This power structure reproduces and legitimizes domination through the 
manipulation of curricula and its system of rewards, (i.e., evaluations, promotions, 
scholarships, and graduations), while distancing from power and privilege those 
without this knowledge.  Every linguistic token distributed through educational 
institutions and subsequently legitimized through attaining different kinds of 
economic viability within the labor market can be viewed as evidence of the unequal 
distribution of power and privilege in society.  Since mastery of this standard 
language indexes educational and economic opportunity, graduates of the highest 
level of educational institutions with great linguistic competency come to be viewed 
by others as possessing desirable social characteristics.  The internal dispositions, or 
habitus, through which the external characteristics originated “incline agents to act in 
… certain ways” and are acquired through repetitive practices that “reflect the social 
condition through which they were acquired” (Thompson, 2001, p. 12). 
 
2.3.1 Primary and Secondary Habitus  
The relationship among language, education, and power becomes linked 
through the repetition of everyday learned behaviors, and the differences between 
Bourdieu’s own childhood and adulthood trajectories illustrate how these behaviors 
become inculcated.  He was raised in the provincial town and farming community of 
Béarn, where the Béarnais dialect was spoken.  After having attended and then 
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succeeded in various institutions of higher education, such as the prestigious École 
normale supérieure in Paris, he was granted special privilege within academic circles 
and, thus, French society.  He became aware of the “dispossession” of his own 
cultural, provincial heritage and the distance between his urban academic pursuits and 
the rural existence of his family and friends.  He became acutely aware of how others 
from outside his community devalued his local language and culture in preference of 
the dominant language.  He also realized that the choice of one linguistic code over 
another within a particular context entailed much more than mere linguistic form, but 
also constraints and censorship.   
Whereas he once had been indoctrinated via the primary habitus, or the 
familial set of learned dispositions, practices, and behaviors, a secondary habitus 
encountered at school taught him how to talk, think, and argue “correctly” within 
institutional environments, where he was made to internalize the appropriate 
legitimate practice through a structured process of inculcation.  This successful 
inculcation of the secondary habitus in which he willingly participated separated him 
from his community, family, and friends while enabling him to achieve academically, 
professionally, and economically, ultimately as Chair of Sociology at the Collège de 
France.   
This rupture and dislocation from the past has been termed an “internal 
colonialism … that occurred in France as regional populations with their own 
languages and local particularisms were brought into the control and under the 
hegemony of the dominant French society and culture” (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 72).  
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Similarly, external colonialism with its own system of hegemonic institutions invokes 
among dominated peoples a comparable system of constraints and censorship through 
the imposed acquisition of the secondary habitus associated with the new, powerful 
regime.  This kind of rupture had considerable consequence among successful 
students, especially Arab and Berber students in colonial Morocco.  Once they were 
educated in modern French curricula, they were unable to return to their social origins 
without difficulty.  This was true for both the individual and the community.  For 
example, a French education altered traditional marriage customs in terms of 
postponing the age of marriage and consequently the selection of suitable spouses.  
Meanwhile, Moroccans without this learned habitus taught at the French schools, all 
those educated in the traditional disciplines or those who did not attend school, were 
incapable of assuming positions of authority and were unable to aspire to any real 
kinds of upward mobility or social progress.   
 
2.3.2 Dominant Language as Legitimate Language  
For Bourdieu, the secondary habitus is the result of a long-term process of 
institutionalization within the educational system that reinforces a process of 
legitimization of cultural knowledge belonging to the ruling bourgeois class.  Those 
of the socially and politically powerful class then reinforce their domination over time 
by reproducing this cultural knowledge as legitimate, desirable, and profitable.  One 
such example of this theory noted by Bourdieu (1991/2001) is the evolution of a 
single, standard French language arising from regional dialects.  In this case, the 
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Parisian dialect became the dominant and legitimate language by the 16th century, 
coinciding with the growing influence of the courts of Paris.  During this period of 
bilingualism4 in early France, the educational system accelerated the spread of the 
language of the court, the Parisian dialect, among the nobility and higher classes.  
With the rise of centralization and nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries came the 
expansion of a free but obligatory education in the late 19th century.  Once the 
curricula at these schools became standardized throughout the country, schools 
became the primary locus for distributing appropriate, dominant cultural knowledge.  
The teacher, instrumental in this process, “works to build the common consciousness 
of the nation” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 49).  While the teacher teaches the young students 
how to speak in acceptable ways, he or she, as both “maitre à parler” and “maitre à 
penser,” simultaneously teaches them how to think, “already inclining [the students] 
quite naturally to see and feel the things in the same way” (Bourdieu, 2001, pp. 48–
49) through the use of the acceptable, legitimate, and dominant language.  
  
2.3.3 The Role of the School and Legitimate Language  
The school becomes, then, one of the most important means to create 
unification within a specific market, under one curriculum, speaking a single 
                                                 
4 Bourdieu (1991/2001) termed this linguistic situation in France as bilingualism.  “A situation of 
bilingualism tended to arise.  Whereas the lower classes, particularly the peasantry, were limited to the 
local dialect, the aristocracy, the commercial and the business bourgeoisie and particularly the literate 
petite bourgeoisie had access much more frequently to the use of the official language, written or 
spoken, while at the same time possessing the dialect” (p. 47).  As demonstrated in my earlier 
discussion of bilingualism and diglossia in this chapter, this situation would be better characterized by 
the term diglossia by both definitions developed by Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967).  More 
specifically, Fishman would call this diglossia with limited bilingualism, at least until the expansion of 
the obligatory school system. 
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language already codified and standardized, thereby officialized, through various 
political and literary agencies.  The development of linguistic standardization and 
regulation throughout state institutions guarantees authoritative supremacy of that 
language.  The language, or “code, in the sense of cipher, that governs written 
language, which is identified with correct language, as opposed to the implicitly 
inferior conversational language, acquires the force of law in and through the 
educational system” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 49).   
Language and culture become inexplicably linked through the development 
and refinement of the educational system to the point where language and culture 
attainment index educational achievement.  Those who control these privileged 
linguistic resources remain the political, economic, or symbolic prestigious members 
of society, including teachers, as they are also among those who embody and profit 
most from this monopoly of cultural knowledge.  In fact, teachers are especially 
critical and ideologically vulnerable to the reproduction in this process, since 
often originating from the lower middle class or from teachers’ families, they 
are all the more attached to the charisma ideology which justifies arbitrary 
culture privilege, because it is only qua members of the intellectual class that 
they have some share in the privileges of the bourgeoisie. (Bourdieu, as cited 
in Reed Danahay, 2005, p. 48) 
The intellectuals, influential persons of the community, and more precisely, teachers, 
are responsible for reproducing dominant or legitimate knowledge because they profit 
the most from the acquisition of this cultural knowledge.  
      According to Bourdieu, power is maintained and reproduced by those who are 
most able to assert its utility, use it most accurately, and profit from such distinction 
 
35 
in the market as a result of the effectively standardized school system, which 
disseminates language policy.  The transition of French from what Bourdieu termed 
official to national language in France secured positions of authority for the 
prestigious members of society, teachers, highly educated individuals, and the 
nobility, through the manipulation of the linguistic resource. 
Promotion of the official language to the status of national language gave … 
[the local bourgeoisies of priests, doctors, or teachers] that de facto monopoly 
of politics, and more generally of communication with the central government 
and its representatives, that has defined local notables under all the French 
republics. (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 47) 
Distinguishing appropriate, official language from popular language via the most 
influential members of a community and disseminating this resource through 
educational success and economic potential ensured the survival of the elite, 
legitimized their power, and increased the value attributed to the dominant language.  
It is for this reason that French-trained educators and civil servants were among the 
highest compensated and the most influential members of Moroccan communities 
during the protectorate, surpassing even the influence of many among the 
traditionally educated locals.  
2.3.4 Legitimate Language as Capital 
Standardization of legitimate cultural knowledge through a single, obligatory 
language is most effective when the economic market becomes unified with the 
educational market.  This is effectively accomplished with the granting of degrees, 
thereby offering advanced opportunities within the hierarchical workforce so that “the 
school [comes] to be seen as a principal means of access to the labour market” 
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(Thompson, 2001, p. 6).  In this way, language and cultural knowledge, or cultural 
capital, distributed and reproduced through the educational system, becomes an 
economic resource, or economic capital, through increasing an individual’s economic 
potential in the job market.  This cultural capital offers to the few who master it 
symbolic value, or symbolic capital, as over time the possession of linguistic markers 
becomes a marker of success and prestige obtained through educational attainment 
and certified authorization of diplomas and degrees.   
The mastery of legitimate language is so important to acquiring symbolic, 
cultural, and economic capital that the negation of the dominant cultural capital 
through the use of linguistic variants is also granted symbolic prestige, as long as the 
speaker displays definitive mastery of the legitimate cultural capital.  For example, 
the mayor of Béarn who speaks in his native Béarnais dialect while also possessing 
competence in the official French language 
is praised as [speaking] “good quality Béarnais,” [yet] had it been uttered by a 
peasant who spoke mere fragments of French … [the same expressions] 
would have been accorded a quite different (and no doubt much lower) value. 
(Thompson, 2001, p. 19) 
This kind of “strategy of condescension” in which an educated person is able to 
choose among various linguistic codes results in achieving symbolic profit from 
“negating symbolically the objective relation of power between the two languages 
which co-exist in this market” (Thompson, 2001, p. 19).  Likewise, in colonial 
Morocco, those Moroccans who were able to author the manifesto for educational 
rights in highly polished French while also encouraging Moroccans in their native 
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language to denounce the French colonial government were later empowered as 
leaders of the nationalist movement.  While their mastery of MA increased their 
appeal among the masses, their mastery of French granted them the opportunity and 
authority to upset the colonial regime through resisting symbolic domination.   
 
2.3.5 Distinction, Misrecognition, and Symbolic Domination  
The official, dominant language often comes to symbolize a certain unity and 
sense of community, or “an illusion of linguistic communism” (Bourdieu, as cited in 
Thompson, 2001, p. 5), after it has been deemed the acceptable standard variety; 
however, it simultaneously disguises a façade behind which social exclusion is 
perpetuated among those unable to fully master it.  The near-universal existence of 
linguistic variance from the legitimate language among various members of a single 
speech community illustrates that language is not “uniformly distributed throughout a 
society” (Thompson, 2001, p. 18), while the perception of appropriate language and 
the belief in its legitimacy remain largely uniform.  The participation among 
interlocutors to perpetuate the value of the legitimate language and the devaluation of 
linguistic variants depends upon the “active complicity” (Thompson, 2001, p. 23) of 
all participants within a market, even though only a few may obtain advantage from 
it. 
For the forms of expression which receive the greatest value and secure the 
greatest profit are those which are the most unequally distributed, both in the 
sense that the conditions for the acquisition of the capacity to produce them 
are restricted and … that the expressions themselves are relatively rare on the 
markets where they appear. (Thompson, 2001, p. 18) 
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This profit of distinction was especially pronounced in protectorate Morocco, 
where the acquisition of French as the dominant language was quite rare, given the 
limited access for Arab and Berber Moroccan students to attend the highest levels of 
French schools.  This rare profit of distinction ensured that French education was 
among the most desirable options for many Moroccans.  The fact that students from 
all social groups increasingly sought a French education by the end of the protectorate 
reveals that students came to privilege French language education over traditional 
education, even if this meant that they would have to acquire French.  Furthermore, 
Moroccans went to great lengths to undergo the most competitive French exams, the 
baccalauréat advanced diplomas, even competing for the highly sought baccalauréat 
in philosophy.  Thus, by the end of the protectorate, Moroccans were becoming 
increasingly complicit (in the way Bourdieu, as cited in Thompson, 2001, employed 
the term) in prioritizing French education over traditional education.  However, this 
linguistic cooperation was far from uniform and was more prevalent among 
Europeans and Jews than Arabs or Berbers, for whom both CA and MSA were 
simultaneously gaining greater significance. 
The search for a profit of distinction stems from an imposed, inculcated notion 
that all members within a market have the same ideas and beliefs about legitimate 
language and linguistic unification.  However, the search for a profit of distinction 
results in symbolic domination, or symbolic violence “without consciousness or 
constraint” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 51) led by those who master that language at the 
expense of those who do not.  Those who are subjected to this violence do not 
 
39 
recognize it as such, since symbolic power is an invisible power based on shared 
belief (Bourdieu, as cited in Thompson, 2001).  Members of the speech community 
are compelled to accept this false ideology as valid and devalue their own linguistic 
production based on repeated social and historical experiences through the power of 
the institution.  In order to ensure the cooperation of even the most dispossessed of 
this cultural or linguistic knowledge, “it was necessary for the school system to be 
perceived as the principal (indeed, the only) means of access to administrative 
positions which were all the more attractive in areas where industrialization was least 
developed” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 49). 
The legal imposition of a language by itself without the presence of 
generalized institutions to ensure the diffusion of cultural and linguistic competence, 
such as the school system and economic field, would not be adequate because “legal 
or quasi-legal constraints … can at best impose the acquisition, but not the 
generalized use and therefore the autonomous reproduction, of the legitimate 
language” (Bourdieu, 2001, p. 50).  In lieu of imposing French as an official language 
of Morocco, the colonial school system created desirable economic opportunities for 
its graduates and attracted them to study at the best French schools.  Professional and 
economic success for Moroccans meant educational achievement at the best French-
speaking schools, making French the de facto official language in Morocco.  As a 
consequence, speakers of other local linguistic varieties, Berber or Arabic, endured 
symbolic domination at least until the last decade of the protectorate. 
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As colonial schools developed an educated French-speaking clientele and 
created profitable jobs for Francophones in Morocco, the Arabic and Berber 
languages were devalued and excluded from economic or social opportunity; 
however, the process of legitimizing French in Morocco was different from the 
scenario in which French became the legitimated language of France.  First, the 
Jewish and European communities were undergoing a language shift similar to the 
process described by Bourdieu, while the Arab and Berber communities were 
differently positioned.  In these communities, both Arabic and French became 
legitimate languages but came to represent different kinds of capital.  Morocco 
avoided complete French dominance because languages granting symbolic capital in 
Morocco did not necessarily coincide with those offering economic forms of capital.   
 
2.3.6 Beyond Bourdieu: Resistance 
Bourdieu’s theories on social reproduction and the linguistic market do not 
allow for a great deal of agency in the educational pursuits or linguistic production of 
individuals from the subordinate classes and fail to explain how individuals from 
these social groups are able to navigate under the determinism of powerful, structured 
institutions.  The majority of his work on schools as sites of domination examined the 
forces of the dominant classes and how those forces produced constraints by which 
members of the dominated classes were forced to comply. In her critique of Bourdieu, 
Reed-Danahay (1996) wrote, “In most of his writings on education, Bourdieu focuses 
on the educational strategies of the bourgeois families, rather than farmers or other 
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lower classes, as they use schools to reproduce and assure their own dominant 
position (p. 29).  Interestingly, Bourdieu’s theory focused on the educational and 
professional pursuits of the privileged but did not elaborate on the likely trajectories 
of the dominated, a social group with the most motivation to show resistance.  What 
is lacking from Bourdieu’s linguistic market and social reproduction theories is an 
understanding of how social groups and individuals choose different outcomes, 
negotiate domination, and participate in their own linguistic production and 
professional success or failure when confronted by symbolic violence in school.     
In contrast to Bourdieu’s overly deterministic theories on the reproductive 
nature of social institutions, many have argued that social agents from less privileged 
social groups are able to resist symbolic domination by many different means (Reed-
Danahay, 1996; Scott, 1990; Willis, 1977).  Since the ability to resist depends on 
social agents, groups or individuals, to recognize what is in store for them and oppose 
this “inevitability,” a certain amount of agency is also required in theories of 
resistance.  In the same way that the degree of symbolic violence can vary, resistance 
can take many forms.  In this dissertation, I define resistance as any attempt by 
subordinate groups or individuals to reject the cultural knowledge belonging to the 
dominant class as the dominant culture.  Reed-Danahay (1996) asserted that 
resistance can occur in several ways:   
Resistance and accommodation have several components, and … may operate 
along a continuum ranging from total compliance (tacit, overt, and passive), to 
total rebellion (tacit, overt, and active resistance).  Resistance may be overt, 
tact, and active or passive.  … Compliance, similarly, may take tacit, overt, 
active or passive forms. (p. 40) 
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As resistance can be characterized in many different ways, various researchers 
have approached the study of resistance differently.  Willis (1977) found in his 
research of working-class young males that identity differences such as gender and 
social class impacted how groups of young men at secondary schools in England 
rejected educational pursuits and resisted social-class mobility.  These young men 
formed a subgroup whose group ideology was contrary to the dominant one 
encountered at school.  This ideology, which privileged social-class bonds at the 
expense of acquiring dominant culture taught at school, led these boys to reject school 
and accept working-class jobs.  As a result, Willis concluded that individuals are 
active participants in determining their destiny and are not passively indoctrinated to 
succeed or fail as predicted in Bourdieu’s social reproduction theory.  “In different 
ways, all social agents have a hand collectively in constructing their own destiny, 
doing so in a way which is not simply determined from outside and which often 
enjoys the labyrinthine complexity of a ‘cultural form’” (Willis, 1977, p. 207).  
In Domination and the Arts of Resistance, Scott (1990) sought to reveal the 
range of forms that resistance can take between both dominant and dominated social 
groups when relating to each other.  Scott (1990) used the term hidden transcript to 
refer to instances where resistance was invisible.  “The hidden transcript is typically 
expressed openly—albeit in disguised form” (Scott, 1990, pp. xii–xiii), in contrast to 
the public transcript, “the open interaction between subordinates and those who 
dominate” (Scott, 1990, p. 2).  He stated that both the dominant and the dominated 
employ hidden transcripts, and “the more menacing the power, the thicker the mask” 
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(Scott, 1990, p. 3).  In contrast to Bourdieu’s notion where only the powerful have 
invisible agendas, Scott’s (1990) approach recognizes that both the dominant and the 
dominated carry hidden transcripts, but the degree to which this is recognized 
depends on the kind of subordination and threat.  Scott (1990) drew his evidence 
largely from “studies of slavery, serfdom, and caste subordination on the premise that 
the relationship of discourse to power would be most sharply etched where the 
divergence between … the public transcript and the hidden transcripts is greatest” (p. 
x). 
In Reed-Danahay’s (1996) examination of rural peasant communities of 
France, she found that resistance was one part of the answer to how children in the 
small village of Lavialle were able to resist inculcation of dominant culture at schools 
in France.  She uses the terms “persistence, resistance, and coexistence … for ways of 
looking at regional or ethnic identity in plural societies” (Reed-Danahay, 1996, p. 
206).  Cultural persistence was the resiliency of groups to combat cultural 
domination; resistance “stresse[d] the refusal of groups to change in certain ways” 
(Reed-Danahay, 1996, p. 206).  Coexistence implied multiple forms of cultural 
identity in nation states.  Rural communities were able to forge a Franco-Auvergnat 
identity so that regional identity was prioritized alongside the socialization to be 
French in school.  In this way, these students remained bicultural or culturally 
diglossic, as Reed-Danahay (1996) termed it. 
What these researchers have in common is that they acknowledged the 
multiple forces at work in obliging social agents to comply, partially comply, or 
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refuse to comply with the forces of social institutions.  Such scholarship questions 
Bourdieu’s overly deterministic reliance on unconsciousness and passivity of social 
agents undergoing symbolic domination.  Like the researchers of resistance theory 
who have argued that this domination is not unilateral and that many different forces 
conspire to negotiate, accommodate, or resist domination, I similarly propose that 
reaction to domination is not predictable or unilateral, and at times may be 
contradictory.  Willis (1977) claimed, “Life systems of oppression do not exist 
separately.  … They coexist and intertwine in surprising and complex ways, that 
sometimes buttress each other, and at other times contradict each other” (p. 208).  
Similarly, I argue that reaction to symbolic domination is subject to much variation 
among different members of a single community, especially among multicultural and 
multilingual communities of Morocco, and does not elicit uniform responses from the 
same community or even the same individual.  In their reaction to French education 
in protectorate Morocco, Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers demonstrated different 
kinds of “transcripts.”  Whereas some individuals and communities appeared to have 
endorsed or acquiesced to French education, others refused.  Some displayed 
contradictory attitudes toward French education.  Whereas once some protested 
French education, some later accommodated it and sought coexistence of French and 
traditional education.  This is true sometimes even within the same individual at the 
same time.  This topic of resistance specific to protectorate Morocco will be explored 




2.4 Previous Research on the French Language in Protectorate Morocco  
Most research on language and education at the beginning of the 20th century 
investigated Moroccan local languages and was conducted by French officials.  In 
order to better understand the culture and dialects of the speech communities there, 
French officials created research institutions to house those findings.  These research 
centers, such as the Institut des hautes études marocaines in Rabat, were intended to 
teach local Arabic dialects and Berber varieties and ethnology to colonial 
administrators.  Journals and dictionaries authored by various European 
ethnographers, scientists, religious missionaries, linguists, and colonial officials were 
created for this purpose.  Over the course of the protectorate, the discussion of 
language and education in colonial records focused on promoting the expansion of 
French in certain educational establishments so as to facilitate French hegemony, 
especially among European, Jewish, and Berber communities.   
By the end of the protectorate, discussions on languages in education became 
more widespread and politicized, as many Arab and Berber Moroccans desired to 
increase the study of Arabic at the schools specifically created for these communities.  
Such concern over language instruction became one of the reforms advocated by the 
future Moroccan nationalists, Comité d’Action, in the 1934 Plan des réformes 
marocaines.   By the 1950s, widespread discussions on how to make Arabic the 
official language of the country and how to replace French with Arabic through a 
policy of Arabization became a common theme in nationalist discourse.  From the 
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protectorate into independence, the selection of French or Arabic instruction became 
symbolic of national division or unity in Morocco, and research on education and 
languages reflected these ideologies, from that of the colonial perspective during the 
protectorate to the nationalist one after independence.   
Colonial rhetoric, which stressed differentiation and antiassimilation, nurtured 
a local nationalistic discourse that sought assimilation through unified Moroccan 
nationalism by 1956.  Both of these perspectives exacerbated social divisions, 
whether by recognizing and highlighting differences between social groups or erasing 
difference altogether.  Segalla (2009) positioned colonial and nationalist discourses 
within the historical literature on Morocco and analyzed how each essentialized their 
stance in opposition to the other. 
The colonial discourse of the French protectorate produced a distorted vision 
of Moroccan life that was closed off to counterevidence and complicating 
empiricism and which prevented adroit adaptation of policy to changing 
circumstances and to the aspirations of Moroccan Muslims.  … Nationalists 
… made use of colonial ideas of ethno-cultural essentialism in the 
construction of anti-colonial counter hegemony.  … Cultural essentialism was 
a tool for rallying a diverse public, for rescuing personal dignity from the 
humiliation of imperialism, and for manufacturing and enforcing a consensus 
that would bring stability to the postcolonial society. (Segalla, 2009, pp. 261–
264) 
French or Arabic education became the force that ensured social division under the 
colonial arrangement or unification under the nationalist one.  The link between each 
of these perspectives and education was so significant that nearly all documents on 
education during the protectorate referenced the nationalist movement in response to 
colonial policies.  Since each perspective was advanced through a discussion of the 
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use of either French or Arabic, these languages became indexical to each of these 
discourses, to the exclusion of Berber and other native languages present in Morocco. 
 
2.4.1 Colonial Discourse 
Research regarding cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity of Morocco 
attracted considerable scholarly attention after the arrival of French colonists.  The 
majority of research on Morocco for the first half of the 20th century had as its 
starting point a European, specifically French, perspective.  Doctors and religious 
missionaries reported their experiences in the remote inland regions.  Colonial agents 
sought profit and political opportunity in a similar manner.  Later, European-trained 
scientists sponsored by colonial interests rationalized indigenous customs and ethnic 
disparity.  These reports, many funded by French authorities and produced in French, 
sought to investigate the social, material, and general conditions of everyday 
Moroccan; ethnic diversity among Berber tribes; linguistic variation; and religious 
factions in order to inform colonial authorities about how to penetrate and govern 
Morocco.   
Since research on Morocco was initially driven by colonial motives, the bulk 
of early work expressed a colonial perspective guided by France’s mission 
civilisatrice.  In justifying colonial endeavors, this research reflected biased colonial 
ideologies with discriminatory points of view, laden with the presumption of “the 
‘European conquerors’ ever-present confidence in their ability to define, categorize, 
and comprehend the colonized society” (Segalla, 2009, p. 115).  Segregating 
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Moroccan communities into schools with different levels of French instruction was 
condoned on the premise of protecting native populations.  Bureaucrats exploited new 
scientific disciplines like ethnography, linguistics, and psychology to categorize, 
generalize, stereotype, and rationalize the Moroccan “other.”  Such discrimination 
was defended by the overarching objective set by Général Hubert Lyautey, the first 
Resident Générale, who governed the French protectorate from 1912 until 1925, in 
order to preserve Moroccan culture and to maintain the “charm” (Segalla, 2009, p. 
15) of the authentic Moroccan city.  This philosophy, or “commit[ment] to the 
principle of adaptation to ethnic difference” (Segalla, 2009, p. 19) advocating the 
need for separation between Europeans, Jews, Muslims, and Berbers, was reiterated 
by French colonial administrators in the Department of Education.  These 
administrators writing on the subject of segregating Moroccans early in the 
protectorate included Louis Brunot (1920–1939), Georges Hardy (1919–1926), and 
Paul Marty (1912–1930), as well many other leaders of the Direction of Public 
Instruction (DIP).  This ideology of separating and reinforcing ethnic difference 
remained in force at least until the 1940s (Segalla, 2009).  By the time of Roger 
Thabault’s tenure (1929–1941), the director of primary education and then head of 
DIP, the emphasis on ethnic limitations had become more subdued, likely due to 
historical circumstances, but the “emphasis on concrete, practical education” (Segalla, 
2009, p. 244) remained.   
Some of these perspectives by colonial officials in the DIP encouraged the 
notion that, in contrast to the Europeans, Moroccans were inherently inferior and 
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were “lazy, vain, indolent, selfish, liars, and hypocrites” (Segalla, 2009, p. 129), 
despite evidence to the contrary.  Segalla (2009) noted among many French 
researchers of the period the abundance of references to character or Moroccan 
psychological flaws. 
The psychological characteristics of “the Moroccan” were invoked even by 
writers who were generally critical of Hardy-era DIP policy.  Gaudefroy-
Demombynes recognized that poverty and economic pressure were the main 
obstacles to recruitment and regular attendance in the professional schools, 
but he simultaneously blamed Moroccan character flaws. (Segalla, 2009, p. 
171) 
 As a whole, Moroccans during the early protectorate were portrayed as 
psychologically and morally incapable, and such labels were increasingly validated 
when Moroccan students encountered difficulties in the foreign school system created 
by the French. 
When discussing the difficulties associated with the vocational education of 
Moroccan students, DIP writers invoked the notion that these students were 
different, not as individuals but as an ethnic group with traits distinguishable 
from those of European students, traits that were psychological in origin rather 
than the result of social or economic conditions. (Segalla, 2009, p. 170) 
 Many bureaucrats of the DIP, the military agents within the Bureau 
d’Affaires, and other administrative officers were prolific researchers during the 
protectorate.  They produced many ideologically positioned works.  In nearly all the 
research developed during this period, the use of simplified labels invoke social 
groups as fixed categories, as either European, Jewish, Berber or Muslim, as if these 
categories were permanent, indisputable, and recognizable.  “French imaginings of 
Moroccanness [were presumed] static, natural, and neatly bounded identity” (Segalla, 
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2009, p. ix).  Such terms in the colonial research erroneously contrasted religious 
categories with those denoting ethnicity, provenance, or language.  Differentiating 
group divisions in reality is much more complex; humans are not easily labeled by 
ethnicity, religion, social group, language, or other fixed categories. 
The notion that … human beings are distinctly divided into groups with 
discrete moral, social, and psychological characteristics, groups that are easily 
identifiable by their language, religion, parentage, social role, or phenotype … 
is inherently hostile to individual variation. (Segalla, 2009, p. 261) 
Because of the categorization of Moroccans, stereotypes and insistence on social 
divisions pervade much of the colonial research on education and ethnography.  
Readers often encounter the generalized casual use of terms such as indigène to refer 
to all non-European Moroccans; juif or israëlite to refer to Jews in Morocco; and 
berbère, a term based on the word barbarian originating during the Roman Empire, 
to refer to Berber populations.  For each of these groups, different schools were 
created to address the particular needs of each community, and the curricula at each 
of these schools reflected those beliefs.  Categorizing Moroccans as Jewish, 
European, Muslim, or Berber resulted in disrupting the cultural landscape that 
Lyautey’s principle had intended to protect. 
Whereas the early French protectorate (1912–1940) was characterized by 
segregationist policies consistent with the policies set by Général Lyautey, the 
sources documenting the later periods of the protectorate (1940–1956) demonstrated 
an evolving pragmatism in educational philosophy and correlate with significant 
world events that impeded normal research and educational operations in France and 
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Morocco.  These included the Great Depression, World War II, the fall of France in 
1940, the Vichy government, the creation of Israel, the decline of colonization, and 
the rise of global independence movements.  After 1940, the limited historical sources 
available demonstrate that colonial policy had shifted to a perspective of practicality 
born from historical necessity.  But this perspective might also have been a result of a 
purposeful silence during a very negative time in history when, from 1941–1945, 
Vichy laws restricted the rights of Jews in German-occupied France and French 
territories.  The majority of writings at this time by French officials restricted 
discussions to budget limitations and the recognition of an emerging nationalist 
movement. 
There was little discussion of Muslim education [at this time] … nor do DIP 
publications from the post-Vichy period offer any information on the subject.  
… It is possible that [French protectorate officials were] too preoccupied to 
address educational reform of any kind.  However, it is also likely that the 
DIP’s silence regarding the Vichy years reflects the protective amnesia of the 
“Vichy syndrome” rather than mere inactivity. (Segalla, 2009, p. 241) 
From census accounts, the last decade of the 1940s was marked by more entry 
to French schools for Moroccan Arab students, increased school attendance by 
Moroccan Arab girls, and urban and international migrations.  Since this period also 
coincided with growing opportunities to attend schools sponsored by nationalist 
sympathizers, French writings began to advance the notions of expanding education 
to a greater number of Arab Moroccans than ever before.  By that time, colonial 
rhetoric began to take a back seat to nationalist calls for reform, which, by the late 
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1940s, increasingly voiced discontent with low literacy rates and inadequate 
curricula. 
 
2.4.2 Nationalist Discourse 
The Moroccan perspective countered this colonial rhetoric and became 
increasingly hostile toward French colonial policies.  The student organizations for 
former Moroccan students of colonial French schools supported educational reform 
and advanced the nationalists’ Plan de réformes.  The 1934 Plan de réformes called 
for an increase in the amount of time dedicated to Arabic study at French-sponsored 
schools, greater educational opportunities for Moroccan girls, teachers from other 
Arab countries to diversify teaching staff and course content, and opportunities for 
access to the baccalauréat and university-level education.  The topic of education, 
therefore, became a contentious subject in terms of promoting Moroccan 
independence, reestablishing Moroccan identity, and invigorating nationalistic 
sentiment. 
Contrary to the colonial ideas of categorizing communities, the nationalist 
discourse called for imagining a single society undifferentiated by ethnic or religious 
origin.  The new perspective of Moroccanness masked real social divisions for the 
apparent benefit of the new nation.  Predictably, the nationalists called for 
Arabization, a process they claimed would erase the years of French rule and 
eradicate former social divisions through linguistic unification.  Complete 
Arabization of the school system was advocated on the grounds that foreign 
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languages like French impeded the spread of education, in contrast to the language of 
authenticity—Arabic.   
In support of this policy, one of the central leaders of the nationalist party, 
Allal El Fassi (as cited in Boukous, 1996) stated in the 1960s that the genius of a 
people manifests itself uniquely in the national language.  The support for 
Arabization was based on the assumption that Arabic was the language of Moroccan 
unity and that this language embodied Moroccans as authentically devout Muslims.  
Neglected in this policy were the facts that literary Arabic, both MSA and CA, 
remained foreign to many, especially the 40–60% of Moroccans who spoke Berber as 
a native language, and that all Moroccans were not Muslim; the largest Jewish 
populations in the Arab world called Morocco home at that time.  The nationalistic 
policies that ensued from these views were potentially as dangerous as the colonial 
ones, and the rhetoric that validated such policy was no less venomous.  Support for 
this nationalistic discourse reverberated in statements by King Hassan II (1961–
1999), the “commander of the faithful,” in which he reinforced Moroccan identity as 
Arab and Islamic until 1994, when he first gave a speech in Berber, thereby 
recognizing Berber identity and language as part of Moroccan identity (Ennaji, 2005).   
Like the colonial directors who oversaw colonial schools before 
independence, nationalist leaders “us[ed] schools as a tool of cultural control and to 
instill a pre-conceived cultural identity … like Hardy-Brunot [who] attempt[ed] to 
preserve ‘the Moroccan’” (Segalla, 2009, p. 249).  During the final years of the 
protectorate, Arabic became increasingly symbolic of Moroccan identity as the 
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nationalist movement gained momentum.  After independence, the new nation 
adopted Arabization as a language policy; imposed Arabic as the national language in 
Moroccan education, administration, and commerce; and questioned the preservation 
of the French language in all national institutions.  This policy to Arabize the schools 
was intended to realize the nationalists’ ideal of Arabic as the official language, to 
redefine Moroccan identity as Arabic speaking and Muslim, and to fill offices of 
national significance with modern, educated Arabic speakers.  A Moroccan nation 
united by Arabic and Islam, therefore, necessitated the eradication of any trace of the 
former colonial identity.  French was deemed unacceptable despite the fact that the 
language continued to serve important roles in accessing a better life through 
enhanced education and employment in independent Morocco. 
The argument for Arabization was based not on financial or pedagogical 
concerns but on the ideal of the monocultural nation-state and the belief that 
the Arabic language was an essential part of Moroccan nationhood, and 
therefore that French-language instruction constituted a betrayal of the 
Moroccan self. (Segalla, 2009, p. 258)  
French was progressively replaced in the national curriculum and government 
agencies with MSA in the 1960s.  Students were taught MSA earlier than French, 
which was postponed from the 1st year to the 3rd year of primary school curriculum.  
MSA was taught before the introduction of any other language.  Gradually, subjects 
such as philosophy, history, geography, math, natural sciences, physics, and 
chemistry were taught in MSA by the late 1980s.5  However, all university-level 
                                                 
5 “Dans la décennie 60 au collège et dans la première moitié de la décennie 70 au lycée et à l’université 
et notamment pendant l’année scolaire 1973/4 pour la philosophie et l’année scolaire 1974/5 pour 
l’histoire et la géographie … [les] matières scientifiques et [les mathématiques] … étaient arabisées à 
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instruction remained in French at that time, with the exception of the religious 
disciplines.  Complete Arabization of primary and secondary school curricula 
continued well into the 1990s.  French remained indispensable at least as late as 2000 
for most university-level courses because it remained the language of instruction, 
most notably in the study of the sciences. 
By the 1990s, [Moroccan officials] … achieved the complete Arabization of 
the public primary and secondary schools, with French taught only as a 
second language.  Science, math, and engineering instruction continued in 
French only at the university level and at numerous private schools. (Segalla, 
2009, p. 255) 
Despite the many strides to Arabize primary and secondary education over the 
course of nearly 50 years, the nationalists’ goal of replacing French speakers with an 
educated Arabic-speaking populous was never completely realized.  For one reason, 
foreign languages, especially French and, today, English, continue to serve social 
functions that policy makers intended Arabic to fill because of the ongoing role of 
private schools and bilingualism in Moroccan higher education.  Before Arabization, 
only 7% of Moroccan Arabs, including native speakers of both Berber and Arabic, 
spoke some French.  “Quantitatively, more Moroccan people (at least 25%) speak 
French today” (Ennaji, 2005, p. 37), with other estimates as high as 41.5% according 
to French government statistics; however, a consequence of Arabization is that 
students’ qualitative mastery of French is less significant.  Ennaji (2005) observed, 
                                                                                                                                           
l’école primaire de 1981 à 1983 et au collège de l’année scolaire 1982/3 à l’année scolaire 1985/6 pour 
les sciences naturelles, la physique et la chimie et à partir de 1984 pour les mathématiques” (Krikez, 
2005, p. 49). 
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“The Arabization process has led to a decrease in the students’ command of French” 
(p. 37).   
The increase in the number of French speakers in Morocco is partly due to 
increased enrollments and higher literacy rates after independence.  Natural 
population growth and increased enrollment partially explains how French became 
more widespread.  Additionally, inherited French pedagogies throughout the school 
system were maintained and preserved due to practical concerns, budgetary necessity, 
and the availability of pedagogical resources and teachers after independence.  These 
factors contributed to the spread of French throughout the country in unprecedented 
ways.  Moroccan materials and educated professionals in MSA were few in 1956.  
Many Moroccan teachers still depended on their pedagogical training received in the 
French schools before independence.  Moreover, French coopérants, or foreign 
government employees, remained employed in influential positions in post-
protectorate Morocco, especially in educational fields.  A high “number of expatriate 
French teachers” remained employed in Morocco, for more than 20 years after 
independence comprising up to “13% of the total number of teachers working in 
secondary schools” (Bentahila, 1983, p. 12).  This was especially true at the 
university level, where 25% of teachers were French nationals (Bentahila, 1983).   
Besides the reasons of pedagogical imperatives, the number of French 
speakers in independent Morocco continued to increase because French remained 
essential in accessing higher education, economic opportunity, and improved social 
status.  For decades under Arabization, the French language was maintained 
 
57 
alongside MSA under the bilingual school system, institutionalizing French alongside 
the new emphasis on MSA, especially at the highest levels of education.  Whereas the 
social sciences were taught in Arabic, the natural sciences were uniquely taught in 
French.  This was because, as Ennaji (2005) remarked, “The general public was 
conscious of the crucial role of French in education and in socio-economic 
development.  They associated French with modernity and progress and Arabic with 
literature and Arab-Islamic tradition” (pp. 36–37).   
As a result of increased economic potential linked to university study, French 
remained indispensable to those wishing to better their lot in life.  Seckinger (1988) 
asserted that economic opportunity continued to be associated with French literacy in 
Morocco even 30 years after independence:  “French represents technological, 
economic, and even ‘cultural’ development … for many Moroccans, and is frequently 
flaunted as a badge of ‘modernity’” (p. 72).  In contrast, Arabic came to be viewed as 
the language evoking tradition, religion, and Moroccan identity.  Over time, the 
association of each language and social functions came to represent either modernity 
or authenticity.  
French has gained more prestige and influence in the country because of its 
utility in economic and technical sectors and its role in social promotion.  
Thus, modernity, social success, prestige, economic and scientific matters are 
associated with French, whereas Arabic is associated with identity, roots, 
cultural authenticity and tradition. (Ennaji, 2005, p. 37)  
Consequently, French and Arabic continued to represent real social, academic, and 
economic divisions that Arabization of school programs after independence alone was 
unable to eradicate.   
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The process of Arabizing the curriculum failed to erase social and economic 
opportunity that those who spoke French were still able to acquire.  Once French 
became more difficult to acquire because of the Arabization of primary and secondary 
education, French became even more valuable.  After independence, French-language 
education was more desirable than Arabic-language instruction, especially among the 
elite. 
Many Moroccans, of various classes, continued to see French-language 
education as the key to economic success.  Moroccan’s political and economic 
elite continued to send their children to French mission schools.  … The rich 
thus avoided the difficulties encountered by “arabized” students when 
entering higher education in science, mathematics, and engineering in 
Morocco or when pursuing opportunities in Europe. (Segalla, 2009, p. 257) 
Students of the higher classes were more able to acquire French through their 
restricted social networks, within private schools, and their familial networks, with 
the result of improved employment opportunities.  Less fortunate students were far 
less likely to acquire French because there were fewer resources or opportunities to 
acquire it, thereby ultimately eliminating these students from higher education and 
enhanced economic opportunities.   
The imposition of Arabic in the curriculum without regard to the requirements 
of higher education and the job market had serious consequences for the less 
fortunate students.  As French became more difficult to acquire for the majority, 
thereby securing a profit of distinction, Arabic instruction reinforced tighter academic 
social selection to the benefit of those who acquired French and impeded the poorest 
Moroccans from acquiring this crucial skill in an environment that necessitated it.  
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Seckinger (1988) insisted, “‘Arabization,’ which advertise[d] itself as a way to 
equalize opportunity, may in reality act to perpetuate pre-independence elitism 
institutionalized in exclusive private schools that continue[d] to emphasize French” 
(p. 85).  The linguistic relationship between MSA and MA being similar to the 
differences between Latin and early modern French, when Moroccans entered school, 
they were then confronted with great linguistic challenges of having to learn more 
than one foreign language, both MSA and French.  This cost was far greater for the 
probable majority of Berber students who were forced to learn Arabic as a foreign 
language alongside French (Segalla, 2009).   
Arabization did not reach the goal of complete standardization within all 
institutions because Morocco had already undergone significant divisions whereby 
some communities had acquired French and profited from this skill while others were 
unable to do so.  The policy of Arabization did not replace French with Arabic in all 
areas of Moroccan society.  Different opportunities continued to exist for speakers of 
each language.  Presuppositions of a Moroccan culture united by language, religion, 
and ethnicity accentuated social divisions in Morocco in a similar way to the 
emphasis on social divisions by colonial schools years earlier.  Moreover, the failure 
to create a monolingual Arabic-speaking state reflected deeper problems inherent in 
aligning language policy with cultural ones.  The discussion on nationalizing 
language in Morocco reflected rhetoric like that employed by the colonial power 
decades earlier.  Whereas colonial powers justified the emphasis on social divisions 
as a means to preserve the character and identities of local populations, nationalists 
 
60 
erased regional or ethnic difference in order to advance the notion of a unified Arab 
and Islamic state.  “The equation of decolonization with a rejection of language 
change might be better understood as a historically developed concept, a legacy of 
both the colonizers’ discourse of cultural preservation and the nationalist inversion 
thereof” (Segalla, 2009, p. 258). 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed the sociolinguistic theories necessary to the 
analysis of the spread of French in protectorate Morocco.  First, I presented two 
definitions of diglossia by Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967) and differentiated 
diglossia from bilingualism.  After locating the nature of language coexistence in 
protectorate Morocco, I introduced the important terms for Bourdieu’s linguistic 
market theory.   In accordance with this theory, educational success and the 
acquisition of French among Europeans, Jews, Moroccan Arabs, and Berbers became 
linked to economic success.  However, this only partially explains the spread of 
French in Morocco.  To complement Bourdieu’s overly deterministic theories of 
social reproduction, I presented research on resistance by Willis (1977), Scott (1990), 
and Reed-Danahay (1996) and argued that dominance is not necessarily hierarchically 
imposed, as Bourdieu’s theory predicts.  Finally, I presented the previous research on 
the subject of language and education in Morocco, demonstrated how the biases in the 
research perpetuated both colonial and nationalist discourses, and outlined how 
languages and schools became symbolic to national or group identity.   
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL DIVISIONS IN PROTECTORATE MOROCCO 
 
Chapter 1 demonstrated how more Moroccans speak French in Morocco since 
independence than during the protectorate and how social and educational success 
there corresponded to greater French mastery.  Chapter 2 examined the multilingual 
communities in protectorate Morocco, diglossia and bilingualism according to 
Ferguson (1959) and Fishman’s (1967) definitions, and the sociolinguistic theories of 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice and the language market.  This chapter analyzes the 
process by which four social groups, European, Jewish, Muslim, and Berber 
communities, came to exist in the research on Moroccans by French authorities and 
how group differences based on religious, ethnic, and linguistic salient features 
became institutionalized in the colonial legal and educational systems.    
The discussion of how each of the communities came to be designated as 
separate groups by French authorities is important in understanding why certain 
communities were able to access different kinds of schools and legal status in 
Morocco.  First, I show how the colonization of Morocco was different from, as well 
as influenced by, the colonization of Algeria and Tunisia.  Then, I demonstrate how 
French authorities came to view Moroccans as divided between Muslims, Jews, and 
Christians after the reports from Christian organizations that, before the protectorate, 
had come to Morocco to spread the Gospel and then reported their findings on the 
needs of these local communities.  In addition to separating Moroccans on the basis 
of religious identification, I subsequently demonstrate how the Kabyle Berber myth, 
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imported from the colonial experience in Algeria, influenced the designation of 
Moroccan Berbers as a separate and privileged social group from Moroccan Arabs.  
Next, the census information for each of these communities is provided in order to 
show each group’s prevalence and participation at the beginning of the French 
protectorate.  Afterwards, I demonstrate the difficulty of distinguishing communities 
by these designations as well as the consequences of doing so.  Finally, I reveal how 
the divide-and-rule strategy of governance employed these ideologies of socioethnic 
divisions as the basis for institutionalizing difference within the new colonial legal 
system.  
 
3.1 Morocco in Contrast to Algeria and Tunisia  
Despite many similarities with its North African neighbors, Morocco was the 
only Maghreb country not conquered by the Ottoman Empire.  For this reason, the 
dynasty of the Moroccan Sultan, the commander of the faithful embodying both 
political and religious authority, had not undergone any serious threat since 1664 
(Tessler, 1982).  However, because of its proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar, 
Morocco became desirable to European powers to advance diplomatic and 
commercial activities and as a strategic possession for colonial expansion.  Morocco’s 
prosperous maritime activities through both Atlantic and Mediterranean coastlines 
often rendered it vulnerable to attacks from pirates as well as from expanding 
European colonial interests.  As a result, in 1912, Morocco was partitioned into four 
protectorate zones: (a) a northern zone under Spanish control, (b) a southern zone 
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under Spanish control, (c) a central zone governed by the French, and (d) an 
international zone governed by several European powers in the northern coastal city 
of Tangier, as demonstrated in Figure 3.  This split was the first set of 
institutionalized divisions by European authorities in Morocco and, therefore, the first 
effort to govern Moroccan according to a policy of divide and rule. 
 
Figure 3. French and Spanish protectorates in 1912. Source: Morocco Since 1830: A 
History, by C. R. Pennell, 2000, New York: New York University Press.  
The foreign influence in neighboring French territories of Algeria and Tunisia, 
by contrast, was longer lasting than that of the Moroccan protectorate, which endured 
a mere 44 years.  The establishment of the Moroccan protectorate in 1912 occurred 
82 years after the annexation of Algeria (1830) and 31 years after the Tunisian 
protectorate (1881).  The colonization of Morocco operated under different historical 
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pressures at different stages of development.  The first of such pressures consisted of 
regional competition with the other, more established French territorial possessions 
for resources such as finances, soldiers, public works, settlers, and an educated 
workforce to assist in the development of the modernization efforts when such 
assistance was critical.   
On the international front, the French authorities in Morocco endured different 
historical, political, economic and social constraints at an earlier stage of 
development than officials in Algeria or Tunisia had endured.  Some of these 
important events included World Wars I and II, the rise of fascism in Spain, the 
international economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the development of the 
state of Israel, the development of the League of Nations and the United Nations, 
obligatory and free education in France in the 1880s, and the rise of Zionism and anti-
Semitism in France after the 1894 Dreyfus Affair.6  Therefore, while colonizing 
concerns should have focused on finding solutions to basic infrastructure problems, 
such as the construction of buildings, transportation, communication, schools, 
sanitation projects, and jobs, the French Résident Général, the French military 
appointee to oversee protectorate matters, was forced to manage local affairs under 
the constant pressure of local, regional, national, and international limitations.  
                                                 
6 In the late 19th century, a Jewish officer in the French army by the name of Alfred Dreyfus was 
accused and convicted of having been a spy for the Germans.  The Dreyfus affair revealed a rising anti-
Semitism in France and Europe.  Shortly thereafter, the Zionist movement, which advocated for the 
large-scale immigration of Jews to Israel, gained great momentum throughout Europe and influenced 
early colonial policies in the Moroccan protectorate.  Early colonial policies sought to protect and 
improve the condition of the Moroccan Jew in such ways as trying to eliminate Jewish childhood 
marriages with the installation of AIU schools and secular, Westernized curricula for both Jewish boys 
and girls.  Other communities in Morocco did not receive similar attention. 
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Meanwhile, all of these pressures and efforts in infrastructure development proceeded 
simultaneously with the pacification campaign of the Moroccan countryside by the 
French military, an endeavor that continued as late as 1934, 22 years after the 
beginning of the protectorate and concurrent with the military campaign of World 
War I.  Therefore, the French government preferred a policy of very little intervention 
in many areas of the country except in matters that contributed to the pacification and 
penetration effort.  To illustrate this point, I include a map that shows the progress of 
the French pacification effort by the 1930s (Figure 4).  Figure 4 identifies the zones 
that came under French influence before the protectorate, 1907–1912; the zones that 
came under French influence early in the protectorate and during World War I; the 
areas of Morocco that came under French influence after World War I; and the areas 
that remained dissident in 1927. 
Since there were few French researchers in Moroccan history, linguistics, and 
sociology before the establishment of the protectorate, little was known about the 
regional and social diversity among Moroccans.  The discovery of diverse ethnic 
groups in Morocco, Jewish, Berber, and Berber-speaking Jewish communities, for 
instance, hastened the accumulation of research on ways to facilitate pacification, 
with special emphasis on how to accommodate great religious and ethnolinguistic 
variation.  Institutes were rapidly constructed to research social diversity in Morocco.  
Initially, however, the documentation provided by the former travelers, European 
diplomats, French soldiers, Christian missionaries, and Jewish organizations such as 
the AIU before the creation of the French government proved more essential, as it 
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was available more quickly than the publications of the institutes.  As informative as 
any of the reports were, each offered only a partial glimpse into the various Moroccan 
communities and reflected the biases that had prompted their journey or research in 
the first place.   
 
Figure 4. French pacification of Morocco. Source: Berbers: Their Social and 
Political Organization, by R. Montagne (D. Seddon, Ed.), 1973, London, England: 
Frank Cass. 
 
3.2 Influence of Religious Organizations 
Some of the first informants to report on the social condition of Moroccans 
were missionaries from various Christian and Jewish organizations dismayed by the 
desperate conditions plaguing North Africans.  Encouraged by reports on destitution, 
illiteracy, and illnesses, religious missions were created in some areas of northern and 
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central Morocco in order to provide church-sponsored social and medical welfare 
programs.  They sent missionaries to provide medical care and educational programs 
by which to spread the Gospel and to convert Moroccans.  Although most religious 
societies had little long-term impact on the lives of Moroccans, these informants 
spread the image of a nation divided between Jewish, Muslim, and potentially 
Christian populations and laid the groundwork for the segregation policies of the 
French protectorate.  
In 1862, the AIU, the first modern school for Jews, arrived in Morocco, with 
the mission to improve the condition of Middle Eastern Jews through education.  
These schools became highly influential in providing services to Jewish Moroccans 
and advancing great social change among Jewish communities 50 years before the 
arrival of the protectorate in 1912.  Their success in recruiting students and altering 
the substandard existence of Moroccan Jews led many other Jewish and Christian 
groups to follow.  
At the height of religious missionary work in Morocco,∂ from the 1880s until 
just after 1900, there were seven active Protestant organizations with 81 missionaries 
and 18 locations in Morocco: (a) the British Society for the Propagation of the Gospel 
Amongst Jews, (b) the British and Foreign Bible Society, (c) the North Africa 
Mission, (d) the Midmay Mission to the Jews, (e) the England Presbyterian Church 
Mission (which later merged with the Central Morocco Mission), (f) the Southern 
Morocco Mission, and (g) the Gospel Union.  Despite their efforts to recruit Muslim 
or Jewish Moroccan converts, their effectiveness was greatest in the realm of medical 
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assistance.  In 1900, there were more than 70,000 consultations among the combined 
organizations.  In contrast, their effectiveness in education was considered mediocre, 
only enrolling 150–180 students between 1900 and 1904 (Miège, 1955).  These 
efforts were abandoned due to financial difficulties, few students, and few religious 
conversions.  The Spanish of Tetuan and Tangier witnessed the most results, with 
only 40 or so converted and only 10 Jews from Essaouira; four in Casablanca; three 
in Rabat; and a few Muslims in Fez, Marrakech, and Tangier (Miège, 1955).   
The activities and expenses of these religious organizations in Morocco were 
very meager compared to what had been spent in Egypt, Syria, and Palestine, where 
such organizations had successfully established schools and hospitals for more than a 
century (Miège, 1955).  Unlike the Catholic Franciscan missions, which largely 
served the increasing European presence, Protestant missionaries were the first 
foreigners to live in the interior of Morocco.  In addition to social assistance, they 
brought “religious propaganda” (Miège, 1955, p. 154) to Moroccans and reported 
back to the European public their findings on the Moroccans’ social, linguistic, moral, 
and religious existence.  Because of their great knowledge of local customs and 
languages in addition to their increased relations with protectorate and local officials, 
Protestant missionaries were also invaluable sources of information for colonial 
administrators (Miège, 1955). 
Christian organizations failed overwhelmingly to attract much interest among 
Moroccans.  Instead, they heightened awareness among Europeans that Moroccans 
were divided according to differences in their faith as primarily Muslim or Jewish.  
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However, thanks to the importation of the Berber Kabyle myth, many missionaries 
also reported back on the presence of communities of Berbers who appeared to be 
semi-Islamic practicing and possible Christian converts.  The Berber Kabyle myth 
originating from the French colonization of Algeria intensified rumors that Berber 
communities practiced traditions that appeared to share similarities with Christianity 
and were, therefore, more susceptible to the Christian message and conversion 
(Miège, 1955).   
 
3.3 The Kabyle Myth and Moroccan Berbers 
The first noteworthy experience among protectorate officials with Moroccan 
Berbers occurred after 1912 in the Middle Atlas.  “There was only one French officer 
with any knowledge of the tribes in the region, Maurice LeGlay, and there was no 
scholarly research on the language, customs, or institutions of any Middle Atlas tribe” 
(Burke, 1976, p. 188).  What the French initially knew about Moroccan Berbers was 
very limited, and contact with Berbers in rural and mountainous areas often resulted 
in conflict, so the French were motivated to pacify the rural zones.  Institutes like the 
Comité d’études berbères created in Meknes in 1915 and the Institut des hautes 
études marocaines in Rabat intended for French military officers and civil servants in 
the new French regime were merely in development and were not available to educate 
protectorate and military officials at a critical period of development.  Thus, the prior 
decades of research of and experience with Algerian Kabyles provided rapid and easy 
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insight on Moroccan Berbers for French officials at a time when pacification of these 
tribes was difficult.   
For a century before the Moroccan protectorate, the French framed notions of 
Algerian Berbers through the Kabyle myth, which viewed Berbers as unique and 
different from Arabs, not only linguistically but also ethnically, culturally, religiously, 
and politically.  These Berber tribes were believed to be more similar to European 
culture “based on the supposed democratic nature of Kabyle society, its lesser degree 
of Islamization, the more equal treatment of women, and the supposed assimilability 
of Kabyles to French culture” (Burke, 1973, p. 189).  Intellectuals and ethnologists 
familiar with Algerian Berbers asserted that Moroccan Berbers were very similar to 
Kabyles, in particular the Moroccan Tamazight, who were at the time more difficult 
to subdue due to their political organization, which differed from that of the southern 
tribes.  Their mountainous habitation protected them from invasions and dependence 
on Moroccan rulers, and they were believed to be only “superficially Islamicized, 
preserv[ing] the customs, rituals, and superstitions of their earlier faith beneath a 
veneer of Muslim beliefs and practices” (Burke, 1973, pp. 193–194).  The belief that 
Berbers were culturally separate from Arabs and closer to Europeans led many 
French officials to the conclusion that Berbers would be easily assimilated into 
European culture.  Therefore, for the French, “the Berber represented the perfect 
middleman between the Orient and the Occident, Europe and Africa” (Silverstein, 
2002, p. 7), a middleman whose similarities with the European would allow 
assimilation of French interests more suitably than the Arab population.   
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The belief that Berbers would effortlessly assimilate French culture was 
especially enhanced by the perceived similarities to the French in political 
organization.  Through Berber religious and political assemblies, or jamaas, one 
would find “veritable sovereignty which the chief of the patriarchal family possesses, 
as in ancient Rome … [with] a kind of democratic spirit which enabled them to resist 
the makhzan” (Burke, 1973, pp. 194), or the king and his government.  Moreover, 
Moroccan Berbers were perceived to be more similar to the French than were Arabs 
based on their treatment of women, which was seen as similar to French family codes. 
The customary laws by which the internal life of the group was regulated, as 
in Kabylia, … [were] often more in harmony with the spirit of ... [French] 
code than the laws of Islam.  … Berber treatment of women was much closer 
to the European than to the Arab, and Koranic prescriptions relative to 
women, their place in the family, and their rights were not practiced by 
Berbers. (Burke, 1973, p. 194) 
Besides similarities regarding political organization, many French officials 
also justified the semblance to European culture on the basis of racial and biological 
similarities.  These arguments linked Berbers to European lineage in racial, moral, 
and linguistic terms.  In fact, prominent disagreements oscillated as to whether their 
common origin was Germanic or Siberian, because some colonial scholars thought 
that these groups shared similar language and facial characteristics (Bidwell, 1973).  
Berbers could actually trace their origins to simultaneous movements of 
people from the European North and the Asian South.  Further, they had 
maintained traits from each of these origins—from the European-type blond 
hair and blue eyes of certain Kabyles, to their language which resembles that 
of the Basques. (Silverstein, 2002, pp. 6–7) 
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From these assertions of similarity to European lineage, others argued that the 
Berbers were the original inhabitants of North Africa who, not having intermixed 
with Arabs, continued original, or non-Arab, cultural practices. 
French military ethnographers understood them as the original inhabitants of 
North Africa who had preserved more than any other people their 
Mediterranean identity.  … Denying any influence from outside cultures, be 
they Arab, Punic, or Roman … certain colonial linguists and ethnologists 
argued that the Berbers constituted the true autochthones of the region who 
had resisted all invaders and cultural influences. (Silverstein, 2002, pp. 5–6)   
Such perspectives implied that influences from other cultures that had come in 
contact with Berbers through time were nonexistent, erasing any cultural, historical, 
linguistic, religious, and ethnic influences that had uniquely shaped Moroccan Berber 
culture differently from Arab culture in Morocco.  However, by defining Berber traits 
as closer to those associated with European civilization, authorities found justification 
to assimilate Berbers as instrumental agents through the divide-and-rule strategy and 
to seek to accelerate the pacification effort by means of segregating them from other 
Moroccans.   
 
3.4 Social Divisions in 1912 Morocco  
Morocco had the most inhabitants of all of the countries of the Maghreb, 
comprising nearly half of all North African inhabitants (Le Tourneau, 1962).  With 
the largest population of Jews and Berbers in North Africa, the French administration 
in Morocco differentiated legal and educational assistance to each community based 
on its ethnic and religious particularities so as to keep the French presence from 
disrupting Moroccan society in any drastic way.  Le Tourneau (1962), an important 
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figure in the education system and former director of the collège de Fès, confirmed 
that Morocco was composed of three separate communities, Muslims, Jews, and 
Europeans.  Further, Le Tourneau (1962) explained how religion, in this case 
Christianity, also became the salient feature among Moroccans to denote Europeans, 
since European nationality often coincided with Christianity.    
Though Berber constituted an ethnic or linguistic distinction and not a 
religious one, French officials believed that significant cleavages justified the 
consideration of this population separately from Jewish and Muslim, or Arab, 
communities.  Berbers were perceived to be only superficially Muslim and therefore 
unlike Arab Moroccans who faithfully preserved Islamic traditions (Gaudefroy-
Demombynes, 1928).  To the French, Moroccan Berbers maintained different 
religious and cultural traditions than the Arab Muslims, and these differences 
validated their distinction from other Moroccan communities, despite evidence of 
groups that blurred these distinctions, such as the Jewish Berber communities or city-
dwelling Berbers who were indistinguishable from urban Arabs.  
 
3.4.1 Europeans 
Prior to the French protectorate, a few Europeans from many different 
countries of origin came to live and work in Morocco.  Since these settlers came from 
all European countries and colonial possessions belonging to various European 
powers, this group included a heterogeneous group with different nationalities in 
addition to great linguistic and religious diversity.  The designation of European 
 
74 
included not only those born in European countries such as the Spaniards, Portuguese, 
Germans, British, Italians, and French who came to live in Morocco but also those 
who had acquired European citizenship, especially those who had originated from 
other French colonies and territories.  Since Algeria by this time had become a full-
fledged French territory, some Muslim Algerian inhabitants became French subjects 
and gained de facto French citizenship by the late 19th century.  As for Algerian 
Jews, in 1870 more than 35,000 were granted French citizenship with special 
religious status under the Crémieux Decree, which had granted French citizenship to 
Jews in Algeria.   
Muslim and Jewish Algerians with French citizenship were indistinguishable 
from Moroccans in that they were similarly either Jewish or Muslim; spoke French as 
a second language, if at all; and spoke Berber or Arabic as native languages.  
However, classified as Europeans in the same way as European-born settlers, Jewish 
and Muslim Algerians were granted privileges and opportunities that most other 
Moroccans were unable to receive.  For example, besides higher salaries and 
increased job opportunities, Europeans in Morocco often dwelled in the ville nouvelle 
districts, the newer districts of a city, further segregated from the more impoverished 
parts of the city such as the madina (Pennell, 2000), the old part of the city where 
Moroccans lived, and the mellah, the specific quarters near the old city where Jewish 
Moroccans lived. 
Many Algerians with French citizenship entered Morocco, especially in the 
area near Oujda in northeastern Morocco, and became residents entitled to benefits 
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similar to those awarded metropolitan-born French citizens.  Their presence in some 
areas of Morocco rivaled the density of indigenous Moroccans, as evidenced by the 
population of Oujda in 1926, when up to 53% of inhabitants were Algerian (Katan, 
2005).  These Algerian-born French citizens often occupied higher posts in the 
protectorate than Moroccans as Indigenous Affairs officers, inspectors, municipal 
service directors, regional directors, and specialists of Moroccan services for the 
Résident Général because of their European status (Ayache, in Katan, 2005).   
Prior to 1912, the number of combined European nationals remained very 
low.  In 1850, records indicated that only 389 Europeans inhabited Morocco.  
Afterwards, their population grew considerably; by 1921 there was 1 European for 
every 55 Moroccans, and by 1952 there was 1 European for every 22 Moroccans 
(Cerych, 1964).  In 1927, the European population was just over 90,000, more than 
60,000 of whom were French nationals (Benzakour, Gaadi, & Queffélec, 2000).  By 
1952, out of a total population of 8.085 million in Morocco, there were 367,000 
European inhabitants, of whom 75% were French, 60% were adult, and 89% lived in 
cities (Merrouni, 1983), especially the coastal cities.  About 10% of this population 
was Algerian, estimated in 1956 to number 31,767 (Cerych, 1964).   
 
3.4.2 Jewish Communities 
      In 1912, the Jewish communities totaled no more than 110,000 people 
distributed throughout northern and southern Morocco, although inhabiting mostly 
the southern zones and Marrakech.  Even before the arrival of the French, Jewish 
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communities from rural zones of the South and the High Atlas regions as well as the 
urban centers like Marrakech were in the process of migrating towards the port cities 
of Essaouira, Agadir, Tangier, and particularly Casablanca.  By 1952, the Jewish 
population in French Morocco nearly doubled in size to 210,000, though by then 
many Jews had relocated in the coastal and urban cities (Laskier & Bashan, 2004).  In 
the mid-1950s, the Moroccan Jewish population, at 240,000, was one of the largest in 
all of the Arab world outside of Israel, more than Tunisia at 100,000 or Algeria with 
140,000 (Laskier & Bashan, 2004).     
Historically, Moroccan Jewish communities maintained many regional, 
linguistic, and cultural distinctions.  The toshavim were the earliest Jewish settlers 
who most resembled Muslims in customs and spoke Judeo-Arabic or Berber.  The 
megorashim were the more economically prosperous Jews expelled from Spain who 
spoke Judeo-Spanish and primarily lived in the northern Moroccan regions (Laskier 
& Bashan, 2004).  Similarly, differences in places of residence and living conditions 
separated many of the different communities of Jews.  Most Jews before 1912 lived 
in mellahs, walled quarters whose gates were locked at nightfall, hence reaffirming 
segregated communities, whereas more “affluent Jews lived outside the mellah, 
notably in the neighborhoods of European merchants” (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, pp. 
480–481) in the ville nouvelle districts. 
As more impoverished Jews left the countryside for the urban centers where 
the more prosperous Jews lived, conditions worsened and “relations between richer 
Jews and their poorer brethren became more strained” (Pennell, 2000, p. 91).  
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Socioeconomic differences permeated Moroccan Jewish existence before the arrival 
of the protectorate.  While the overwhelming majority lived in extreme poverty, a few 
affluent Jews found influential employment in international trade, as agents for 
foreign firms, independent merchants, translators, protégés, or consular agents 
(Laskier & Bashan, 2004).  Their privileged economic status permitted them to alter 
their social status:  “Some affluent Jews spent time in Europe and acquired foreign 
nationality, then returned with a different status than their brethren, who remained 
subordinate to the Makhzan’s jurisdiction” (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, p. 477).  
Otherwise, most Jews were considered dhimmi by the Makhzen, the governing 
council for Morocco, which required Jews to pay a tax for their protection because of 
their lower social status.  Prior to the establishment of the French protectorate and the 
educational initiatives of the AIU, many Jews manufactured alcohol; some were petty 
traders, artisans, farmers, or metalworkers; some worked in textiles, leather, 
carpentry, construction, or pharmacy; and some provided various other services 
deemed inferior or forbidden by Islam (Laskier & Bashan, 2004). 
 Regional differences also existed between rural and urban Jews.  Few walled 
mellahs were located in the countryside; as a consequence, Jews outside urban areas 
lived among Muslims and at times were left unprotected.  One of the “mellah’s 
responsibilities was to provide refuge for victims of epidemics or abuse” (Gottreich, 
2007, p. 114).  In areas outside of Makhzen rule, rural Jews fell under the 
administration of a pasha, a local Berber tribal leader, and sought protection from a 
custom of local patronage in exchange for payment or services (Gottreich, 2007).  
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Such allegiances rendered rural Jews dependent and vulnerable to different powers of 
influence and accelerated possible friction between urban and rural Jews.  
“Accusations of theft [were] exchanged between urban and rural Jews.  ... The 
amorphous ‘group feeling’ among Moroccan Jews sometimes took a back seat to 
more tangible interests, particularly when the Jews came from different communities” 
(Gottreich, 2007, p. 114). 
       Before and early in the protectorate, Moroccan Jews, especially those in the 
interior, maintained “extensive transnational economic and social networks” 
(Gottreich, 2007, p. 7) and were often able to speak many different languages, 
including Arabic and Berber and various European languages needed for commerce 
and diplomacy between foreigners and Moroccans.  For this reason, many were able 
to profit from the arrival of the European commercial and diplomatic agents.  Jews 
with such knowledge were able to seek opportunities to become European citizens 
and protégés, a system initiated after the French-Moroccan commercial treaty of 1767 
(Gottreich, 2007), until shortly before the establishment of the French protectorate.  
In the 18th and 19th centuries, becoming a protégé offered legal protection through 
contractual relations with European consuls in exchange for linguistic and cultural 
skills that many Jews could offer.  This was a rare opportunity for Jews to escape 
their disadvantaged economic condition at a time when Moroccan Jews were unable 
to improve their condition by obtaining French citizenship like Algerian Jews.  Status 
as this kind of consular agent granted them “immunity from Moroccan government in 
most tax and judicial matters” (Gottreich, 2007, p. 7) but “wreck[ed] a sense of 
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existential havoc with their sense of identity” (Gottreich, 2007, p. 9) because of their 
proximity to Europeans or Westerners.       
Because of their socially and economically disadvantaged situation, Moroccan 
Jews attended French schools more than any other social group throughout the term 
of the protectorate.  Education, specifically a French education, brought greater 
opportunities to acquire languages and new skills for jobs in the changing economy.  
As a result of poverty, search for employment, lowered status as dhimmi, and the 
increasing presence of Western ideals fostered by a French education, many Jews by 
the end of the protectorate sought to immigrate abroad as a means to escape 
misfortune in Morocco.  Within a short period of time, the Moroccan Jewish 
community was impacted by unprecedented historical events with the rise of Zionism, 
the creation of Israel, global insecurity as a result of World War II, the Vichy 
experience, anti-Semitism, and the nationalists’ zeal for independence.  Between 
1947 and 1956, more than 100,000 Jews immigrated to Israel (Laskier & Bashan, 
2004), leaving only about half of the original number of Jews residing in Morocco.  
This trend accelerated after independence due to the increasing pro-Palestinian and 
anti-Israeli sentiment in many Arab countries in the 1960s.  Today, only about 5,000–




3.4.3 Arab Communities 
     In 1921, the total Arab and Berber Muslim population in Morocco was 
approximated at 3.372 million.7  By 1952, this estimate more than doubled to 7.675 
million (Merrouni, 1983).  At the beginning of the protectorate, Arab Moroccans 
were primarily rural, living among and often indistinguishable from Jewish and 
Berber communities.  Only 25% of all Moroccans dwelled in the urban centers 
alongside Europeans.  However, over the course of the protectorate, a million 
inhabitants from the countryside left the rural zones, and more than half of these 
immigrated to the cities (Merrouni, 1983).  As these migrants began their new lives in 
the cities, they had to integrate with Europeans where French was more important in 
their daily lives.  By 1951, outside of the 19 cities and municipalities throughout 
Morocco, there were 100 Moroccans for every European.  In the urban areas, among 
the six top cities, Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, Meknes, Rabat, and Oujda, that 
statistic became 5 Moroccans for every European (Cerych, 1964).       
Throughout the protectorate, the combined Muslim and Jewish Moroccan 
population was marked by its youthfulness in comparison to the European population.  
In 1951, nearly half of all Moroccans, or 48%, were younger than 19 years old 
(Merrouni, 1983), compared to only 37% of the European population (Cerych, 1964).  
Throughout the term of the protectorate, these Moroccan communities were generally 
poor, earning nearly 20 times less than the European population (Merrouni, 1983), an 
                                                 
7 Although census information was collected for all Jewish, Muslim, and European communities 
beginning in 1921, 1926, and 1931, it is not until 1936 that data collection became more reliable.   
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important factor in predicting educational access and their ability to pay school 
tuition. 
 
3.4.4 Berber Communities 
      In contemporary Morocco, the proportion of Berber speakers is estimated at 
40% (Charrad, 2001), although many sources have found this number difficult to 
confirm or deny with any certainty, and they inhabit largely rural and mountainous 
areas.  According to Hoffman (2008), today about 80% of Moroccans speak MA, 
though only half speak it as a first language.  Thus nearly 40% of Moroccans speak 
MA exclusively, another 40% speak MA and a Berber language, and 20% are 
monolingual Berber speaking.  In 1936, according to French protectorate census 
information, there were over 2.5 million Berber speakers, of whom 1.56 million were 
monolinguals, whereas 880,918 spoke both some Berber and Arabic (Maroc 
Secrétariat Général du Protectorat, 1936).  However, these numbers likely 
underestimated the situation, as the complete pacification effort was still tenuous in 
1936 and accessing rural and mountainous areas remained treacherous.  Prior to 1960, 
the number of French-speaking Moroccans was not calculated, but according to the 
1960 census, the proportion of Moroccans bilingual in Berber and French was 
estimated at 4% (Maroc Service des Statistiques, 1960). 
      In contrast to the neighboring countries, the Moroccan Berber population, 
more numerous than in Algeria or Tunisia, was estimated in 1900 to be at least 60% 
of the total population (Burke, 1976).  Moroccan Berbers were also linguistically 
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heterogeneous, with three recognized varieties of Berber language: Tarafit, Tachelhit, 
and Tamazight.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the Tarafit dialect was primarily spoken 
in the northern Rif mountainous zones; the Tachelhit dialect in the south; and the 
Tamazight dialect, the most similar to the Algerian Kabyle dialect, in the Atlas 
Mountains and central zones.   
      Diversity among Berbers was not limited to only linguistic and geographic 
differences, but as mentioned previously, some Berbers were discovered to be Jewish 
and therefore non-Muslim.  According to 1936 census figures, Jewish Berber 
monolinguals were calculated at 24,462, or 15% of Moroccan Jews, and Jewish Arab 
or Berber bilinguals were calculated at 95,682, or 59% of all Moroccan Jews.  Thus, a 
combined 75% of Moroccan Jews spoke Berber.  This situation was even more 
prevalent in southern Morocco, like in Marrakech, the largest city in the south, where 
90% of Jews spoke Berber in the late 19th century and were “deeply rooted in the 
Arab-Berber milieu” (Gottreich, 2007, p. 6).  Though the number of bilinguals does 
not indicate native language and hence, ethnic origin as Berber or non-Berber, the 
total proportion of monolinguals, approximately 15%, suggests a significant number 
of Jewish Berbers.  Hence, “the linguistic distinction cuts across both … religious and 
ethnic lines:  There are Berber-speaking Jewish communities” (Gellner, 1969, p. 13) 
as there are Berber-speaking Muslims and Arabic-speaking Jews, Berbers, Muslims, 
or Europeans.  
      The discovery of Jewish Berber populations advanced the notion that Berbers 
were more similar to European culture and ancestry than Arab culture and ancestry.  
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Several researchers attempted to explain the existence of Jewish Berbers as the 
original or “true” Jews with primitive manners and local traditions having descended 
from Berber tribes (Slouschz, as cited in Schroeter, 1997).  Alternatively, some 
researchers argued that Jews became Berber as a result of commercial activities, since 
they traveled extensively and later settled amongst Berber towns (Schroeter, 1997).  
On the contrary, others claimed that all Jews in Morocco, including those expelled 
from Spain, were of a similar Berber origin who at a later date converted to Judaism 
(Schroeter, 1997).  These myths of ancestry confirmed for some that Berbers shared a 
common Judeo-Christian heritage with the French and thus shared fewer traditions 
with Islamic culture (Schroeter, 1997).  Such justification advanced the divide-and-
rule strategy and further encouraged the institutionalization of segregated 
communities. 
 
3.5 Difficulty of Dissecting Moroccan Communities 
As the various exceptions discussed in the previous section indicate, 
separating communities using the terms Jewish, Muslim, Berber, and European was 
problematic, since the formulation of these categories was based on inconsistent, 
unrelated, and overlapping features.  Speaking a language, whether MA or Berber, 
did not necessarily indicate religious or ethnic kinship, just as religious affiliation did 
not presuppose ethnicity.  In the same way that individuals of a single group might 
display differences among linguistic, ethnic, and religious characteristics, none of 
these features above reliably predicted group affiliation.  However, the French 
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employed these categories in their divide-and-rule strategy as a means to facilitate 
colonial hegemony and, in so doing, reinforced the segregation of Moroccan 
communities. 
The use of religion to distinguish Jews from Muslims assumed that Europeans 
and Berbers were non-Muslim and non-Jewish.  Europeans were thus assumed to be 
largely Christian in a similar way that Berber communities were believed to be non-
Muslim and non-Jewish, an assumption originating from the Kabyle myth.  
Europeans came from diverse countries and spoke multiple languages, so their only 
communality, according to this view, was that they shared a common religion or 
culture based on such principles.  This was not true of the naturalized French citizens 
of Moroccan or Algerian origin who spoke Berber or Arabic as a first language, some 
of whom were Jewish, while others were Muslim.  The term Muslim, or musulman in 
the French archives, largely designated Arabic-speaking Muslim populations who 
were of Moroccan origin, not foreign born.  This meant that Berbers were not 
considered to be Muslim, European, or Algerian.  However, many Moroccan 
Muslims were Berber, and, as noted, some Muslims, especially Algerians living in 
Morocco, had acquired French citizenship.  The term Jew, or israëlite in the 
literature, denoted Jewish-practicing, non-Muslim, non-Berber, non-European 
communities, though some Jews were Berber and some had acquired French 
citizenship.  Finally, the term Berber, berbère, included only those who lived in 
predominantly rural Berber regions and spoke a Berber language, as long as they 
were not Jewish.  Inconsistencies to these group delineations were forgotten or 
 
85 
ideologically eliminated from official documentation so that these four social groups 
assigned by French officials became the basis for French administration in Morocco.   
 
3.6 The Strategy of Divide and Rule: Institutionalized Ideologies  
In order to subdue rural communities and exert influence in regions far from 
the cities, French officials reformed the legal system in Morocco by reassigning the 
power attributed to local officials and courts.  Whenever possible, the French 
assigned a governor or mandated that the tribal chiefs, the powerful leaders exerting 
regional influence, would rule in the name of the French colonial state in an effort to 
avoid undue fragmentation of Moroccan tribes (Charrad, 2001).  French Native 
Affairs officers were stationed in every pacified town or region in order to ensure 
local loyalties by guarding every level of administration:  They attended court 
proceedings, recommended the appointment of local officials, and guaranteed 
complicity by influencing judicial decisions.  Wherever the French ruled, they 
reformed local control structures by instituting standardized professional exams for 
local administrators, authorizing lists of auxiliary legal professionals, reducing the 
number of Moroccan bureaucrats, and assigning legal representatives by means of 
direct appointment.  As a result, such a system of appointing regional (pasha, qaids, 
tribal leaders) and judicial leaders (qadi, judge, or adil, notary) disrupted the balance 
of social standing among traditional leaders whose prestige had formerly depended on 
the recognition granted by local courts.  Their eroding social position was further 
diminished by the loss of jurisdiction within Islamic courts, which were superseded 
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by modern, secular, colonial courts.  The diminished wealth of their clientele, eroding 
social positions of scholars, and the emergence of new secular courts with more 
power and prestige meant that the power of the traditional Muslim courts 
deteriorated.  
Because of ongoing pacification efforts in remote areas of the country not 
previously under the control of the Makhzen, the French government required a 
“more economical way to rule through the existing tribal institutions” (Charrad, 2001, 
p. 128).  Indirect rule through maintaining traditional tribal institutions meant that 
segments of the Moroccan population necessitated governance by separate 
institutions, or a divide-and-rule strategy, that divided legal systems and political 
allegiance according to distinct segments of the population.  Whereas Arab Muslims 
were to be governed according to Islamic sha’ria law, non-Muslims required a very 
different court system that corresponded to their religious and cultural differences.  A 
legal system demarcating Europeans, Jews, Berbers, and Arabs did little to disrupt 
daily life and corresponded precisely to colonial perceptions of differentiating social 
groups by stereotypes.   
Separate social groups with different histories, cultures, and religions required 
different administrative assemblies to represent their individual interests, the French 
believed.  Ideologies regarding these communities became institutionalized when the 
French established separate court systems for each of the distinct social groups.  In 
the revised legal system instituted by French officials, minority communities were 
granted legal representation based on religious traditions and customary assemblies.  
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Separate courts were created for Berbers, Jews, and Arab Muslims on matters of a 
cultural and religious nature, such as personal affairs, whereas secular offenses were 
administered in centralized Makhzen courts, or those courts administered under the 
sultan’s control. 
This native law was organized into four separate systems which built on and 
“reformed” traditional practices: Muslim Law (inheritance, non-registered 
land, marriage, divorce, etc.) judged by the qadi; Makhzen Law (penal and 
administrative law for Moroccans) judged by the local makhzen official, the 
pasha or qaid; Customary Law (local legal matters in certain Berber-speaking 
tribes) judged by the tribal council or jama’a; and Rabbinical Law (inheritance 
and other matters for Jews) judged by the Rabbis. (Paul, 1975, p. 160)  
As a result, the power of the secular Makhzen and European courts increased while 
the power of the religious Islamic courts diminished alongside that of the authority of 
traditional local leaders.   
Cases involving Arabs were then “under the jurisdiction of the secular 
Makhzen courts, created, and supervised by the French” (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, p. 
491) and simultaneously under the lesser jurisdiction of a qadi in the sha’ria courts, 
those respecting Islamic family law.  Though criminal matters were still tried under 
sha’ria law in the Makhzen courts for all Moroccans, application of sha’ria law for 
non-Muslims was reduced in the Makhzen courts.  Meanwhile, Jewish and Berber 
courts were granted more authority than ever before.  Rabbinical courts ensured Jews 
were granted personal and religious rights while still abiding by the Makhzen courts 
to litigate criminal or administrative matters.  Berbers were allowed to exercise 
“Berber customary law and tribal councils” (Charrad, 2001, p. 140), creating their 
own courts of appeal.  They were able to exercise full jurisdiction over personal 
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status, family law, inheritance, and commercial matters, exempting them from Islamic 
family law.  After 1930, French tribunals were set up in tribal areas applying French 
penal law in all cases of criminal matters (Charrad, 2001).   
Protectorate legal reforms delineated certain powers to separate courts 
according to ethnic origin and litigation as either religious or secular on “the 
assumption that Moroccans differentiated religious and secular law, and … that there 
was, within the Makhzen, a hierarchy of courts” (Halstead, 1967, p. 64), even though 
this was in conflict with local custom.  Consistent with this hierarchy of courts, 
European settlers were prosecuted in French courts under French penal codes 
allowing for defense by lawyer, arrests with warrants, opportunity for appeals, and 
imprisonment only when charged with a crime (Mannin, 1953).  The French court 
system oversaw all cases of commercial law and any case involving Europeans 
(Pennell, 2000) and thus exercised great authority.  Since Europeans held more 
capital and political sway, these courts represented interests with greater authority 
than the Moroccan courts.  As a result, “the European capitalist sector everywhere 
took the upper hand, [and] that portion of the society and the political economy that 
the Muslim courts presided over lost vitality” (Paul, 1975, p. 228). 
      Before the implementation of the new courts by the French, Jews in Morocco 
had not been granted the same legal status as Muslims.  They had been required to 
pay the Muslim jizya tax, required to dress in a manner distinguishable from 
Muslims, prohibited from bearing arms, and prohibited from providing evidence in 
Muslim court.  In exchange, Muslims granted Jews freedom of worship, community 
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autonomy, and protected Jewish lives and property (Laskier & Bashan, 2004).  Jews 
had been under the jurisdiction of communal rabbinic courts unless it was a matter 
between Muslim and Jew or applicable under the penal code.  After 1912, Jews were 
granted improved status with the rise of the secular Makhzen courts.  “Jews were 
regarded as equals before the law, and their dhimmi status was formally eliminated. 
… Cases involving all Moroccans … came under the jurisdiction of the secular 
makhzan courts, created and supervised by the French” (Laskier & Bashan, 2004, p. 
491).  Even though Jews were still required to present their cases before Muslim 
courts, the authority of rabbinic courts increased alongside that of the secular courts. 
The exceptionality of Berber communities based on assumed religious, 
linguistic, geographic, and political differences also required different legal rights 
under the French protectorate.  Since Berbers were considered to be less attached to 
Islam than their Arab neighbors, they were also believed to be less attached to Islamic 
sha’ria law.  The more the French were able to separate Berbers from Islam, the more 
likely they would bond with the colonizer, or so it was believed.  As Arabic was 
inherently linked to Islam and sha’ria law, subverting that language became a 
simultaneous goal.  All efforts to de-Arabicize were prioritized as were opportunities 
to bypass Islamic sha’ria law in order to foster a closer relationship with the French. 
If the Berber could be isolated from all Arab influence, then gradually brought 
under the jurisdiction of French law, the influence of French schools, and the 
discipline of the Christian religion, all traces of Islamic culture could be 
eradicated and the Berber would become a European. (Halstead, 1967, p. 70) 
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The greatest effort among French officials to diminish Arab influence was the 
introduction of French penal law in Berber regions.  This was an overt display of the 
colonial mission, by providing French privileges to previously neglected 
communities, in addition to reinforcing ideologies and the political strategy of 
imposing separate and counterweight communities in Morocco.  The first attempt to 
create this political counterweight was in 1914, and the second was in 1930.  The 
freedom for Berbers to adhere to the customary courts, the jamaa, was guaranteed by 
the dahir of September 11, 1914, and then in the Berber Decree, dahir berbère, of 
May 1930.  Both stipulated that Berber communities were to maintain their own 
judicial system and were permitted different legal and social status from Arab society 
and Islamic sha’ria law.  These decrees were intended to ensure the confidence of 
tribal leaders that neither the French nor the Makhzen would alter their customary 
ways by introducing caids, qaids, or sha’ria law or enforce submission to the 
Makhzen (Burke, 1973).  However, since the first decree did not stipulate “what 
customary law was, nor designate which tribes were regarded as ‘Berber,’ these 
matters were left to administrative judgment, with the result that the larger proportion 
of tribes which ultimately submitted to the French army were declared ‘Berber’” 
(Halstead, 1967, p. 69).   
As the definition of Berber had not yet been imposed on these communities 
and the pacification effort had only begun in 1914, the first decree did not receive 
much attention.  The second decree in 1930 had much different unintended 
consequences.  The 1930 Berber decree revised the legal status of Berbers in order to 
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circumvent traditional Islamic practices among the seemingly less devout Muslims 
and counterbalance the Muslim majority in the rest of the country.  This political act 
shifted secular powers from the Makhzen court to the French courts, thereby legally 
dividing Berbers from Arabs and drawing them closer to Europeans.  Unfortunately, 
this legal division upset both Arabs and Berbers.  Moroccans revolted throughout the 
country, and the nationalist movement gained momentum.  Before the protectorate, 
the notion of Berber had been amorphous.  Separating Berbers from Arabs and 
defining them as a unique social group worthy of considerable attention in Morocco, 
in line with the numerous characterizations that had guided French endeavors, had 
serious consequences.  Berber communities became more interested in a unified 
Moroccan identity based on false French conclusions that the 
Berber was superior to the Arab; the Berber people and civilization had a 
homogeneous character entitling them to the dignity of “nationhood” denied 
to the Arab, and finally that the Berber and Arab were in uncompromising 
opposition.  … Such prioritizing of Berber culture and identity led some to 
suggest that instead of a Berber policy, “if the French had had a “politique 
arabe,” giving them a free rein to exploit the Berbers, they might have been 
spared some heart-breaking disasters. (Bidwell, 1973, pp. 60–61)   
Separating Moroccans by legal status and the numerous ideologies that 
accompanied the notion of dividing communities exacerbated social and political 
organization in Morocco (Charrad, 2001) at the same time that such divisions 
empowered French authority in Morocco.  The divisions created by the divide-and-
rule strategy during the French protectorate had direct consequences in granting 
another kind of inequality for Moroccans, that of unequal access to French language 
and education.  Although unequal access to French education brought fewer 
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objections than legal status had, it brought greater socioeconomic disparity among 
some communities because language and education were tools for social mobility.   
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated how French colonial administrators came to 
identify Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers as four separate communities in 
Morocco and how these categories were reinforced by and institutionalized in 
colonial legal policies.  To understand how social groups came to be viewed 
according to these divisions, I investigated the major historical events and 
demographic singularities that differentiated Morocco from its neighbors.  By 1912, 
after more than 80 years of experience in Algeria and 30 years in Tunisia, the French 
found these former colonial experiences to be significant examples of how and how 
not to govern the new colony.  Moreover, these previous experiences served as a 
ready-made template for French authorities to quickly gain understanding about 
communities for which they originally knew very little.  
Besides the influence of previous colonial experiences in Algeria and Tunisia, 
the Christian and Jewish groups that reported on religious diversity in Morocco led 
French officials to emphasize the role of religious divisions in Morocco.  Identifying 
communities according to religion permeated most levels of classification to the 
extent that other markers of identity were neglected.  In addition to these reports, the 
Berber myth imported from Algeria in Morocco corroborated the idea that Berbers 
were less Muslim and displayed characteristics inherent in Christianity.  In this 
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classification system, however, French officials erased the existence of Jewish 
Berbers as well as that of Jewish or Muslim Europeans.  Therefore, separating 
Moroccans according to European, Jewish, Arab, and Berber communities was 
problematic, given that religion, language, and ethnicity were not all pervasive 
categorizations.  Discriminating groups according to salient features neglected the 
fact that those features were not necessarily stable identifiers in all contexts.   
In sum, then, ethnicity … is a factor of quite differential importance, a factor 
that varies with situational contexts and the additional affiliations by which 
each of the participants is characterized.  Identity as a Berber or an Arab is 
not, however, in almost any context all all-pervasive typification in terms of 
which one views and relates to another person. (Rosen, 1973, p. 171) 
Categorizing Moroccans demonstrated to what degree the French authority failed to 
objectively view the overall system in which Berbers, Arabs, and Jews coexisted in 
Morocco.   
To approach the question of social relations in Morocco mainly in terms of 
ethnic differences is to perpetuate the same error of misplaced concreteness of 
which the French themselves were so guilty: it is to give a reified and primary 
status to a distinction which … is of more ambiguous and subsidiary 
importance. (Rosen, 1973, p. 173) 
Finally, I illustrated how these ideologies became institutionalized in offering 
differences in legal status to each community in an effort to further the French 
strategy of divide and rule.  Dividing Morocco on the basis of sociocultural divisions 
served a greater political need to assimilate populations who would assist the French 
endeavor and ensure the survival of the French regime in the divide-and-rule strategy.  
Offering legal advantage to groups important to the colonial endeavor, the Jewish, 
Berber, and European communities, and fostering that relationship via legal privilege 
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strengthened French authority.  This political strategy, in turn, had consequences in 
educational and employment opportunities for Moroccans.  As Chapter 4 explains, 
the strategy of dividing communities according to their usefulness to the colonizer 
also coincided with the implementation of a colonial school system that offered 
access to French instruction and better employment to only those communities with a 




CHAPTER 4: DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS TO FRENCH SCHOOLS AND 
FRENCH INSTRUCTION: SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AND 
DISPOSSESSION 
 
Having demonstrated the importance of French in Morocco decades after 
independence, the sociolinguistic concepts necessary to the examination of language 
spread in Morocco, and the various ideological constructs and strategies that impacted 
the formation of protectorate institutions, I present in this chapter the mission 
civilisatrice philosophy and how it led to the creation of different schools for what the 
French labeled the European, Jewish, Berber, and Arab communities.  Differences in 
curricula, student selection, and teacher qualification at each of these schools 
selectively reproduced a French-assimilated minority intended to compose the future 
leadership of Morocco while purposefully keeping the majority of Moroccans from 
acquiring the French language and the various kinds of capital that this language 
offered.   
To begin this chapter on colonial education in protectorate Morocco, I define 
the mission civilisatrice ideology and illustrate how education became the institution 
by which to foster the colonial relationship between Moroccans and French authority 
in protectorate Morocco.  Second, I identify the network of French educational 
opportunities created for each social group and examine the link between the quality 
of French education at the best schools and access to higher education and 
employment.  To show how the highest levels of French education remained 
inaccessible to the majority of Arab and Berber Moroccans and how the schools that 
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were created for these groups reproduced socioeconomic inequity or dispossession, I 
discuss the other kinds of schools children from these communities attended—
traditional schools, free schools, and their limited enrollment options at the schools 
for Europeans or the Jewish AIU schools—and the challenges to studying at each.  
Finally, I illustrate, following Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1977/2000) social 
reproduction theory, how a rigorous selection process at the best colonial schools and 
how the difference of teachers’ qualifications at each of the schools socialized 
students differently so that some communities were able to master the dominant and 
legitimate colonial language to a greater degree than others.   
 
4.1 Education and the Mission Civilisatrice 
Beginning in the 18th century, the French rationalized colonial endeavors 
throughout the world and in Morocco by advancing the notion of the civilizing 
mission, or the mission civilisatrice, through education.  The notion of civilization has 
a direct relationship with the notion of education in France where the term éducation 
refers to not only institutional learning, or la formation, but also upbringing and 
exposure to culture and the idea of having become civilized.  During the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, the French considered it their ideological and moral 
responsibility as an evolved society to bring progress, peace, and freedom to less 
fortunate, uncivilized countries and cultures.  France, as a more “advanced” society, 
thus was perceived as possessing a mandate to civilize undeveloped nations and to 
raise the native population from what French people perceived as these nations’ 
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miserable condition to the level of the evolved, or civilized, nation—that is, to the 
level of France (Benzakour et al., 2000).  Having evolved from the missions of the 
Catholic Church in spreading Christianity in the Arab world, this supposedly secular, 
political mission civilisatrice was bound by both a desire and obligation to enlighten 
the less fortunate, which inherently presumed an unproblematic ranking of 
civilizations, languages, and cultures in terms of inferiority and superiority.   
To achieve the goal of the mission at the macro level, French military might, 
economic systems, and legal systems were introduced in the new colony in order to 
demonstrate superiority of the more powerful democratic and wealthy nation state.  
To effect change at the local level, medical practices and education advanced the 
civilizing cause in a manner similar to the cause of religious organizations prior to 
and, to a lesser extent, during the protectorate.  Although the French authorities made 
great strides in improving the health and well-being of local populations during the 
protectorate, healing the body alone did not easily alter the mind.  In lieu of military 
force, this civilizing mission through education was intended to generate new ideas 
and an appreciation for the gift of French culture.  Education would introduce not 
only “civilized” notions of modern science and rational thinking but also the language 
of the superior power as a means through which to express those new ideas.  
Educating segments of the local communities came to be seen as the most assured 
method that a colonizing nation had to propagate its ideas among these still 
“primitive” populations and, presumably, to gradually bring them up to the level of a 
civilized nation (Léon, 1991, p. 24).  Colonial administrators, therefore, instituted 
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methods to teach French as a means to consolidate influence and lead local Moroccan 
elites to participate alongside the authorities in governing the new colony (Léon, 
1991).  
Besides the practical applications of disseminating the language, the use of 
French as a language of power also offered opportunities for those in power to silence 
or distance those who were unable to speak it (Léon, 1991).  Encouraging the 
acquisition of French in Morocco required caution, because unfettered access to 
language and modern ideas within traditional society was potentially dangerous.  
French instruction could open up possibilities for anticolonial discourse, and 
acquisition of the tool of oppression theoretically could undermine the colonial 
project.  To minimize this risk, the French authorities in Morocco created educational 
institutions and curricula for social groups divided according to differences in 
religious, linguistic, geographic, and socioeconomic origin as the colonizers 
perceived them.   
Different schools were created for European, Jewish, Arab, and Berber 
communities in Morocco according to their utility to the French government.  Each 
school employed a different teaching methodology, selected students differently, and 
employed teachers with different qualifications.  As a general rule, only utilitarian, 
superficial language instruction was to be taught to the majority of Arab Moroccan 
children, thereby potentially avoiding the spread of new but dangerous ideas.  
However, some social groups significant to advancing the French colonial project 
were introduced to greater French instruction than other groups.  Children of 
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Europeans who, because of their different origins, spoke various other languages and 
were susceptible to competing political allegiances received the highest levels of 
French education.  French officials intended to prioritize the assimilation of this class 
culturally and linguistically to the French language and culture (Léon, 1991).  
Children from the Moroccan Arab elite also benefited from such education, thereby 
maximizing the likelihood of the success of a colonial partnership among the elite, in 
contrast to the general public.  Similarly, greater French-language education was 
intended to varying degrees for children from Jewish and Berber communities, two 
minority groups the French saw as instrumental in consolidating their authority as a 
means of securing cooperation and success of the civilizing mission.  By offering this 
education according to social origin, the French encouraged the most influential 
Moroccans to collaborate in the colonial project.  In turn, the material, spiritual, and 
intellectual condition of those who sought this privileged partnership with the French 
was altered. 
 
4.2 Separate Schools for Separate Communities 
European children in Morocco were able to enroll in the French écoles, 
collèges, and lycées, which taught a very homogeneous curriculum, identical to that 
of French schools in France.  After they passed the baccalauréat at the end of 
secondary school, the lycée, many of these students were then able to study at 
universities in France.  Jewish students attended either the AIU, schools originally 
associated with the international organization of the same name headquartered in 
 
100 
Paris and financed by private sources, or the écoles franco-israélites, the primary 
schools created by colonial authorities for Jewish Moroccans to limit the influence of 
the AIU schools.  Both of these kinds of schools shared very similar curricula, 
including rigorous instruction in modern, secular disciplines, with French as the 
language of instruction in addition to some Hebrew.  Additionally, the écoles 
berbères and collège d’Azrou were created for non-Jewish Berber Moroccans and 
intended to disseminate a quality education in the French language so as to foster a 
more intimate relationship between Berber students, their communities, and the 
colonizer.  In contrast, colonial schools for Arab Moroccans, or “Muslims” as they 
were labeled, sorted students on the basis of social origin.  Moroccans of elite status, 
referring to a family’s social and political influence more than economic wealth, were 
eligible to attend the écoles de fils de notables, whereas Moroccans of nonelite status 
were expected to attend the écoles populaires.  At the écoles populaires, students 
were further differentiated according to rural or urban provenance in the écoles 
rurales and the écoles urbaines, respectively. Table 1 shows the various schools 
instituted by colonial officials that were intended for each of the different 
communities in Morocco as they defined them.   
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Table 1. The Segregated School System Created for Each of the Different 
Communities in the French Protectorate  
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Table 1 (cont.) The Segregated School System Created for Each of the Different 
Communities in the French Protectorate 
4.2.1 Schools for Europeans 
Before the arrival of the French protectorate, European settlers and consuls 
living in Morocco sought to educate their children in a manner similar to that of their 
country of origin.  For this reason, several private schools sponsored by multiple 
European agencies continued to offer education similar to that offered in their country 
of origin.  In all, schools for Europeans were attended by about 1,800 students in 
1912 (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928), but they were deemed poorly organized.  For 
the most part, they located in the coastal cities of Tangier and Casablanca (Merrouni, 
1983).  Similarly, there were also private French schools like those of the Alliance 
française or those belonging to various religious missions created by different 
Protestant or Catholic orders.  Besides providing a general elementary education and 
Christian instruction, these private religious schools offered medical and social 
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welfare programs that attracted a small number of the general Moroccan population in 
addition to Europeans, especially students from more modest backgrounds.   
Yet, from time to time, the Moroccan community accused the directors and 
staff at these academies of proselytizing Moroccan youth.  For this reason, French 
private schools did not seek to recruit a large number of non-European students, 
particularly after the creation of the French protectorate colonial schools in 1912.  
Other concerns, such as required payment of the tuition, also limited the number of 
non-European students able to attend.  The influence of these private schools was 
therefore limited, and the total number of students remained low.  After the end of the 
protectorate in 1959, there were only 35 such private schools in Morocco (Benzakour 
et al. 2000), Christian and Alliance schools combined, offering both primary and 
secondary education, sometimes with as few as four students to a class (Knibiehler, 
Emmery, & Leguay, 1992).        
In 1912, French officials established public colonial schools for European 
students based on the model in use in France at the time with the intention to 
assimilate those who were not already French-speaking.  Prior to the protectorate, 
European students, of various faiths, regardless of country of origin, among the 
French, Spanish, English, German, Italian, Greek, and Maltese communities, attended 
diverse educational establishments (if they received formal education at all), spoke 
different foreign languages, and pledged different political as well as religious 
allegiances.  After 1912, children of European origin attended primary schools 
sharing a unified curriculum taught in French by instructors from France.  In turn, the 
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new regime could depend upon graduates of these schools to work in administrative 
and economic positions in service to the new government.  A rigorous secular, 
modern education for all European children, which was inaccessible to other 
communities, ensured this system of patronage.  At the primary school level, the 
diverse European elements were assimilated into a group of French speakers who saw 
the world through French eyes; secondary instruction created an elite population 
capable of working not only in Morocco but also in France or its other colonies 
(Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928).   
The French prioritized construction of these schools, and children from 
European communities quickly filled them.  The near-exclusive European student 
body in 1912–1913 included 1,688 students.  In 1922–1923, the number of students 
increased sharply to 15,096, nearly 9 times the number of students 10 years prior.  
These are staggering statistics considering that education was not yet mandatory in 
Morocco and that this rate of attendance was higher than in the countryside of France, 
where attending primary school was mandatory at the time.  Besides Europeans 
attending these schools, other social groups did seek and gain admission.  As 
demonstrated by the total number of students in secondary education in 1925, out of 
2,900 students, 409 were Jewish of North African origin (recall that European Jews 
were documented as “European”), and 40 were identified as Muslim (Gaudefroy-
Demombynes, 1928) of both Algerian and Moroccan origin.  These numbers reflect a 
large disparity between Jewish and other Moroccan students that did not accurately 
reflect the proportion of their population in Moroccan society.  For various reasons to 
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be explored in the following section, students from Jewish communities were more 
often admitted to European secondary schools, but the same opportunities were more 
limited among other non-Jewish Moroccan students.   
After successful achievement on the baccalauréat exam at the end of their 
secondary studies, students either continued their education abroad or sought highly 
desirable administrative positions in Morocco.  The fact that the overwhelming 
majority of students completing secondary institutions were French nationals made 
French students the candidates of choice for colonial administrative positions.  Those 
of French origin would ideally provide the new leadership in Morocco, thereafter 
taking the dominant role in the administration and economy of the country.  As the 
French saw things, these graduates were the intended leaders and directors for any 
and all operations in the country—representatives of France in Morocco who 
deserved to fill positions of power and, according to Hardy (1924), who should never 
be inferior to other elements of the population. 
The protectorate authorities chose not to create new universities in Morocco, 
desiring instead that qualified students, chiefly French or European in origin, continue 
their education in universities in France or Algeria.  Doing so required a very high 
mastery of French as well as the substantial economic resources necessary to afford 
life abroad.  However, the French did create research institutions such as the École 
supérieure d’arabe et dialectes berbères (1912) and the Institut des hautes études 
marocaines (1920), which were intended to focus on issues specific to Morocco such 
as Arabic and Berber language and pedagogical training.  Open principally to 
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Europeans, both institutions housed all research regarding Moroccan social, 
ethnographic, and archeological investigations so as to better understand those that 
the French sought to control, thereby advancing the colonial project.  These 
institutions did not receive full university status but offered diplomas with less 
prestige than those offered at French and Algerian universities, since the function of 
these institutions first and foremost was to train translators and interpreters in high 
demand within the newly created French administration.  In 1925, the Institut des 
hautes études marocaines, which had by then merged with the École supérieure 
d’arabe et dialectes berbères, had 524 students, most of whom were employed within 
the French public service sector or were women, likely unemployed spouses of 
French administrators (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928).  Only 46 were Moroccans 
(Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928).  By the end of the protectorate in 1956, of 1,063 
students, 290 were Moroccans (Benzakour et al., 2000).    
 
4.2.2 Schools for Jewish Moroccans 
Beginning in 1860, the AIU, headquartered in Paris, sought to improve the 
condition of Jews in the Muslim world through education and social welfare 
programs.  The first school sponsored by this agency was constructed in 1862 in 
Tetouan, in northern Morocco, and offered French instruction along with Hebrew and 
religious courses taught by teachers educated in France (Merrouni, 1983).  Many 
more schools soon followed in the central and southern zones so that, at the beginning 
of the French protectorate in 1912, there were 27 schools with over 2,000 students.  
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By 1956, the AIU had expanded to 83 schools geographically well dispersed 
throughout urban and rural Morocco, instructing over 33,000 students, both boys and 
girls (Laskier, 1983).  These institutions, which required tuition, educated more 
Jewish students and built more schools throughout Morocco than had any of the AIU 
affiliates in other countries.   
The education of Moroccan Jews was so significant to protectorate officials 
that, in 1916, the French authorities also created a handful of tuition-free écoles 
franco-israélites schools based on the same model but without religious or Hebrew 
courses.  But by 1924, the écoles franco-israélites merged with the AIU schools, and 
the AIU Central Committee shared oversight of all Jewish education in French 
Morocco with French authorities who subsidized the joint endeavor.  Apart from a 
small number of Jewish boys who sought a traditional religious education offered by 
local Rabbis, the overwhelming majority of Moroccan Jewish girls and boys received 
a modern and an increasingly secular French education at the French-sponsored AIU 
schools. 
Though “the French administration discouraged all but the most affluent 
Muslims and Jews from attending its schools for European settlers” (Laskier & 
Bashan, 2004, p. 489), Jewish students were more likely than other Moroccan 
students to gain admittance to the lycées created for Europeans because of the high-
quality French instruction offered at the AIU (Benzakour et al., 2000).  The high-
quality primary and secondary study at the AIU permitted students to earn the brevet 
élémentaire after finishing elementary study and offered opportunities to pursue 4 
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years of secondary study in the cours complémentaire.  Jewish students could then 
attend the lycée for Europeans or continue in the cours complémentaire at the AIU 
and earn the baccalauréat after 3 additional years.  Both of these diplomas increased 
their employment opportunities in administrative positions (Laskier, 1983) and were 
required for entrance to university.  The French-based education offered at the AIU 
and at schools for Europeans impacted Jewish communities to a greater degree than 
any other social group in Morocco, permitting them to shift their position in the social 
hierarchy in unprecedented ways.  “Jews managed to undergo social mobility to a 
greater degree than the Muslims owing to their avidity for educational progress, … 
the most privileged among them succeeded in enrolling in écoles européenes” 
(Laskier, 1994, p. 30).  In 1954, nearly all Moroccan Jewish children achieved a 
primary education, around 25,000 students, and nearly all attended school in the 
French language (Benzakour et al., 2000).   
Since nearly all Jewish children were being educated in French-based 
curricula and the French language (Benzakour et al., 2000), significant social 
transformations followed suit.  First, urban Jewish communities underwent language 
shift, with French replacing other languages as the language of daily life.  Initially, 
this language could serve as a practical language of communication between different 
Jewish groups who, having migrated from different regions of Morocco to the cities, 
spoke different Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Spanish varieties.  “By sitting together in the 
same classroom, the diverse elements developed the habit of speaking French, and it 
was this language that united them and helped eliminate linguistic and 
 
109 
communication barriers” (Laskier, 1983, p. 126).  Later, this utility in speaking 
French surfaced outside the classroom as a vernacular preference. “French became 
the dominant spoken language among the Jews of the major towns.  … By 1939 
Judeo-Arabic, Judeo-Spanish and Spanish had gradually receded in favor of French in 
French Morocco” (Laskier, 1983, p. 280).  Being educated in French and speaking 
French encouraged Gallicization of names and Westernization of attire, infiltrating 
even the countryside, or the bled (Laskier, 1983).  These linguistic and cultural 
transformations paralleled similar evolutions in the sphere of public space.  Prior to 
having received a French education, most Moroccan Jews lived in the mellah, or 
Jewish ghetto, where Jews had once been forced to live, segregated from other speech 
communities.  As a result of their French education and new avenues towards social 
progress, many were able to move to highly sought after housing in the European 
districts, the villes européenes.  By doing so, they would not only leave the ghetto for 
more luxurious accommodations, but also “strengthen their ties with the Europeans 
through integration into their communities” (Laskier, 1983, p. 278).   
 
4.2.3 Schools for Non-Jewish Moroccans: Elite and Non-elite, Arab and Berber 
Whereas Jewish students were to be lifted from their misery through 
education and Europeans were to direct the new economy, the French authorities 
envisioned that non-Jewish, Arab Moroccan students, labeled as “Muslim” by 
protectorate officials, were to receive a practical education necessary to operate in a 
modern economy without uprooting them from their social origins (Hardy, 1924) in 
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schools labeled broadly as écoles franco-musulmanes.  In order to encourage 
attachments with the new regime, instruction in the French language was necessary, 
but only as a means to inculcating French ways among these Moroccans.  The French 
believed that introducing these Moroccan students to French education would 
encourage them to think in French ways, assimilating French ideas and improving 
their technique (Merrouni, 1983).  On a moral level, the colonial authorities believed 
this French instruction would achieve the goal of pacifying the country while 
tactically enabling commercial transactions and provide public servants for the newly 
created French administration, which lacked low-level translators and auxiliaries.  
The French administration devised separate schools for Arab Moroccans 
disseminating secular instruction on the basis of traditional social hierarchies and 
social origin, as established by the dahir of August 20, 1920 (Merrouni, 1983).  By 
respecting social hierarchies, local languages, mores, and religion as much as possible 
and by prioritizing mutual cultural respect and safeguarding traditional institutions, 
the French hoped that their presence would not radically transform society (Merrouni, 
1983).  This slow evolution towards modernity was accelerated for the higher social 
classes because this group, who attended the more rigorous schools, needed such an 
education in order to perform a larger function in the developing economy.  The 
primary schools, the écoles de fils de notables, and the secondary schools, the 
collèges musulmans, were created for the elite Arab Moroccans.  For the less affluent 
Arabs, the primary schools were divided among urban communities, or the écoles 
urbaines, and the rural communities, the écoles rurales.  At the secondary level for 
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the general public, the écoles professionelles were created in order to encourage the 
professionalism of various trades necessary for the emerging economy (Gaudefroy-
Demombynes, 1928; Marty, 1925; Merrouni, 1983). 
 
4.2.3.1 Schools for the Moroccan elite  
The French écoles des fils des notables primary schools, designed exclusively 
for Arab students of higher social status as the sons of Muslim nobles, were 
developed to cultivate the sons of the Moroccan aristocracy in areas of 
administration, commerce, and the traditional professions of Moroccan nobles.  The 
students at the écoles de fils de notables, which in 1928 included 575 total primary 
students at five schools throughout French Morocco (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 
1928), were selected by the authorities based on their parents’ status and loyalty to 
the regime with the intent that these bourgeois youth would form an elite who would 
later serve the protectorate government faithfully (Benzakour et al., 2000).  At the 
very least, these schools’ “purpose was to bind the fathers more closely to the French 
system” (Pennell, 2000, p. 177).  Although the families had to pay tuition, these 
Francophiles would “be fluent in French” (Pennell, 2000, p. 177) and would have the 
option to continue their secondary studies at the collèges franco-musulmans located 
in Rabat, Fez, or Marrakesh.  Afterwards, they could seek careers in commerce or the 
administration (Hardy, 1924).  French was taught, not as a foreign language, but as a 
second native language (Benzakour et al., 2000; Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928).  
The incorporation of a moderate amount of Arabic language and religious instruction 
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at these schools was intended to ensure that these students remained attached to social 
traditions of their own culture at the same time that they were introduced to secular, 
modern notions belonging to the French regime (Benzakour et al., 2000).   
After success at the collèges, students with the diplôme d’études secondaires 
marocaines and, after 1930, the baccalauréat, were theoretically employable in the 
new administration as civil servants.  Not until 1938 did the French authorities deem 
the diplôme d’études sécondaires marocaines as equivalent to the French 
baccalauréat, which granted access to jobs in the protectorate administration; 
however, such access remained highly competitive (Merrouni, 1983).  These jobs as 
translators, assistants, and low-ranking bureaucrats in the French administration were 
the measure of success for these graduates because there were few opportunities to 
attend university, and the most respected professions, like medicine, pharmacy, and 
law, were primarily available to students who intended the schools for French 
nationals (Merrouni, 1983).  Initially these collèges were reserved for the families 
from the Makhzen, or the governing elite of Morocco, but by the end of the 
protectorate, students from other categories of the population filled these schools.  
Over time, students of the privileged classes chose, instead, to seek other kinds of 
educational opportunities at the schools for Europeans at the same time that 
Moroccans from the less privileged classes came to view the schools for the 





4.2.3.2 Schools for the non-elite 
For the general Moroccan public, the French administration created primary 
schools, écoles populaires, but varied the curricula according to rural or urban locale, 
écoles urbaines and écoles rurales.  In the cities, students were directed towards 
manual labor, especially construction, and the traditional indigenous arts.  In the 
country, they were encouraged to work in areas like agriculture, tree farming, and 
animal husbandry.  On the coast, they were expected to work in the fishing and 
shipping industries.  Children—almost always male children—were expected to 
continue in their traditional familial occupations, but with an emphasis on perfecting 
their manual skills (Hardy, 1924).  
These schools for the general public maintained optional attendance and 
taught French, although limited in quality, to create a group of Moroccan foremen 
and agricultural workers able to communicate with French supervisors.  French was 
intended to be taught in a practical or useful way to correspond with students’ likely 
employment after their studies.  For example, oral skills were emphasized over 
written skills at some schools, whereas “practical” French at the elite école des fils 
des notables referred to the ability to write commercial transactions or reports.  Even 
so, French instruction at both the écoles urbaines and écoles rurales occupied a 
prominent place in the program.  Whereas Arabic and religious courses were taught 
for 3 hours a week, French was in use 27 hours a week (Benzakour et al., 2000; 
Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928; Merrouni, 1983).  The bulk of courses—math, 
geography, art, and ethics (la morale)—was conducted in French.  This instruction 
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did not lead to any diploma or certificate; thus, as Merrouni (1983) stated, these 
students could not seek employment in administration.  In 1927, there were 43 urban 
schools with 4,284 students; in the rural zones, where nearly 80% of Moroccan Arabs 
lived, there were only 17 rural schools with 768 students (Benzakour et al., 2000). 
 
4.2.3.3 Vocational schools and schools for Arab girls 
In a similar vein, professional and apprenticeship programs were founded to 
furnish the skilled labor needed for industry.  These apprenticeship programs included 
4 hours of instruction a week with the goal of not only providing a practical education 
but also developing the manual dexterity of the children and orienting them toward 
the professional or vocational schools, where they would become future workers for 
European employers (Merrouni, 1983).  French was used as a language of instruction, 
as in the écoles urbaines and rurales, whereas Arabic was nearly absent from the 
curriculum as a language of instruction (Benzakour et al., 2000).  In 1927, there were 
15 such schools with 520 students (Benzakour et al., 2000).  By the 1950s, 7,500 
students attended French professional schools (Zouggari, 2005).  
The creation of professional apprenticeship programs in Morocco represented 
the first serious endeavor to educate female, non-Jewish Moroccans.  At the 
beginning of the protectorate, the only opportunity for these Moroccans to attend 
school was to enroll in the schools offered by Christian missions or, for a very few 
among the elite, to study with a private tutor.  Though schools that girls could attend 
were rarely located in the interior, a few Catholic schools operated in Meknes and 
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Midelt, one of which offered training in embroidery and carpet weaving.  Likewise, 
Protestant missions also created schools, such as those offered by the Scottish 
missions in Marrakesh and Mogador (the present-day coastal city of Essaouira), 
where English, not French, was the language of the curriculum.  Though initial 
experience in Algeria and in the Protestant missions in Morocco demonstrated that 
vocational schools tended to attract only the poorest students seeking commissions 
for their handiwork (Paye, 1957), over time, education for girls in the vocational 
schools appealed increasingly to a variety of Arab Moroccan families. 
Unlike the considerable percentage of girls attending Jewish or European 
schools, few girls of Moroccan Arab or of Berber origin attended school unless it was 
to learn a trade.  In 1913, the first French-funded workshop school where the girls 
learned carpet weaving and needlework, opened in Salé with the assistance of a 
female scholar of Arabic from the Paris Oriental Language School, Louise Bouillot 
(Irbouh, 2005).  According to Irbouh (2005), Mme. Bouillot successfully befriended a 
ma‘alma, a female teacher of crafts, who taught embroidery, lace-work, and weaving 
in her home in Salé to an average of 30 girls.  After a year of assisting the direction 
and the production of these crafts with financing from the French protectorate, Mme. 
Bouillot’s workshop became the most successful in all of Morocco with the support 
of the ma‘alma, her students, and the community.  Besides reporting on the closed 
female sector of the society, Bouillot’s largest accomplishment was the trust and 
positive influence that she was able to build between herself, a French roumiya, or 
Christian outsider, and the local population.  By 1917, such increasing support let to 
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requests by students and their families to include oral French lessons, in addition to 
more general subjects.   
A year after Mme Bouillot’s success at the Salé school, existing workshops 
“with efficient teaching methods and well-controlled labour” (Irbouh, 2005 p. 119), 
like the Rabat workshop of Ben Gnaoui in 1914, were updated by implementing 
general education courses as well as courses in French and Arabic.  Then, workshops 
similar to the Salé model were initiated in Fez in 1915 and elsewhere soon after.  
Incentives for girls to attend these schools varied from the attraction of school 
cafeterias to offering clothing as gifts and commissions for their handiwork.  The 
success of most of these schools was, at first, largely due to the representation of the 
poorer students who sought the promise of lucrative careers in order to improve their 
chances in the marriage market (Knibeihler et al., 1992).  By teaching subjects 
pertaining to household management, these schools ultimately altered the marriage 
prospects of most students, poor or affluent, and increased the likely sum of the 
dowry (Gaudefroy-Demombynes, 1928).   
After 1921, the arrival of the fqiha, a female Qur’anic instructor, attracted 
affluent families to send their daughters, because the fqiha’s presence guaranteed an 
Islamic education alongside a vocational one (Paye, 1957).  In 1928, there were 1,000 
students enrolled in these workshops, most of whom by then originated from among 
the highest social classes of the population.  Of the eight such schools in operation in 
1928, six offered elective French lessons on the condition that the parents requested 
it; however, the language of instruction remained overwhelmingly Arabic.  By the 
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mid-1930s, the presence of the fqiha became less critical in attracting students; 12 of 
20 schools did not employ one (Paye, 1957).  The lack of qualified female 
Moroccans, both fqihas and Moroccan female teachers of other subjects, reinforced 
the necessity for French administrators to recruit female French nationals as 
instructors, who, as a consequence, taught increasingly more French in these schools 
in addition to modern general studies (Paye, 1957).  These schools with the greatest 
French instruction recruited the highest number of students, particularly those from 
the elite classes, and had the most regular attendance by 1934 (Paye, 1957). 
As early as 1925, Moroccans began to seek more formal education for this 
population of non-Jewish girls.  The Arab, Moroccan, male elite who had been 
educated in the French-language collèges and écoles de fils de notables had asked that 
Moroccan girls be educated so that their sons could find wives with similar modern 
and Western ideals (Knibiehler et al., 1992).  Increasingly, parents requested greater 
study of the French language in the curriculum for girls as they began to value a 
modern general education similar to the opportunities that offered to their sons.  Not 
until 1938, however, did girls have the opportunity to select a modern education in 
lieu of a vocational or handicraft education.  Then, in 1942, the certificat d’études 
primaires des fillettes musulmanes was instituted, which finally permitted girls to 
attend secondary school and thus find job opportunities other than as domestic 
servants.   
After the war, the rate of non-Jewish Moroccan girls attending any of the 
colonial schools increased more than that of any other section of the population, but 
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their presence was still below the rates of European, Jewish, Arab, and Berber boys.  
In 1944, there were 7,000 girls, compared to a combined 34,000 Arab and Berber 
boys in modern French education out of a total 1 million eligible students (Knibiehler 
et al., 1992).  Less than 10 years later in 1953, approximately 35,000 girls were 
attending colonial schools in contrast to 225,000 Arab and Berber Moroccan boys 
(Knibiehler et al., 1992).  By the end of the protectorate, whereas 18% of boys from 
Muslim communities attended school, only 6% of girls did likewise.  
 
4.2.3.4 Schools for Berbers 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the French believed that the Berbers 
were a special people who deserved to be French speaking and de-Islamicized.  In 
this vein, schools for Berbers followed educational initiatives that favored their 
assimilation as part of the mission civilisatrice strategy.  Therefore, schools were 
created among Berber communities as a part of a larger French mission to pacify the 
countryside, gain the sympathies of Berber communities after years of hostility, and 
privilege communities that were thought to be ethnically similar to the French.   
Instead of “favoring the spread of the Arabic language and of Islamic law” 
(Burke, 1973, p. 196) as the French had done in Algeria, the French government in 
Morocco ensured that “there were Berber-speaking officers attached to each post in 
Berber country, so that the spread of the Arabic language would not be unwittingly 
encouraged” (Burke, 1973, p. 196) and would never come to serve as a language of 
broader communication.  The recruitment of Berber-speaking officers to serve in 
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Berber-speaking areas lessened the need for Arabic translators or interpreters, it was 
believed, as all oral interactions and written reports were eventually to be completed 
in French (Burke, 1973).  The fact that Berber languages were not written or codified 
only encouraged the belief among the French that language shift to French was likely 
(Paye, 1957).   
Schools were considered the perfect mechanism to assimilate Berbers into 
French culture and language and to discourage Arabization or Islamicization.  The 
French indigenous affairs officers, the regional superiors tasked with oversight of all 
local activities, were instrumental in this process because they served as teachers or 
directors of these schools, often bridging intimate relationships with the local 
populations (Burke, 1973).  In other cases, French-speaking teachers were recruited 
only among those of French or Berber origin (Benhlal, 2005).  French-Berber schools 
were to employ only the French language (Benhlal, 2005; Benzakour et al., 2000), 
and Arabic was forbidden even as an intermediary language between teacher and 
students.  The creation of Berber schools began in 1923 with six schools in the 
Middle Atlas; each had fewer than 20 students (Merrouni, 1983) and was established 
in a region that was home to a military administration office, indigenous infirmary, 
and a market (Benhlal, 2005).  The first Berber schools were set up in the villages of 
Imouzzer, Ain Cheggag, Azrou, Ain Leuh, Khenifra, and El Qbab.  These schools 
welcomed fewer than 120 students in 1923; by 1928, only 5 years later, there were 18 
schools with 742 students (Benzakour et al., 2000; Merrouni, 1983).  These schools 
had only mediocre success and many dissolved soon after their opening.  Despite 
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varied efforts at recruitment through medical, nutritional, and financial incentives, the 
schools’ fixed locations did not appeal to families who often moved around as 
migratory herders or farmers.  In the end, these schools failed as a result of irregular 
student attendance; the neglect to include Qur’anic education in the curriculum; and 
the failure of French officials to recognize the social importance of the fiqh, or the 
religious instructor, within Berber communities. 
At the secondary level, the collège d’Azrou expanded in 1930 from the 
primary school offering artisanal, agricultural, and teaching courses to offering 
advanced studies that prepared students to attend the prestigious military school, Dar 
Beïda in Meknes.  The collège, like the collège de Fès or the collège de Marrakesh, 
was intended to educate the Berber elite who, as French speakers, would fill 
necessary administrative jobs in Berber-speaking regions.  These graduates were to 
provide a counterweight to the Moroccan French-speaking elite employed in 
administrative jobs in the cities.  The collège d’Azrou was only slightly more 
successful at recruiting students than the various primary schools created for Berbers 
were because it offered the certificat d’études secondaires musulmanes and eventual, 
although limited, access to professional opportunities.   
Like the collèges musulmans, this school attempted to attract the elite and 
higher social classes among Berbers.  However, mostly transient and low-income 
Berber families from afar were drawn to this school, encouraged by the presence of a 
dormitory, which assured the material well-being of their sons.  Attempts at recruiting 
the intended population, the elite and higher socioeconomic classes, were evidently 
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not successful, as 80% of all students were from modest or poor socioeconomic 
origins, as indicated by statistics from 1929–1958 (Benhlal, 2005).  Furthermore, the 
majority of those who attended this school never successfully completed their 
education; only 8.8% of the entire student body at the collège d’Azrou received the 
certificat d’études primaires musulmanes.  Only 5.7% received the highest diploma, 
the certificat d’études secondaires musulmanes, compared to the results of the collège 
musulman de Fès, where 28% received the certificat d’études secondaires 
musulmanes (Benhlal, 2005). 
Besides the especially low number of Berber students attending or finishing 
French protectorate schools, the recruitment of Algerian teachers in the Berber 
classroom undermined the French goals of educating Berbers.  Protectorate officials, 
in particular school officials like Paul Marty, reported as early as 1923 that some of 
the Algerian Kabyle teachers who had been recruited to teach in the Berber schools 
because of their mastery of French and the assumed linguistic and cultural similarity 
between Berber communities were teaching Arabic and Islam or encouraging their 
students to attend neighboring Qur’anic schools (Merrouni, 1983).  Arabic-speaking 
students were more attracted to the schools for Berbers than were Berber speakers.  
As a result, some schools had to close “because [the schools for Berbers] had too high 
a proportion of Arab boys” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 250), whose presence altered the nature 
of the intended curriculum.  “If the school was in a town, it was difficult to keep Arab 
children away: if it was in the deepest bled no one came” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 250).  In 
order to recruit students and to meet the demands from parents and communities, the 
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French authorities finally introduced Arabic into the academic program at the primary 
schools and the collège d’Azrou in 1931, although minimally at only 1–2 hours 
weekly, while the Berber language was taught only as an elective (Rivet, 2005). 
Despite efforts to create a French-speaking Berber milieu through French 
schools, Berbers rejected speaking French in favor of speaking Arabic, even if this 
language was unknown to most Berbers before the involvement of the French in 
Morocco.  In 1923, a French officer noted that a Tamazight speaker who was only 
able to speak a few words of Arabic became more motivated to master this language 
as the French pacification campaign progressed.  When a French officer spoke to 
Berbers in their native language, they would often respond in Arabic as an indication 
of their opposition to French policies (Merrouni, 1983).  At the collège d’Azrou, 
“attempts to resist Arabic influences were carried to the length of rebuking boys who 
called themselves ‘ben’ Foulan [a common naming pattern in Arabic] instead of using 
the Berber ‘ou’ [Foulan]” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 251).  
The primary and secondary French-Berber schools, in particular the Berber 
collège d’Azrou, never achieved the goal of creating French-speaking Berbers to any 
serious degree.  Even if students learned French during their 2 years of study, they 
quickly forgot it, especially given the lack of other French speakers who inhabited the 
mountainous zones (Paye, 1957).  Native Affairs officers found the graduates of 
Berber schools to be no use for their purposes since “knowledge of Arabic was 
needed in every bureau” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 251).  Given that students at Berber 
schools were only taught minimal Arabic, their skills remained inferior to those of 
 
123 
their collège musulman compatriots.  As a result, Berber students were unable to 
perform the jobs for which they had supposedly been trained, specifically as 
interpreters or secretaries to customary tribal courts, where Arabic was often 
necessary (Paye 1957).  Beginning in 1939, French authorities were thereby forced to 
reinstate and increase the number of hours of instruction of Arabic in Berber schools 
(Benhlal, 2005). 
These linguistic trends toward a preference for Arabic among former students 
had parallels within the community at large.  In 1942, a Native Affairs officer 
reported that after 24 years of Berber schools, 16,000 of the population of 21,000 
spoke Arabic and 20 spoke French (Bidwell, 1973; Paye, 1957).  In spite of regional, 
linguistic, and ethnic diversity, there was tremendous uniformity among Berbers in 
language preference, as Arabization became widespread geographically and 
chronologically.  “During the protectorate there was a constant movement into a more 
advanced stage of Arabization” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 49), and “at the end of the 
protectorate, the Berbers were better [more observant] Muslims than they had ever 
been” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 55).  Attempts at educating Berbers failed because 
“whatever the French tried to do, to educate was to Arabize” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 55).  
Despite the efforts to co-opt Berbers through the education system, the French found 
that the Berbers “did not reject the idea of assimilation, but it was assimilation to the 
Arabs and not to the French that they sought” (Bidwell, 1973, p. 56). 
The first generation of students to enter the collège d’Azrou included 
proportionately more students from the higher social classes than those from the 
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lower social classes; however, after 1940, the French instruction and culture taught in 
this school became a prerequisite for social advancement among all social classes 
(Benhlal, 2005).  Of the 2,090 students registered at the collège d’Azrou between 
1927 and 1959, only 10–20% was considered to have come from the elite class, 
despite the intent to serve the upper class.  The economic and status disparity of social 
groups attending this institution further influenced the eventual perceived value of the 
institution.  After 1945, the elite no longer sought enrollment at the collège d’Azrou 
because it did not provide them increased social prestige; on the contrary, the less 
fortunate, making up 80% of students there, saw this institution as an opportunity for 
social mobility (Benhlal, 2005), an opportunity that was otherwise unavailable to 
them.   
Over time, the schools designed for Berbers lost prestige in favor of the 
schools created for Arab Moroccans.  In fact, Berber students came to view their 
milieu and the schools created for them as inferior to any of these school’s urban 
counterparts, the collèges musulmans in Fez, Rabat, and Marrakesh (Paye, 1957). 
Success at the collège d’Azrou did not offer opportunities to further academic 
advancement at any of the other colonial schools.  There were no baccalauréat 
equivalents with European schools or at the schools for Arabs and, therefore, no path 
to access higher education.  No enhanced professional opportunities were available to 
graduates, as the quantity and quality of professional opportunities offered Berber 
students were purposely limited to serving colonial interests within Berber territories.  
For these reasons, many Berbers, especially those of the higher social and economic 
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classes, viewed education at the collèges musulmans intended for Arab Moroccans as 
superior to that of the collège d’Azrou, which was seen as a dead end (Rivet, 2005).  
Berber Moroccans, especially the elite who continued to seek a quality education and 
social distinction, ultimately sought to enroll their sons in institutions where 
baccalauréat preparation was possible, where courses in Arabic and Islamic studies 
were included, and where overall instruction was considered more prestigious 
(Benhlal, 2005; Paye, 1957), such as that offered at the collège musulmans.   
 
4.3 Educational Alternatives: European, Traditional, and Free Schools 
Many Moroccan students did not enjoy the same access to modern education 
as that available to European or Jewish students, so many Arabs and Berbers sought 
an education outside institutions sponsored by the colonial power.  Three years before 
independence, in 1953, only 10% of the Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans 
(137,170 students out of a possible 1.360 million) were educated in French schools 
(Cerych, 1964; Laskier, 1994).  Comparatively, in 1952, after 40 years of French rule, 
90% of the European population was enrolled in school (67,722 total students), and 
60–70% of the Moroccan Jewish population (32,967 total students) was enrolled in 
French schools (Laskier, 1994).  The French rationalized these low attendance rates 
by proposing that educating fewer Moroccans was a way to avoid upsetting 
traditional society and creating social unrest; in that way, disseminating a high-quality 
education for a few Moroccans was more important than focusing on the total 
quantity of students educated (Merrouni, 1983). 
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Of the 10% of non-Jewish Moroccan in French schools, 97.5% attended 
primary schools, only 2.2% attended classes the secondary level, and barely 0.3% 
pursued a higher education (Merrouni, 1983).  Bidwell (1973) calculated that only 
1,500 Moroccans had finished secondary school, and only 42,000 had a primary 
school education by 1958.  The underrepresentation of Moroccan students at the 
secondary levels of education was largely due to the 90% dropout rate at the primary 
level (Cerych, 1964).  When non-Jewish Moroccan students were offered 
opportunities to attend classes leading to the baccalauréat after 1930, all students 
able to do so at collège Moulay–Idriss in Fez chose this option, even if it meant 
certain failure.  The baccalauréat had gained so much prestige in opening doors to 
better schools and higher education that nearly all Arab and Berber students chose 
this option over the less prestigious courses of study that did not lead to advanced 
study, even though they almost never succeeded in passing the baccalauréat exam.   
After completing their studies, Arab and Berber Moroccan students, even 
those educated at the better colonial écoles and collèges, encountered challenges of 
many sorts.  To begin with, their education was generally deemed inferior to that 
received at Jewish schools or those catering primarily to European students, an 
assumption made by both Europeans and Moroccans.  In fact, such a perception was 
likely long justified because the diplomas granted to Arab and non-Jewish Berber 
secondary students, the diplôme d’études secondaires musulmanes, the only terminal 
degree for non-Jewish students until 1930, were not granted equivalency in terms of 
access to higher education and administrative jobs to the diplomas of institutions 
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serving Jews or Europeans until 1938 (Merrouni, 1983).  Though Arab and Berber 
students were finally granted the opportunity to prepare for and take the baccalauréat 
exam at the collège musulman in 1930, this achievement was judged to be only 
theoretically equivalent to the bac from one of the lycées designed to serve European 
students—although this exam, only offered initially in Latin, was considered one of 
the most difficult of the baccalauréat exams (Merrouni, 1983).   
In lieu of attending schools created for Arab and Berber Moroccans, a number 
sought to enroll in French schools created for Europeans. They and their families 
recognized that these schools disseminated the most valuable and necessary 
credentials to access secondary and tertiary educational institutions and the elite 
positions that came with such an education.  Yet, at the primary level, Moroccans 
were forbidden to enroll in these schools when a school created especially for the 
Arab or Berber community was available to them.  At the secondary level, dissuasion 
was protocol.  Parents were advised that by attending a school not designed to meet 
the Arabic language and Islamic needs of their child, he would be permanently 
uprooted from his cultural milieu; however, in some cases, permission was granted to 
certain elite Moroccans or children, particularly sons, of civil servants (Benzakour et 
al., 2000).  Moroccans from humble social backgrounds found their opportunities 
even more restricted.  Pennell (2000) recounted the story of Mehdi ben Ahmed Ben 
Barka, a future leader of the nationalist campaign in Morocco, “the son of a small 
shopkeeper in Rabat, who, [extremely bright], sat at the front door of a French school 
for three months until the headmaster’s wife intervened and got him admitted” (p. 
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228).  Because of his success at French schools set up for Europeans, he was 
eventually able to alter his career opportunities as a tutor to Mohammed V’s son, the 
future King Hassan II, and become an influential member of the Istiqlal Nationalist 
Party.  
Although primary schools designed for European children remained off limits, 
after the dahirs of October 28, 1944, and November 28, 1944, select Muslim students 
were awarded the legal privilege of attending European lycées (Merrouni, 1983) with 
evidence of great aptitude and sufficient knowledge of French.  Similarly, in regards 
to access at the AIU schools, “from time to time Muslim youths, too, were 
represented at the AIU notably in the coastal towns.  Most of them, however, despite 
an open-door policy, chose not to attend, and only a handful of youths coming from 
affluent families welcomed the schools” (Laskier, 1983, p. 116).  Eventually, 
however, the restrictive policies of attending the European schools were relaxed in 
response to demands by nationalists.  By 1955, there were 1,599 non-Jewish 
Moroccan students in secondary European schools, compared to 4,600 in the 
secondary schools created for them.  Shortly before independence, Arab and Berber 
students were finally granted admission in European primary schools, although they 
were still largely underrepresented (Cerych, 1964).    
Alternatively, some Moroccan students chose not to attend French schools 
because they or their families either were suspicious of being proselytized or 
maintained a general distrust of education based on Western curricula, which could 
not at the time be divorced from Christianity (Pennell, 2000).  Some parents 
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mistrusted the segregated French system of education on the grounds that it clearly 
offered Moroccan students fewer and more limited opportunities.  Therefore, some 
Moroccans preferred sending their children to traditional Islamic schools that 
continued to teach Arabic and the Islamic sciences during the French protectorate.  
These schools included the primary msids schools, the medersas or zaouias secondary 
schools, and the Islamic universities of Qarawiyin and Ben Yusuf.  The material 
conditions in these schools were dismal: students of different ages and levels were 
seated on the ground in a single dark and dingy room.  These schools did not lead to 
any certificate or diploma; they taught the Qur’an as it had always been taught: 
through rote memorization (Knibiehler et al., 1992).  In 1920, 100,000 students out of 
a possible 800,000 attended Qur’anic schools, but only 10,000 learned to read and 
write; 2,000 attended courses in mosques and zaouias (Knibiehler et al., 1992).  At 
independence in 1956, 120,000–150,000 students out of a total population of less than 
8 million school-aged children studied at the msids, and at the secondary level, there 
were 2,000 students.  In comparison to the enrollment in French schools, the primary 
msid in Casablanca in 1949 accepted 9,462 students as compared to 6,685 students 
enrolled in French schools for Arab Moroccans in Casablanca (Benzakour et al., 
2000).  As these numbers indicate, more non-Jewish Moroccan students attended 
traditional institutions than attended modern French institutions—if they went to 
school at all, of course.   
In response to the limited opportunities for Arab and Berber students to learn 
the modern subjects—specifically, Western philosophy, mathematics, and the social 
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and physical sciences—Moroccans devised two different types of alternative schools 
to the French colonial schools.  First, many Moroccans felt traditional education at 
the traditional msid school was inadequate in pedagogy and content because of the 
reliance on memorization of the Qur’an and a complete focus on the Islamic sciences.  
In response, a movement arose to renovate the traditional primary school, the msid 
renové, and the curriculum of many of the existing traditional Qur’anic schools was 
modernized by adding more modern subjects like science to the existing curricula.  
Because these renovated schools continued to prioritize the Arab-Islamic character of 
the former msid, a second type of school, the free schools, or the écoles libres and 
écoles privées, were created in 1919 as an alternative to traditional education at the 
msid.  These schools offered a modern education nearly identical to that offered at the 
French protectorate schools but with more emphasis on the Arabic language, 
Moroccan history, and Arabo-Islamic culture.  Influential Muslim community 
members who believed that instruction in the Arabic language, the Islamic faith, and 
moral education was lacking in the French protectorate schools assisted in the 
development of these schools by investing great sums of money, often staffing the 
schools as teachers and administrators.  Similar to free schools in content, bilingual 
free schools emphasized a French-language education alongside the instruction of CA 
and MSA. 
Arabic was the intended language of instruction for almost all subjects in 
these alternative schools, including the introduction of modern topics not previously 
taught in religious schools.  By the mid-1930s, the free schools had become more 
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popular.  Some free schools contested French authority by promoting nationalistic 
discourse; not surprisingly, they hired teachers who were members of the budding 
nationalist political party, the Istiqlal.  These schools taught subjects like national 
literature, Moroccan history, and local geography, subjects not offered in French 
schools because they were deemed controversial or destabilizing.  Furthermore, they 
taught these subjects from very different perspectives than the French one.   
The initial success of free schools was remarkable given that these institutions 
depended on limited financial backing of community members and lacked a 
centralized authority to oversee their creation, curricula, and daily functioning.  In 
1925, there were 30 such schools in many cities throughout Morocco, with 1,500–
2,000 students, although only eight free schools endured throughout the term of the 
protectorate (Damis, 1970).  By 1944, there were 6,000–8,000 students, compared to 
35,000 in protectorate public schools (Damis, 1970).  Despite repressive French 
efforts to counter these institutions, by 1947–1948, the apogee of their success, there 
were nearly 25,000 students in free schools, with twice that number still in 
protectorate schools.   
Bilingual free schools with instruction in both Arabic and French were 
deemed the most prestigious institutions among the free schools.  The first of these 
was the M’hammed Guessous school created in 1934 in Rabat by Ahmed Balafrej, a 
former student at the collège musulman and the free school Wazzahra.  He had earned 
a baccalauréat from Henri IV in Paris as well as a licence and a diplôme d’études 
supérieures from the Sorbonne and was also one of the founders of the Istiqlal 
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(Damis, 1970).  Although tuition was high at 200–250 francs a month, there were 500 
students in 1943, and by 1946, one third of the students were girls (Damis, 1970), 
indicating the degree of social acceptance and influence these institutions came to 
acquire.  The higher than average percentage of female students attending these 
schools also offers insight into the evolving attitudes of non-Jewish Moroccans 
toward the education of girls, as long as this education was at least partially in Arabic 
and included culturally relevant topics for the Moroccans.  The high-quality 
instruction at the bilingual free schools was granted equivalency to that of the écoles 
des fils de notables, and their students were able to earn the certificate of Muslim 
primary studies, the certificat d’études primaires musulmane, granted by the French 
colonial government, giving them access to the protectorate secondary schools 
(Damis, 1970). 
French officials recognized the education at the bilingual free schools as high 
quality since the only difference between the French public school and bilingual free 
school was “a greater emphasis on the Arabic language and Islam” (Damis, 1970, p. 
138).  By contrast, students at the other free schools, that is, those that did not 
emphasize instruction in both languages, did not receive such recognition or similar 
diplomas despite a rigorous, 5-year elementary program.  By 1951, there were nine 
bilingual free schools with larger enrollments than the other types of free schools, 
with 600–700 students housed in new modern buildings and boasting directors who 
“were often graduates of the [French] public schools, distinguished personalities in 
their own right, and important members of the nationalist parties” (Damis, 1970, pp. 
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137–138).  A number of directors and teachers in these schools had received their 
education in French schools early in the protectorate.  Thus, an education with 
instruction in French or French and Arabic at the few bilingual free schools offered 
opportunities that the traditional or renovated religious schools, which focused on 
instruction in CA alone, could not.  Thus, the growing influence of these schools and 
the diplomas offered at each led Moroccans to associate a French education at any of 
the colonial schools and bilingual free schools with greater prestige and success. 
    In 1945, protectorate officials endorsed the creation of the elementary Arabic 
certificate, offering the first opportunity for the standardization of curricula and 
access to secondary or higher education for graduates of all free schools, an obstacle 
that had previously impeded student recruitment.  Most who obtained this certificate, 
who before this date were eligible only to attend secondary studies at the Qarawiyin 
or Ben Yusuf Moroccan Islamic universities, now had access to secondary education, 
though not in the French schools in Morocco or France.  After 4 years and the brevet 
obtained at the end of the secondary level, they were eligible to continue their studies 
in universities of the Middle East, a great step forward since “none of them went on 
to the Qarawiyin, which [they saw as representing] a step backward after the modern 
orientation of the elementary and secondary curricula in the free schools” (Damis, 
1970, p. 190).  The students at all of the combined free schools, numbering 
substantially fewer than those who attended colonial schools, clearly demonstrated a 
preference for a modern education, a preference similar to the graduates of French 
colonial schools, even if most of them were instructed in Arabic and not French.  
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After completing their education, the large majority of these Arabic-trained graduates 
worked as apprentices or teachers in the free schools, however, since they were not 
competitive in the new economy, which favored French-trained students from the 
protectorate schools or the bilingual free schools.    
 
4.4 Selection of Students 
As Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1970/2000) social reproduction theory would 
predict, the colonial government’s selection of students from the most important 
social classes to attend the most esteemed institutions ensured that French cultural 
knowledge came to be perceived as prestigious and legitimate in protectorate 
Morocco.  Graduates of these institutions, in turn, legitimized colonial power and 
domination by becoming employees in the protectorate administration and future 
leaders of the protectorate.  Graduates who became community and business leaders 
perpetuated this system of gatekeeping since they had come to believe in the 
institution and in the validity of the system in which they were successful.  Recruiting 
students from influential socioeconomic origins, already predisposed to accessing 
influential social roles and those more easily indoctrinated to believe in the legitimacy 
of authority, reproduced similarly inclined graduates and further legitimized the 
educational initiatives of the colonial government.  
Recruitment procedures are so obviously designed to guarantee [educational 
institutions] students already endowed, through their background, with the 
dispositions they require that we have to wonder whether, as the Romans used 
to say, they aren’t merely “teaching fish to swim.” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 73) 
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 The most predisposed to excel in French schools and the most likely role 
models to perpetuate the dominance of the regime were students from the European 
communities, especially those who shared a common primary habitus with that of the 
secondary one taught at school, in addition to the elite Arab and Berber Moroccans, 
for whom a French education guaranteed their distinction and legitimacy.  Co-opting 
those already privileged, deemed deserving because of their high social standing, in 
addition to the few who succeeded in the competitive system, effectively maintained 
the status quo and guaranteed the reproduction of authority by like-minded agents.  
The schools for Europeans, the écoles de fils de notables, and the collèges 
openly restricted enrollment on the basis of social background.  In other cases, 
students were instead selected to advance to higher grade levels based on the results 
of concours, or competitive examinations, like those employed at the AIU.  The use 
of highly competitive exams served an alternative gatekeeping function that ensured 
the prestige of the system with the appearance of minimizing discriminatory 
enrollment practices.  However, by encouraging meritocracy, such a system still 
largely favored those from more privileged social backgrounds.  Often, students who 
succeeded in these prestigious schools already possessed or were quickly coming to 
possess a habitus that was generally similar to that taught at the schools because of 
their increased contact with French officials, the reliance of their families upon 
colonial policy, and thus their increased motivation or need to acquire the French 
language.   
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A few highly motivated Moroccan students were occasionally granted 
admittance to this system but often at tremendous odds due to greater differences 
between their primary habitus and the educational environment.  These students from 
less privileged backgrounds were selected occasionally to attend the best schools or 
invited to participate in this reproductive process as long as they mastered, and came 
to value, the cultural knowledge belonging to the dominant class, often 
simultaneously enforcing the devaluation of their primary habitus.  “Inculcation at 
school … works to exclude the children of the working classes.  What is inculcated at 
school is not so much knowledge that can be useful to the child but the value of the 
legitimacy of the dominant culture” (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 49). 
 These students succeeded against tremendous odds, which only increased the 
likelihood that they became legendary figures like Mehdi Ben Barka, mentioned 
earlier.  Mastery at French schools rendered these graduates more dedicated 
proponents of the educational system, by virtue of their investment in the system, and 
reinforced the legitimacy of the curriculum for onlookers when unlikely candidates 
overcame obstacles.  For example, not only did Ben Barka succeed at the school for 
Europeans once he was accepted into the lycée, but he later bolstered the importance 
of this French education for others when he became a tutor to the future king of 
Morocco, Hassan II, and as an influential member of the nationalist party.  The rags-
to-palace tutor story of individuals like Ben Barka illustrated that exceptional 
individuals could overcome adversity through mastering a French education.  Further, 
an education worthy of a king that also emphasized meritocracy over social origins 
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further strengthened the perception of French education as important, dominant, and 
legitimate.  
When the French authorities restricted who was eligible to study at the 
prestigious schools, the number and backgrounds of Moroccan students who sought 
enrollment at these schools shifted over time, displaying a clear preference for the 
schools for Europeans.  As the école de fils de notables or the collèges became 
progressively more populated by students from the lower socioeconomic classes, 
many socially and economically prosperous Moroccans sought exclusivity by 
circumventing restrictions to attend European schools.  The European schools were 
increasingly becoming the schools of choice for sons of the elite because of their 
competitive admission requirements, the access they offered to advanced diplomas, 
and the prospect of becoming members of the most influential group of people living 
in the country (Paye, 1957).  In all, Arab, Berber, and Jewish students combined 
comprised only 12% of all students attending schools for Europeans at independence 
(Benzakour et al., 2000).  The fact that only a few Moroccans had been able to attend 
these prestigious schools, which were intended to provide professional opportunities 
for a small French-educated minority, nearly all of European and especially French 
origin, increased the profit of distinction these students received in the marketplace.   
Because of the merit-based selection criteria employed at the AIU, some 
Jewish students from the middle and lower middle class were able to enroll in schools 
for Europeans and alter their lot in life as members of the new elite (Laskier, 1983).  
Additionally, the sorting of Arab and non-Jewish Berber students from “relatively 
 
138 
affluent families” (Laskier, 1983, p. 305) to attend the prestigious collèges and lycées 
ensured that these graduates would receive the profit of distinction necessary to 
access better employment and positions of power upon completion of their studies.  
Among them, Ahmad Balafrej, Muhammad al Kholti, and Muhammad al-Wazani 
continued in their families’ pursuit of distinction by embodying this esteemed French 
education and accessed important positions within the nationalist parties.  Because of 
the selection criteria to enroll in the best institutions, either due to highly competitive 
merit-based criteria or as a result of a families’ prominence, graduates were assured 
social prestige and socioeconomic opportunity.  In some cases, they ascended to 
important positions of power after independence. 
 
4.5 The Diversity of the Teaching Staff 
No less important than the selection of students to attend the most prestigious 
institutions like the schools for Europeans, the quality of the teaching staff at those 
schools played a large role in certifying that institution as prestigious as well as 
predicting the future success of individual students.  By restricting the number of 
students who could access the subsequent levels of study, the teacher upheld the 
prestigious reputation of the school.  More importantly, however, the teacher, the 
gatekeeper to dominant cultural knowledge in Morocco, determined which students 
would succeed at each of those institutions and, thus, determined eligibility to access 
French dominant cultural knowledge.  Teachers in Morocco, themselves invested in 
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and by the school system, were the most prominent proponents and leaders of the 
reproductive system. 
[The school] only fully succeeds when it preaches to the converted: teachers’ 
children and those students who are like oblates, being devoted from a very 
early age to a school they cannot criticize since they owe it everything and 
expect everything from it in return, the “miracle children” from the dominated 
regions of the social world. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 104) 
Motivated by their own personal experience and dedication to formal instruction, the 
best teachers having been educated in France, these masters of cultural knowledge 
became representatives of the French educational system and the power it 
represented; as gatekeepers, they rewarded students who embodied French 
educational ideals but not others.  As Reed-Danahay (2005) noted, 
[Bourdieu] termed [the educational] community a “magical prison” of which 
the teachers were “ostensibly the guards,” even though they were themselves 
prisoners/products of the same system.  The teachers exert their influence 
through the “charisma of office” and “consecrate” the students by awarding 
prizes, titles, and certificates. (p. 51) 
This direct influence over the success of their students, their embodiment of 
cultural knowledge, and their belief in the necessity of such knowledge, in addition to 
their esteemed position in the community, gave teachers tremendous authority over 
the future of their students.  Thanks to their extensive experience in the French 
educational system and the great symbolic capital they derived from it, teachers in the 
most prestigious schools in Morocco were the most prominent advocates of French as 
dominant cultural knowledge.  In turn, the French school system in Morocco 
legitimized the status of teachers as distinguished products of these institutions and 
valuable producers of future leaders at the same time that it relied on their dedication 
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and authority as artifacts, products, and perpetuators of this system.  Bourdieu (1996) 
described the relationship between teachers and the institution as 
possessed individuals who perform the institution’s every wish because they 
are the institution-made man (or woman), and who, whether dominated or 
dominant, can submit to it or fully exercise its necessity only because they 
have incorporated it, they are of one body with it, they give body to it. (p. 3) 
More significant than student selection alone, the teacher determined the 
sustainability of the French colonial educational system (and hence the social order) 
by having spread a collective belief in the system, then having inculcated dominant 
cultural knowledge, and ultimately having selected which students would succeed via 
the granting of diplomas that, at least in theory, permitted graduates to advance to 
higher levels of socioeconomic prestige.   
Consistent with the diversity of educational programs and hierarchy of schools 
in Morocco, the teaching staff at each of the various institutions was neither 
uniformly trained nor followed a consistent methodology.  The AIU schools were the 
most efficient at recruiting highly trained teachers and those most committed to the 
ideology of an educating mission in eliminating Jewish poverty and misery. “With 
their skills … [these teachers at the AIU] could have easily found more lucrative 
positions, [but they found] … a devotion to their jobs, an ideological and moral 
commitment to their work” (Rodrigue, 1993, p. 62). 
 Not only were AIU teachers similar ideologically and in their dedication to the 
cause, but they also were hard working and displayed a thirst for knowledge that 
assisted them in overcoming difficulties they commonly experienced in adapting to 
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life when they studied and lived in France (Chouraqui, 1965).  After having 
experienced oppression of various sorts in a Muslim society, such commitment 
among these teachers to improving the lot of fellow Jews was often stronger than that 
of the French to their civilizing mission.  
     Frequently chosen from among former students even at the young age of 14, 
these future teachers of the AIU were sent to prepare their careers for 2–3 years at the 
École normale israélite orientale in Paris.  Here, they were indoctrinated far away 
from their families while surrounded by like-minded students in the Europeanized 
Jewish community of Paris, the capital of the Francophone world and the cultural 
center from which, they were taught, modern culture emanated.  Their alienation from 
their home communities and new socialization only increased their zeal to realize a 
common educational objective through the inculcation of French culture and 
language.  As a practical necessity, French became the language of instruction for all 
subjects except religious ones and a necessity to communicate between 
internationally recruited students and teachers.  With French as the classroom 
language and the influence of similarly ideologically minded Francophile teachers, 
approaches to education for Jewish children taught at AIU schools were modeled on 
and became similar to those of French-born Jews who had assimilated French culture 
in contrast to those found among the Orthodox Jews in France.   
Teachers at the AIU, thanks to their mastery of the French language and 
culture, became the “first systematically westernizing Jewish elite” of the Middle East 
(Rodrigue, 1993, p. 71).  As a result of such fervor and careful indoctrination, 
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students attending AIU schools abroad inherited this zeal for French culture, 
language, modern disciplines, and education.  Through their evolved secondary 
habitus, these teachers embodied, participated in, and advocated for social change 
based on the Western model and “became the Western Jew in terms of self-
representation and self-identity” (Rodrigue, 1993, p. 71).  The Jewish AIU teachers 
became role models for students by exemplifying newly enhanced social prestige and 
cultural power through assimilation to the Occident.   
These teachers as role models who embodied French culture and enhanced 
social prestige within Jewish communities increased the desire among their students 
to succeed in school and assimilate French culture and language as a means to 
improve their own dominated social status in Muslim Morocco.  The French colonial 
system appeared to offer Jewish communities options that Muslim-dominated 
Morocco likely would not, so Moroccan Jews were highly motivated to gain whatever 
knowledge or skills from these highly influential teachers.  Because of an 
ideologically unified, Westernized, French-speaking teacher corps in Jewish 
classrooms, Jewish students began to study more modern subjects, finished higher 
levels of education than ever before, performed better on French concours, and 
acquired skills for better employment in the French protectorate to a much higher 
degree than Muslim students (Laskier, 1983).  With valuable linguistic and technical 
skills taught by highly trained Francophile teachers at the AIU, Jews were able to 
advance to professions or jobs that often granted them social status within the Jewish 
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and the larger communities or to escape the social and economic conditions that had 
characterized Jewish life in Morocco by emigrating abroad, beginning in 1948.  
Similar to teachers at the AIU, the best, the most educated, the most 
ideologically unified, and the most experienced teachers among all teachers in French 
colonial schools in Morocco were recruited preferentially for European institutions.  
In contrast to the teachers at the schools for non-Jewish Moroccans, in 1917, more 
than 75% of teachers in European schools were qualified—that is, they were titulaire, 
meaning they held a degree—in comparison to only 45% of the personnel at all of the 
other schools for Moroccans.  Instead, there was a higher incidence of interns, 
monitors, vocational instructors, and additional auxiliaries at the schools for both 
Jewish and non-Jewish Moroccans (Belhaj Saif, 1994).  Belhaj Saif (1994) found that 
of all teachers in European school, three quarters had obtained the brevet supérieur, 
whereas in schools for Moroccans, only 38% had achieved the level of brevet 
supérieur, with proportionately more, 47%, having obtained only the brevet 
élémentaire.  The teachers with the highest professional credentials, graduates from 
teaching schools and lauréats, or distinguished faculty, represented more than half of 
the recruits for European institutions but only a quarter of those in the schools for 
non-Jewish Moroccan students (Belhaj Saif, 1994).  Furthermore, teachers at these 
schools for Muslim Moroccans, as compared to European and Jewish teachers, often 
had the least amount of teaching experience and were overwhelmingly interns, recent 
graduates from teaching schools, or 1st-year teachers teaching the highest classes.  
More than 80% of teachers sent to teach in schools for Arab and non-Jewish Berber 
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Moroccans arrived as interns newly graduated from teaching school or teachers with 
less than 3 years of experience, though they were tasked with instructing the most 
advanced courses (Belhaj Saif, 1994).   
The teachers recruited for European schools were more culturally 
homogeneous, which facilitated the instruction of standard French and French culture, 
whereas teachers at the schools for Arab and Berber Moroccans were, as a group, 
more often heterogeneous in origin.  These teachers at the schools for non-Jewish 
Moroccans came largely from French regions, departments, and austere areas, where 
standard French was less likely to be their native dialect than for teachers recruited 
for the European schools.  At that time in France, the use of regionalisms and 
nonstandard dialectal forms was not uncommon among persons from those territories, 
and such teachers would certainly have been unable to embody and disseminate elite 
French culture.  Moreover, up to 20% of the teachers in Arab and Berber schools 
originated from territories belonging to the French colonial empire where French was 
likely a second language (Belhaj Saif, 1994).  The teachers in Arab and Berber 
schools, then, could not have reproduced the dominant and elite French culture that 
was taught and lived in the European schools, where teachers embodying standard 
French culture more effectively reproduced like-minded, privileged graduates through 
more uniform instruction of legitimate language and cultural knowledge.   
Likewise, Arab and non-Jewish Berber students attending colonial schools did 
not have the same kind of teaching staff to increase the likelihood of their social 
mobility as the teaching staff employed at the schools for Europeans and Jews.  Some 
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teachers of French origin instructing at the schools for Arabs Moroccans had studied 
Arabic, whether at the Écoles des langues orientales in Paris or the Institut des hautes 
études du Maroc in Rabat, but other teachers at schools for Arab Moroccans had no 
Arabic language skills whatsoever.  Some teachers, whether of Moroccan or French 
origin, such as those employed in the girls’ art schools, where the goal was to merely 
create camaraderie among the students and families in order to gain cultural and 
political trust within the community, had only foreign language training with no other 
pedagogical skills.  Teachers at the Berber collège d’Azrou did not include any 
professeurs agrégés, or teachers who had passed the highest level of certification, the 
aggrégation, and some of the teachers did not have university degrees, including at 
least one vocational teacher who was unable to read or write in any language 
(Benhlal, 2005).  In an effort to quickly set up many of the schools located in the rural 
outposts, many military officers were recruited to oversee daily routines at the Berber 
schools, and the untrained wives of military officers or colonists often volunteered to 
staff some of these rural schools.   
As evidenced by such a range of teacher experiences, backgrounds, and 
language abilities, the colonial government enforced several methodologies at the 
schools for Arab or non-Jewish Berber students, a situation that stood in contrast to 
teacher preparation and practice at European or Jewish AIU schools.  Though 
colonial officials aspired to standardize the curricula at each of the schools of the 
same category, the fact remains that no uniform curricula existed for the teachers at 
the schools for non-Jewish Moroccans.  This explains, in part, why Arab and non-
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Jewish Berber students, unlike Jewish or European students, displayed a preference 
for attending the école de fils de notables over regional schools, for example, as well 
as a preference for attending the collège de Rabat over the collège d’Azrou for 
Berbers, the collège de Fès, or the collège de Marrakesh.  The quality and nature of 
the teaching staff and curriculum at Arab and Berber schools, therefore, had real 
consequences for the motivation of their students to pursue a French education and, 
thus, the degree and nature of their mastery of French.  
Whereas European teachers and Jewish AIU teachers were effective in 
disseminating cultural knowledge in a fairly homogeneous way, teachers at the 
schools for non-Jewish Moroccans largely reproduced a class of underprivileged 
students with only limited and variable access to this knowledge.  By disseminating 
cultural knowledge associated with the culture of the colonizer inequitably to the 
majority of Moroccans, the protectorate government ensured that the social hierarchy 
it had set up—built largely on the preexisting social hierarchies in Morocco—was 
largely maintained for the majority, while a small minority was able to advance to 
new social and economic significance.  Through access to the highest quality French 
education disseminated uniformly by the most qualified teaching staff, the elite 
maintained their positions of dominance and social distinction.  For a number of 
Moroccan Jews able to take advantage of educational opportunities led by teachers 
with the highest commitment to advancing the social and material condition of their 
students, French became an important and, for some, a primary language as their 
communities underwent a language shift across only a few generations.  Lastly, after 
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having circumventing the rigorous enrollment criteria at the schools for Europeans 
and elite, Muslim Moroccans and having benefited from the quality instruction and 
teaching staff there, relatively small numbers of non-elite Moroccans with French as a 
second language were also able to alter their socioeconomic conditions, in some cases 
at the highest levels, through great aptitude and ability.   
With a prestigious French education at the schools for Europeans; Jews; and 
elite, non-Jewish Moroccans, the lives of former students from non-elite backgrounds 
were profoundly altered as they moved, often against great odds, from impoverished 
backgrounds into social positions where they held great cultural and symbolic capital, 
including mastery of French and all the rights and privileges that accompanied such 
mastery for Moroccans.  These French speakers gained sufficient cultural and 
symbolic power to be accepted into the colonizer’s community—even though they 
were not accepted fully into that community.  Speaking French afforded social 
advantages and new ways of life such that a number of Jews as well as a number of 
elite, non-Jewish Moroccans were able to move to neighborhoods among the 
Europeans, assume European customs, and in some cases emigrate abroad.  Not 
surprisingly, then, the nature of the colonial education system had real consequences 
for social mobility, economic potential, and symbolic capital among Moroccans.  
Furthermore, the existence of Moroccan students, both Jewish and non-elite Muslim, 
who altered their socioeconomic conditions after a French education provided 
evidence that the system of modern education the protectorate government instituted 
in Morocco was a meritocracy rather than merely a replication of some preexisting 
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social order.  Their success at these schools and often their more prosperous 
employment within the new evolving economy validated the importance of the 
French colonial school system and justified the selective enrollment criteria and the 
differences in teacher qualifications.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the mission civilisatrice philosophy and the various 
schools created for different communities as well as the influence of student selection 
and differences in teacher qualifications in disseminating the French language 
inequitably in protectorate Morocco.  In order to maintain the delicate social 
equilibrium required for the colonial project’s viability, the French constructed 
separate educational institutions and curricula for what they saw as the various 
Moroccan communities, an action that guaranteed religious, social, and linguistic 
divisions throughout Morocco while simultaneously furthering the colonial 
government’s divide-and-rule strategy.  More importantly, this hierarchical system 
with strict enforcement of student selection and inadequate teacher qualifications at 
the less prestigious schools also minimized access to French, the language of social 
and economic power, for the less fortunate Moroccans and likewise limited these 
students’ job opportunities, since prestigious jobs required French. Thus, while 
reproducing a preexisting social inequality, this system also created a new kind of 
social inequality by exaggerating the differences among the differently trained 
“products” of the various educational institutions.  
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The French provided educational opportunities for Moroccan students based 
on their background as Arab or Berber, Muslim or Jewish, from rural or urban areas, 
or from elite or non-elite backgrounds.  Thus, this chapter reviewed the various kinds 
of access to the French language for Moroccans through schools based on social 
origin (schools for Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and Berbers); those based on class 
(écoles de fils de notables and collèges musulmans); the schools based on geography 
(écoles rurales and écoles urbaines); the schools based on learning trades and those 
intended for girls; the free schools, the bilingual free schools, and the traditional 
schools (msid, zaouias, etc.); as well as the schools based on religious background 
and private schools (the schools set up by the various Christian and Jewish missions, 
the schools set up by the other European powers, and the Alliance française).  Despite 
the variety of schools that existed during the protectorate, the rise of the French 
economy secured the importance of the most prestigious French schools, the schools 
for Europeans and the AIU, since only these granted credentials that gave access to 
secondary and tertiary education and jobs.  Ultimately, the French language became a 
necessary tool in order to earn any certificat, baccalauréat, or diploma instrumental 
to employment and thus socioeconomic advancement during the French protectorate.   
As a result of the competitive selection process and highly qualified teaching 
staff whereby the most prestigious schools offered the highest quality and degree of 
instruction in French, graduates of these schools came to value and, once in the job 
market, reinforced the cultural knowledge they learned at those institutions as 
legitimate and dominant.  Though the majority of these graduates were European, 
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some were Jewish or elite, non-Jewish Moroccans.  Only a very small number of 
Arabs and non-Jewish Berbers from non-elite backgrounds received a high-quality 
French education at the schools for Europeans or the elite collèges that opened doors 
to jobs as future administrators of the protectorate.  The exclusion of the majority of 
Moroccans from attending the prestigious schools increased the profit of distinction 
for students from less privileged groups who had been able to attend the prestigious 
schools, a fact that, in turn, strengthened their devotion to the French, the French 
language, and the educational system put in place by the protectorate. 
The creation of hierarchical, segregated French schools in line with the 
philosophical mission had long-term consequences for generating new representations 
of power, authenticity, and prestige in Morocco enduring well into independence.  
Since students were sorted into various kinds of schools, each with its place in the 
social hierarchy, and were taught by teachers with varying degrees of experience and 
training, the French these students mastered varied, ranging from the French of the 
Metropole, taught at the schools for the Europeans, to something much closer to what 
is today termed “North African French” at schools in rural areas.   Thus, level of 
mastery of French—and the kind of French they mastered—came to index 
employability.  Chapter 5, therefore, demonstrates how the creation of the disparate 
educational institutions discussed in this chapter reproduced socioeconomic 




CHAPTER 5: THE LINGUISTIC MARKET AND BOURDIEU 
 
      In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the mission civilisatrice 
philosophy influenced the creation of separate schools for different communities in 
Morocco, each offering differing levels of French instruction.  This chapter will show 
not only how French schools linked to employment in the more profitable modern 
sector of the economy gave rise to French as a dominant language but also how 
Arabic, both CA and MSA, simultaneously gained great cultural capital, in contrast to 
what Bourdieu’s linguistic market might predict.   
While French earned a profit of distinction for those with great proficiency 
due to their studies at the prestigious schools, for others this language was responsible 
for their symbolic domination.  In response, some countered this domination by 
supporting the various alternative schools that taught CA and by doing so restored 
significance to this language as a language of solidarity and cultural authenticity.  In 
this chapter, I examine how French, the language granting economic capital, became 
a legitimate, dominant, and powerful language in Morocco, acquiring symbolic 
capital in the process.  Next, I demonstrate the consequences for those who did not 
acquire this resource and the symbolic domination these communities faced in the job 
market.  For this group of Moroccans, I then show how local communities and the 
role of teachers as insufficient role models within those communities influenced 
students’ educational and linguistic choices to support alternative institutions over 
French ones and thus how both French and CA became dominant languages, though 
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with very different values, in contrast to Bourdieu’s linguistic market theory.  Finally, 
I explain how a growing resurgence of CA as a symbolic language with greater 
prestige than ever in Morocco resulted in a new kind of symbolic domination after 
independence, with both French and CA becoming dominant, legitimate languages.   
 
5.1 French as a Legitimate Language in Morocco 
In a short period of time after the arrival of the French protectorate, “the 
Moroccan economy … shift[ed] from the subsistence agriculture of pre-Protectorate 
days to an evolving wage economy” (Pennell, 2003, pp. 148–149).  Increasingly, the 
Moroccan economy became divided into two different sectors: a modern sector 
represented by European agriculture, industry, administration, transportation, and 
intellectual professions and that of a traditional economy corresponding to Moroccan 
agriculture and artisanal trades.  The modern sector was the higher income-producing 
section of the economy and the more numerically significant part of the economy.  By 
the early 1950s, 70% of the economy depended on income from the modern sectors, 
compared to 30% of traditional sectors (Cerych, 1964).  Whereas 100% of Europeans 
participated in the modern economy, only 26% of Moroccans did the same as late as 
1955.  However, between 1938 and 1952, Moroccans accelerated their representation 
in the modern sectors of the economy at a rate of 140% (Cerych, 1964), 
demonstrating their preference for jobs within the better income-producing sectors of 
the economy.   
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The growing predominance of the modern sector within the Moroccan 
economy reinforced the legitimacy of the French education system.  French degrees 
and certificates, especially the baccalauréat, but also the certificat d’études 
primaires, and the brevet élémentaire, became the ultimate credentials for accessing 
better employment in this higher paying sector of the economy.  Students chose 
educational paths, not because of their interest of a particular subject, but because the 
school offered access to the most prestigious degrees, certificates, and occupations.  
The careers with the greatest prestige, such as those in the protectorate administration, 
required mastery of French and success on the most prestigious exams, like the 
baccalauréat in philosophy, verified this linguistic competency and the cultural 
knowledge associated with this language.  In turn, these diplomas allowed students to 
seek highly sought-after positions in service to the state, professions offering higher 
income and increased social advantages like job security, higher salaries, and 
contractual benefits that did not exist in local professions as small merchants, artists, 
and laborers (Paye, 1957).   
As a result of French schools, a clear shift occurred between the professions of 
the parents and those of the students who attended these schools.  Many former 
students were able to take midlevel civil servant posts and coveted liberal and 
technical professions or, at a minimum, escape the agricultural professions of the 
family.  Fewer former students returned to work on the land of their fathers after they 
had attended French schools; instead, students advanced to administrative or 
industrial employment (Paye, 1957).  Likewise, those who had completed more 
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schooling distinguished themselves from their parents in terms of higher income and 
job stability and were able to improve their overall quality of life, as noted in a 
report8 by Camille Mathieu, director of vocational schools for Moroccans in 
Casablanca: 
Ceux qui n’ont fait à l’école qu’un bref séjour n’ont pas amélioré leur 
condition sociale, ils ont bien vite oublié ce qu’ils avaient appris et ce sont 
aujourd’hui de petits manoeuvres comme leurs parents. … De ceux qui ont 
fait des études un peu plus poussées … le niveau de vie s’est nettement 
amélioré.  Ils ont une profession fixe. (as cited in Paye, 1957, p. 627) 
Although the distribution of the French language and education varied by 
social group, Moroccans from every community engaged in behaviors that recognized 
French as a legitimate and dominant language.  Parents of Jewish students from all 
socioeconomic classes desired to send both their daughters and sons to French 
schools, especially to the European schools (Bensimon-Donath, 1968).  A similar 
desire, though to a lesser degree, to attend French schools was prevalent among Arab 
and non-Jewish Berber students.  Enrollment in French colonial schools among lower 
income, non-Jewish Moroccans increased between 1938 and 1952 at the same time 
that the percentage of landowners, rich merchants, and civil servants remained largely 
stable (Paye, 1957).  The increasing prestige of the professions requiring a university-
level education, and thus French, attracted so many students that enrollment in these 
programs increased substantially among Muslim Moroccans after 1940 (Paye, 1957).  
There was so much more interest in French schools that many French schools for 
                                                 
8 No year was given for this citation in Paye’s (1957) work.  However, in his conclusion to that 
section, he alluded to 1938 when he stated how much had changed since 1938, “Sans doute, comme il 
a été noté à plusieurs reprises par les directeurs d’écoles, la situation des familles s’est-elle ameliorée 
depuis 1938” (Paye, 1957, p. 628). 
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Moroccans, especially schools for non-Jewish Moroccans for whom the least amount 
of schools were constructed, had to turn students away or face classes with more than 
40 students (Paye, 1957).  Attempts to enroll in French schools had considerably 
multiplied among all communities and the high demand but limited availability 
reinforced the growing legitimacy of French as a dominant language throughout 
Morocco.    
Because of the profit of distinction one earned from having a French 
education, in addition to the economic advantages directly resulting from speaking it, 
many Moroccans came to believe that this language held a kind of inherent symbolic 
value, or symbolic capital.  This perspective was evident in the many ways former 
students devoted their careers in teaching French to other Moroccans and in the many 
commentaries documenting the legitimacy of French authority.  For instance, many 
former students of the military school Dar el Beïda fought alongside French soldiers 
throughout pacification wars and both World Wars with the firm belief in the ultimate 
validity and legitimacy of French culture and ideas.  Many former students of the 
French schools for Jewish and non-Jewish Moroccans upheld the value of French 
instruction by becoming teachers, directors, and donors of the AIU and bilingual free 
schools, often basing instruction on the French model through which they themselves 
were educated.  Numerous other former students remained attached to their French 
education and perpetuated the significance of this education to their community 
through various community-wide education projects, such as the student alumni 
organization programs from the collège de Fès or collège de Rabat, where they 
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sponsored activities such as evening French courses for adults, performed plays for 
local communities, and assisted other students financially in their attempts to attend 
schools in France (Paye, 1957).   
Because of the enhanced symbolic capital associated with speaking French 
and a French education, Moroccans also sought acquisition of cultural forms 
associated with French culture and language.  Like many Jews who, after having 
completed French instruction at the AIU, took French first names, dressed in 
European clothes, furnished their homes in French style, moved to the city, or 
immigrated abroad, Muslim Moroccans also found French to be a language offering 
access to modern ideas, the sciences, and a means by which to transgress social 
taboos.  New language ideologies, such as the preference of French over CA by 
students at the collège de Fès (Merrouni, 1983), displayed the extent to which French 
had acquired more than mere economic capital but social, cultural, and symbolic 
influence as well.  Similar to many Moroccan Jews who replaced their native 
language with French, a few of the most French-educated Muslim Moroccans also 
replaced their native language with French (Bensimon-Donath, 1968).  French 
cinema, radio, and newspapers became increasingly popular among a small 
percentage of Arab and non-Jewish Berber youth, as it had among Jewish youth.  For 
the few who were able to acquire it, French became a language of entertainment, 
intellectualism, social prestige, and real distinction. 
The economic capital derived from a French education also enhanced 
symbolic capital in the form of marriage opportunities.  As early as the 1930s, the 
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boys at the écoles des fils de notables began insisting that more Moroccan girls have 
access to a French education in order to create a class of potential spouses with 
similar interests and tastes.  Among some girls who attended French schools, a 
French education became a dowry in finding a more economically prosperous spouse.  
Moroccan girls living in French orphanages who were normally unable to marry 
because of their impoverishment and orphaned status, found husbands and 
unconventional domestic freedoms.  A French education also permitted a few 
Moroccans to marry outside of their traditional social networks to French women, as 
had occurred among a very small number of former Berber military students at Dar 
El Beïda. 
A French education also provided symbolic capital in the form of social 
advancement of women in the workforce.  The rate of French-educated Jewish 
women entering the workforce demonstrated a kind of emancipation from former 
social restrictions that a French education facilitated.  At an employment rate of 15%, 
Jewish women were more prevalent in the workforce than either European women 
(12.5%) or Muslim women (6.4%) by 1947 (Laskier, 1983).  Among administrative 
white-collar professions and office work in 1960, or employés de bureau jobs, as 
many as 23.8% of employed Moroccan Jewish women were represented in this 
important sector (Laskier, 1983).  With educational and professional pursuits came 
social change in that, through French cultural knowledge, Jewish women became 
“important members of the elite. … Owing to her education at the AIU and other 
European schools, the Jewish woman … continued working to help her family pursue 
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the path of social and economic advancement” (Laskier, 1983, p. 294).  The 
employment of Jewish and European women in higher income-producing sectors of 
the economy and the contrast between Jewish and European women in the workforce 
compared to non-Jewish Moroccan women illustrated not only the social divide that 
access to French instruction precipitated between communities but also how the 
symbolic capital associated with acquiring French redefined gender roles in Morocco. 
Although French was never directly legalized or rendered official and the 
linguistic markets never achieved complete unification or standardization for the 
duration of the protectorate, French became the most widely spoken foreign language 
in 20th-century Morocco.  The growth in French institutions and the value of services 
these foreign institutions provided catapulted the esteem granted its speakers.  Access 
to modern health care techniques and improved technologies such as transportation 
and communication led by various French organizations, opportunities for social 
advancement through French administrative careers, certified degrees and liberal 
professions, and employment in banking and industrial jobs with increased earnings 
reinforced the dominance of the French language in Morocco.  Later, increased 
contact between various speech communities after migration to urban centers 
necessitated some degree of French.  The greater the frequency of contact between 
interlocutors and these institutions necessitating French, along with the increasing 
authority exerted by these institutions, the greater the need one had to acquire French. 
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5.2 Symbolic Domination: Inequity in the Workforce 
As a result of the advanced curricula at the schools for Europeans, more than 
half of the European population was employed in French administrative jobs and 
received salaries in excess of 590,000 francs a year by 1953, whereas the average 
annual income among all inhabitants in Morocco was only 63,000 francs (Boutata, 
1986).  In comparison, French nationals working in France at this time received on 
average 295,000 francs, almost half the salary of Europeans in Morocco (Boutata, 
1986).  Europeans working in Morocco filled the majority of administrative positions 
as high-level industrial leaders, land owners, merchants, high- or midlevel civil 
servants, high-level army officers, business owners, and the liberal professions, jobs 
that comprised one fifth of the total workforce (Merrouni, 1983) and required a 
modern French education.   
Moroccan Jews, because of their modern French education, entered white-
collar professions as “journalists, teachers, pharmacists, lawyers, ... physicians, … 
[or] lower-middle and middle strata of administrators of diverse ranks … [and 
comprised an] important elite of nontraditional or even modernized employees” 
(Laskier, 1983, p. 293).  
This social group was prominent in higher paying sectors of employment, such as 
within the civil service, private agencies, or banks, and in the industrial sector as 




The Jews had employment priorities in administration and white-collar 
professions because Jews represented the only educated indigenous element 
capable of fulfilling colonial needs.  … Only high-level posts were given to 
Europeans [and] middle- and lower-level positions were granted to Jews.  … 
Next to the French, the Jews were relatively well represented. (Laskier, 1983, 
p. 286) 
Throughout the term of the protectorate, because of advanced educational 
opportunities and language acquisition available through a high-quality French 
education at the AIU, Jews remained better represented in the higher income-
producing sectors of the economy than other Moroccans.  They “still dominated the 
commercial arena in different sectors as late as 1940” (Laskier, 1983, p. 285).  As a 
result, they “were still better represented in their employed population than the 
Muslims were in theirs” (Laskier, 1983, pp. 287). 
In contrast to the prevalence of Europeans in high-level administrative jobs 
and Jews in administration, banking, and financial industries, Muslim students 
occupied the lowest positions in the French civil service as translators, secretaries, 
and auxiliaries if they indeed were able to find employment at all.  Arab and non-
Jewish Berber Moroccans occupied 34% of subordinate civil servant jobs at the 
lowest levels of the administration, jobs that comprised only 5.7% of all professional 
administrative jobs in Morocco (Boutata, 1986).  On average, they earned only 
31,000 francs a year by 1953 in comparison to the average income of 590,000 francs 
that Europeans earned in Morocco (Boutata, 1986).  These Moroccans rarely assumed 
positions in the advanced levels of administration and modern sectors of the economy 
(Paye, 1957).  After 1930, Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans began to take 
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more positions with the French government and industry following a sufficient 
French education, but they competed for these jobs with the increasingly numerous 
highly skilled Europeans arriving in Morocco.  However, the majority of non-Jewish 
Moroccans who were able to find work remained laborers or employed within the 
traditional and rural professions because many never completed their education, 
whether in French schools or otherwise.  While the linking of a French education to 
the job market permitted French-educated individuals—Europeans, a number of Jews, 
and elite Arab and Berber Moroccans—to distinguish themselves in obtaining better 
employment and a better lot in life, the lack of a French education simultaneously 
disenfranchised a majority of Moroccans from such opportunities.   
While other communities recognized French education and language as 
legitimate and valuable by seeking and successfully terminating their education in 
French schools, many Arab and non-Jewish Berber communities displayed a more 
ambiguous position regarding French dominant culture, language, and institutions.  
First, few non-Jewish Moroccans attained the baccalauréat or other diplomas such as 
the certificat d’etudes primaires or secondaires.  Paye (1957) observed that, in 1945, 
there were only 44 Muslim Moroccans who had passed the baccalauréat examination 
and only 128 in 1950.  Second, the student dropout rate in French schools, although 
declining after 1938 (Paye, 1957), remained highest among Arabs and non-Jewish 
Berbers than any other social group, more than two thirds in many cases.  The 
example of students at the Kasbah of Marrakesh elementary school, where fewer than 
6% completed their primary education and fewer than 3% successfully obtained the 
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certificat d’études primaires musulmanes (Paye, 1957), is representative of these 
education failures. Additionally, only a fraction of Muslim girls attended school 
compared with the population of Muslim boys or that of Jewish girls in school, and 
attendance at the highest level of classes contained the fewest students from the 
poorest families (Paye, 1957).  At the same time, the alternative schools and the 
traditional schools continued to compete for students.  While respect for French as 
legitimate and necessary had grown considerably, not all were complicit or 
participants in acquiring it.   
 
5.3 Dual Legitimacy: Arabic and French as Cultural Capital  
   Unlike European communities and a number of Jewish and elite, non-Jewish 
Moroccan communities who replaced their maternal languages with French, CA, 
MSA, and French assumed new significance among Arab and non-Jewish Berber 
Moroccans because of the rising influence of two different kinds of educational 
institutions.  The increasing role of French colonial schools meant that Moroccans 
required some knowledge of French when seeking employment in the modern 
economy, higher education, and thus socio-economic opportunity.  At the same time, 
CA, the language of instruction at most of the traditional schools, and MSA, the 
language at many of the alternative schools, were also becoming important 
legitimates languages with great cultural significance among Muslim communities 
after the growth of educational alternative institutions.  In fact, CA and MSA gained 
greater status during the protectorate as the language of cultural and religious 
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authenticity uniting Muslim Moroccan, Arab, and non-Jewish Berber communities as 
a symbol of Moroccan identity and as a result of the rising nationalist movement.   
By the end of the protectorate, as CA and MSA acquired greater significance 
than ever before, speakers of these languages acquired some of the greatest forms of 
symbolic capital within their local communities and competed with the symbolic 
capital that speaking French conferred. The embodiment of Islamic cultural 
knowledge granted access to a traditional aristocracy with great influence in all 
important social and political events (Merrouni, 1983).  Yet, employment 
opportunities for speakers of CA or MSA remained low during the protectorate, and 
power and prestige associated with these positions became all the more tenuous after 
the introduction of the modern economy.   
At the beginning of the protectorate, very few students completed their studies 
at Qur’anic schools, few obtained any certification or qualification, and only a limited 
number sought higher education at secondary training in mosques and zaouias or at 
postsecondary institutes like the Qarawiyin or other Islamic universities.  The 
employment opportunities for the most successful were largely limited to a few 
prestigious, local positions as religious and legal scholars authorized to interpret 
Sha’ria law, lead religious services, teach or provide notary services.  Many of these 
positions included being an adel (notary), khatib (preacher), imam (prayer director, or 
Qur’anic teacher), muazzen (person responsible for the call to prayer), hazzab (person 
who recites the Qur’an) or fquih (instructor).  After postsecondary study, students of 
traditional learning could become alim (doctor or teacher of high level of Qur’anic 
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instruction), qadi (judge of religious nature), and qaid (local representative).  These 
positions within the traditional job market required mastery of CA, which was the 
most rare of linguistic resources given the general high rate of illiteracy, the relative 
lack of graduates from traditional Qur’anic schools, and the dismal instruction in 
Arabic at the French schools for Arabs and Berbers.  Therefore, those perceived to 
have mastered CA were granted one of the highest profits of distinction within their 
local communities.  By the end of the protectorate, MSA also gained greater 
distinction than before with the association of the nationalist movement and 
Arabization of schools campaign.  
While nearly all Jewish and European students were attending secular schools, 
many Arab and Berber Muslim Moroccans continued to attend traditional religious 
schools throughout the term of the protectorate.  Although French schools appealed to 
most students from all speech communities precisely for the modern curricula, 
pedagogy, and enhanced economic potential, traditional schools among Muslim 
communities represented a form of cultural authenticity lacking in French schools.  
Furthermore, because French schools were unavailable to the majority of non-Jewish 
Moroccan students, traditional schools welcomed proportionately more Muslim 
Moroccan students than French schools did.   
At traditional institutions, students received the most revered forms of cultural 
knowledge, rendering these institutions an important rite of passage into political and 
social life long before the arrival of the French protectorate.  The Islamic subjects and 
role of the teacher, fquih, were viewed as essential to indoctrinating Moroccan 
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identity and deemed of great social and cultural importance.  In fact, inculcating 
conventional cultural and religious knowledge was prioritized at Islamic traditional 
schools over any technical or practical instruction (Merrouni, 1983).  This curriculum 
was so important to local identity that the traditional msid was deemed “an important 
process of socialization for young boys” (Damis, 1970, p. 22), and those who finished 
the primary level at the msid distinguished themselves through social advancement. 
Boys who finished the msid gained a certain element of prestige from having 
learned the Koran, even if they went no further in their studies.  They could 
usually read and write a little, they dressed differently, and were subsequently 
able to marry a girl from higher up on the social scale.  In short, their life style 
was clearly distinguishable from that of others who had left the msid at an 
early age … or who had never attended a msid. (Damis, 1970, p. 22) 
However, success at traditional schools was rare, and the “severe elimination 
process” (Damis 1970, p. 23) due to extremely difficult memorization requirements 
of the Qur’an reiterated the belief that only God determined in whose heart scripture 
would be instilled (Merrouni, 1983).  For the few who completed a traditional higher 
education, the highest form of social prestige, or symbolic capital, awaited them, at 
least until the introduction of the French colonial education system. 
A higher [Islamic] education provided the practical means for gaining 
prestige, patrons, and clients, and ultimately access to government service 
(excluding the protectorate administration, of course).  … Most scholars, 
capitalizing on their great prestige, pursued government careers which 
provided the necessary means of advancement in Moroccan urban life and 
used their knowledge to enjoy the highest social … status. (Damis, 1970, p. 
27) 
Customary notions of what constituted a quality education persisted in both city and 
village, among both Berber and Muslim communities, even after the arrival of French 
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schools.  Although French schools managed to recruit students through linking 
educational attainment to professional opportunities, if an Arab or non-Jewish Berber 
student lacked Arabic and Islamic instruction, his education was considered 
incomplete (Paye, 1957).   
Over time, competition for higher paying jobs in French industry and 
administration undermined the superiority of traditional education and professions.  
As a result, traditional schools witnessed a decline in the number of graduates, with 
fewer and more privileged students succeeding in the traditional educational system. 
The traditional Moroccan professionals during the colonial period found their 
institutions economically and culturally undermined and effectively prevented 
from evolution.  Their attempts to improve their situation, including religious 
and educational reforms, did not go very far and were limited in their 
influence to a small number of urban upper-class families. (Paul, 1975, p. 65) 
Not surprisingly, these few privileged but non-French-speaking students who 
completed an arduous, traditional Islamic education were granted great prestige 
within their local communities.  Yet, their power and prestige became limited to their 
local and regional communities as they competed against graduates from French 
institutions for social recognition and employment.   
Whereas previous generations who had been educated in traditional schools 
accessed cultural success, social prestige, and all the advantages that accompanied 
such success, those generations educated after 1912 in modern French schools 
“possessed or were on the way to acquiring through their studies the potentiality for 
upward mobility which had previously been reserved to the traditional scholar” 
(Brown, 1976, p. 83), thereby shifting the balance of power away from the 
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traditionally educated.  By the end of the protectorate, the esteem granted graduates 
from French language institutions over traditional institutions became more apparent 
in all but religious contexts.  Between 1948 and 1950, enrollment at French schools 
for Arabs and non-Jewish Berbers increased at the same time that enrollment at the 
free schools and many of the traditional schools declined.  French instruction began to 
attract more Muslim Moroccans and, for the first time, girls.  A French language 
education offered new possibilities to groups of Moroccans who were otherwise 
ineligible to improve their social positions based on social origin and gender. 
At the same time, however, a very small number of students who chose to 
study exclusively in traditional schools, at the Qarawiyin, Medersa Ben Youssef in 
Marrakesh, or in universities in the Middle East were able to display marked CA 
competence and gain considerable prestige among their local communities.  True 
mastery of CA earned one of the highest profits of distinction among Muslim 
Moroccans because of the increasingly restricted access to this language; the limited 
opportunities to acquire it; and the fewer, but culturally authentic, job opportunities to 
use this language.  This helps explain why one of the of the top nationalist leaders 
highly educated in CA, Allal al-Fassi, an Arabic and Islamic scholar who had studied 
at Qarawiyin, received great recognition and authority in Morocco.  His powerful 
position as a nationalist leader and prominent political activist before and after 
independence exemplifies how proficiency in CA bestowed some of the highest 
prestige in terms of cultural and symbolic capital, despite the rising economic capital 
granted to French speakers.   
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 In addition to CA speakers who because of their competence in CA earned 
great distinction, Arab and non-Jewish Berber French speakers were also able to 
access the highest ranks and prestige in the campaign for independence.  A greater 
number of Moroccan nationalists who had completed their education at prestigious 
French schools became powerful representatives of the National Istiqlal Party, 
including Mohammed Hassan el-Ouessani, Ahmed Belafrej, Mohammed Lyazidi, 
Mehdi Ben Barka, and Omar Abdeljalil.  Whereas al-Fassi was an Arabic-trained 
scholar from Qarawiyin who did not receive any French language training, more than 
half of the top echelon of the Nationalist Party leadership included highly French-
educated individuals.   
So great was the influence of both traditional schools and French schools that 
many students were often conflicted over the choice of schools.  To avoid this 
dilemma, many chose to attend both traditional and French institutions (Brown, 1976; 
Merrouni, 1983).  In Azrou, for example, the director of the collège berbère estimated 
that even among this community of Arabs and non-Jewish Berbers who perceived an 
Islamic education to be more influential than a colonial one, many students still chose 
to attend both traditional schools and the French collège in order to receive both 
forms of cultural knowledge (Benhlal, 2005).  After the Berber Decree of 1930 
alienated Berber and Arab students and families alike, many found greater ideological 
justifications for attending traditional schools over French schools.  For many others, 
however, economic opportunities that French schools offered students often trumped 
the cultural or symbolic capital granted by traditional schools.   
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5.4 Community Involvement and Resistance to French Dominance  
The rise of two legitimate languages among Arab and non-Jewish Berber 
communities, as opposed to the unification of a single language as had occurred 
among Europeans, Jews, and a few Moroccan elites, reflected the growing influence 
of two opposing education systems and the role of communities in promoting those 
institutions.  The perseverance of the traditional schools despite the low economic 
potential associated with that education, in addition to the lack of adequate funding to 
ensure their survival, demonstrated that local communities were able to maintain a 
certain level of agency in determining their own academic and linguistic alternatives.  
Traditional Bourdieusian theory accounts for the successful products of 
reproduction in French protectorate schools among Europeans and a number of 
Jewish and elite Muslim Moroccans, but unexplained by this theory are the 
coordinated efforts demonstrated by the Moroccan communities who rejected 
colonial schools and complete mastery of French.  Many Arab and non-Jewish Berber 
Moroccans did not participate in the linguistic game by acquiring French and 
attending French schools.  Instead, they preferred what they saw as a culturally 
authentic education, and some among them refused to send their children to French 
schools, even when access was available to them.   
Local or regional community influence, largely discounted in a pure 
Bourdieusian approach, plays a significant role in illuminating the discrepancies 
observed between those who attended French schools and acquired French, on the 
one hand, and those who rejected this education and language, on the other.  Analysis 
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at the level of the community clarifies how some in Morocco employed “everyday 
forms of resistance” (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 60) through variables of identity, 
religion, and gender in their complete or partial rejection of colonial education and 
language.  In her investigation, Education and Rural Identity in Rural France: The 
Politics of Schooling, Reed-Danahay (1996) found that features of group identity 
belonging to members of a rural community in France were important in determining 
the degree of successful student achievement at institutions promoting a national 
curriculum.  “Schooling plays a role in the reproduction of social stratification, but … 
at the local level [scholastic reproduction] is nuanced by factors such as regional 
identity, religion, gender, and peer culture” (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 59). 
 Identity, ethnicity, gender, and religion, the variables initially employed to 
segregate school children in Morocco, remained the same variables that distinguished 
successful reception of French education among French-speaking European, Jewish, 
and elite Moroccan communities from the mixed reaction to attend these schools 
among the majority of non-French-speaking Muslim Moroccans.  In short, the 
community constituted another field of power with differing levels of agency that, at 
times, conflicted with and undermined the power of the French educational 
institution.   
The community’s perception of French schools and teachers as community 
leaders played a tremendous role in the success of that school in addition to the 
individual success of each student.  While the credentials of the teacher at each of the 
different schools correlated positively with the successful inculcation of French 
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cultural knowledge among students, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the role of the 
teacher within the community had even larger consequences for the reception of that 
instruction.  Since teachers at both the European schools and the Jewish AIU schools 
were members of the community in which they taught, attended the same religious 
services, and originated from ideologically similar backgrounds, these teachers were 
generally admired by their community.  As a result, few saw the school as a site of 
religious conversion or as having a dubious agenda, a conclusion substantiated by 
Laskier (1983), who noted that a key difference at the schools for Jewish and non-
Jewish Moroccans was the foreign teaching staff of different religious affiliation.  
“The European school networks … failed to attract Muslims [because they] were 
reluctant to send their youths to schools taught and directed by Christians” (Laskier, 
1983, pp. 130–131).   
The teachers in Jewish schools became ideal role models for their students by 
indoctrinating more than factual or cultural knowledge.  Through the support of their 
communities, they were able to instill respect for community solidarity and social 
reform. By focusing “its attention on the promotion of unity among heterogeneous 
Jewish elements, and by preaching the need for Jewish solidarity, the AIU helped 
integrate the youths of the migrants with local youths” (Laskier, 1983, pp. 124–125).  
Furthermore, given their dependency on the Jewish community partnership, 
AIU teachers were protective of their students outside the classroom in a manner 
similar to that of religious missionaries.  “The teachers’ devotion to the communities 
… compared with the efforts of the Christian missionaries of the Middle East and 
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Africa” (Laskier, 1983, p. 118).  Because of their highly influential role within their 
communities, “they developed the reputation of physicians and healers” (Laskier, 
1983, p. 118).  Numerous Jewish community members praised the arrival of French 
schools as an advantageous opportunity to the degree that a number of Jewish 
Moroccans aspired for French cultural and linguistic assimilation that these schools 
facilitated.  
Likewise, the European communities admired the near-homogenous French 
teaching staff at the French schools for Europeans.  Their high academic 
qualifications and their embodiment of Parisian-standard French cultural knowledge 
distinguished them as authorities within the communities they shared with their 
students.  They were revered as the incarnation of Lyautey’s philosophy, a mythic 
Morocco, and of the mission civilisatrice, as described in the narrative of a former 
student, Bernard Guetta (as cited in Tselikas & Hayoun, 2004).  As the French 
language gained prominence and became increasingly linked to success in the job 
market, schools for Europeans offering rigorous French instruction both gained great 
notoriety (Laskier, 1983) and found additional support due to the esteem the 
community had for their teachers. 
      On the contrary, the lack of community support among the Arab and non-
Jewish Berber population and the lack of teachers with mutual devotion to the 
community in which they taught hindered French education initiatives among these 
groups.  In addition to the few enrollment opportunities for Muslims at French 
schools, the teachers recruited to staff the schools within these communities were not 
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perceived as community leaders.  In every colonial school intended for non-Jewish 
Moroccans, the overwhelming majority of teachers were foreign, French or Kabyle, 
and preferably non-Muslim so as to restrict the possible promulgation of Arabic and 
Islam.  Their status as foreigner re-emphasized social differences between French 
authorities and Moroccans.  As a result, the teachers and the schools where they 
taught remained segregated from the community they sought to instruct.  The 
teachers’ status as outsider in Muslim communities kept them detached from this 
milieu.  In the bled, or the countryside, this relationship was more overtly one of 
conqueror and conquered, as often the Native Affairs army officer was in charge of 
the functioning of the school.  In the city, the division between community and 
teacher was magnified by the fact that the teachers were often Christian from France, 
teaching subjects such as “nos ancestres, les Gaulois,” (“our ancestors, the Gauls”).  
Moreover, the faculty at most of the schools for Moroccan Muslims almost always 
lived in detached conditions from their students.  In the city where most French 
schools were located, teachers lived in European quarters with access to running 
water or telephones, daily conveniences that were very different from those of their 
students and most other Moroccans.   
On the occasion when subjects were taught by native Moroccans, such as 
Arabic courses by the fquih, instead of the traditionally preferred uluma, whose power 
had been usurped (Damis, 1970), all efforts were made to ensure that the pedagogy 
remained uninspiring.  Contact hours were kept minimal, reference to religion was 
prohibited, and inadequate materials thwarted teachers from enticing students.  
 
174 
Accordingly, Arabic classes, the subject that most exemplified Moroccan cultural 
identity in nationalists’ claims, became the least preferred classes among Moroccan 
students in French schools (Adam, 1962; Merrouni, 1983).  As a result, Moroccan 
students were not motivated to seek teaching positions, including positions as fquih, 
Arabic instructor, or monitor in French schools.  The lack of Moroccan teachers in 
French schools reduced the likelihood of reproducing future leaders like the teacher 
role models at the AIU and French schools for Europeans.  Instead, the minority of 
Muslim students who did successfully finish their education in French schools 
preferred pursuing careers in the liberal professions and subsequently abandoned 
geographically, economically, and culturally that original sociocultural milieu that 
rejected foreign instruction.  More often, those who did chose to become 
schoolteachers and directors chose instead to staff alternative schools and advance the 
renovated and free-school movement.  As few Muslim students attained French 
diplomas or a higher education, too few were inculcated to propagate the value of a 
French education.  The lack of French-educated Muslim graduates who became future 
teachers in French schools had a negative impact on the success rates of other Arab or 
non-Jewish Berber Moroccans in French schools.  Consequently, the lack of teachers 
as role models within the local community and the lack of Muslim Moroccans as 
teachers within the schools created for them rendered French education largely 
unfamiliar and exotic.   
Until the 1940s, traditional and alternative institutions remained culturally 
more relevant than French schools for many Muslim communities precisely because 
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these institutions were administered by highly respected community leaders.  Such 
preference for the local and authentic explains how, for a time, some alternative 
schools became successful.  In the same way the AIU teachers attracted Jewish 
students and Berber schools taught by a foreign Kabyle and French staff were largely 
unsuccessful, teachers at the traditional and free schools who were respected within 
their communities were more successful at attracting students and instilling a belief in 
the curriculum.  Although the total number of students in free schools remained less 
than that at the French schools, the rate of growth of these schools was remarkable.  
With community support, a common ideology, and indigenous teaching staff, 
teachers at the free schools were able to influence the success of schools, so much so 
that they successfully incorporated similar modern curricula of that of the French 
schools, including geography, science, and foreign language.   
What differentiated the free schools from French schools was not necessarily 
the extent of French language instruction or the instruction of nontraditional, exotic 
disciplines, but the mission by Moroccans to educate Moroccans in the familiar 
Moroccan milieu.  For these reasons, French or Algerian Kabyle teachers recruited to 
teach in Berber schools were destined to fail; they were unable to gain community 
support due to the perception that they lacked cultural authenticity.  On the contrary, 
through disseminating a shared ideology of Moroccan culture and then distributing it 
by means of highly influential community members, free schools were able to 
assemble great community support and obstruct, if even for a short time, significant 
growth of the French schools for Arab and non-Jewish Berber Moroccans.   
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5.5 From Solidarity and Resistance to New Forms of Symbolic Domination  
The rejection of French schools and the French language by some Muslim 
Moroccans reflected a preference for a kind of cultural and linguistic solidarity 
among community members who valued local forms of cultural knowledge.  Such 
solidarity is often observed among minority groups when upholding regionalisms or 
accents as a means to reinforce bonds between group members (Labov, 1972; Reed-
Danahay, 1996).  However, in many cases, solidarity may simultaneously operate as a 
form of resistance, where groups seek to alter their dominated status by disengaging 
from the milieu belonging to the dominant culture.   
For Bourdieu, the notion of resistance is problematic because the habitus, 
which operates at the level of the unconscious, does not allow for contemplation.  
“The habitus operates primarily at the level of the preconscious, in a take-for-granted 
disposition toward the world of which the social agent is not explicitly aware” (Reed-
Danahay, 2005, pp. 53–54).  Thus, dominated groups are unable to consciously 
recognize their domination.  According to this view, evidence of resistance is part of a 
group’s “commonsense culture, and not a true challenge to the structures that 
dominated them—of which they could not be aware” (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 55).  
Such a perspective assumes that resistance, when observed, reflects only apolitical 
group solidarity; thus, Moroccan proponents of Arabic were not simultaneously 
opposing French as dominant culture. 
On the contrary, other researchers have advocated that resistance emerges 
when the dominated consciously “come to see what is in store for them and therefore 
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resist the forces of class domination” (Reed-Danahay, 2005, p. 54).  Linguistic 
solidarity among some Arabic speakers and proponents in Morocco became, at least 
in part, an alternate form of social dominance, reproduction, and a means by which to 
intentionally resist French authority and French as the only dominant language in 
Morocco.  A kind of national and political consciousness among discontented 
Moroccans grew by the 1930s as a result of educational inequities and economic 
uncertainty.  The Berber Decree of 1930, the Great Depression, the Second World 
War, and a growing nationalist movement forced many Moroccan Muslims to value 
local Arab and Islamic cultural representations in unprecedented ways.  While 
European communities and a number of Jewish and elite Muslim communities 
acquired French and attended French schools, many more Moroccans who were 
denied access to French schools or diplomas demonstrated solidarity and community 
level resistance in choosing to study at schools where CA or MSA was the language 
of instruction.   
The rejection to learn French was not total, however, since these speakers 
found that French, CA, and MSA were required for a range of different social 
functions, each securing very different kinds of capital in the process.  CA and MSA 
reinforced group solidarity as Muslim and Moroccan and were used to overtly resist 
French colonial power, such as the cases when interlocutors chose to reply in CA or 
MSA when spoken to in French (see Chapter 4).  However, choosing to speak Arabic 
did not suggest that the French language was completely insignificant among 
Moroccans.  French remained a language of power and prestige in obtaining jobs or 
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acquiring social prestige that CA or MSA was unable to displace.  In fact, many 
Moroccans continued to pursue French language and education alongside that of CA 
or MSA because French cultural knowledge continued to offer speakers greater 
economic value.  The value of French was so great that Moroccans without high 
levels of French education did not ultimately return to traditional employment or the 
outdated traditional schools during the protectorate.  They increasingly sought a 
French education in other kinds of institutions; moved to the cities and searched for 
new kinds of higher paying jobs; or sought opportunities to alter their dominated 
status in other ways, even advancing the nationalist cause.  This is why so many more 
Moroccans sought enrollment in French schools, why many alternative or free 
schools instructed students in the French language alongside CA or MSA, and in part 
why leaders of the Nationalist Party continued to use French in their proposals for 
reform. 
      French and Arabic grew in their utility throughout the term of the protectorate, 
even among the most dominated groups, those with limited French education and 
professional opportunities.  During the protectorate, while many Arab and non-Berber 
Jewish students demanded an increase in the hours of CA or MSA instruction, these 
demands emphasized broader instruction in CA or MSA alongside that in French, not 
to diminish French instruction.  As debates regarding the utility of French and Arabic 
in Morocco circulated between Arabic as promoting local solidarity and authenticity 
and French as necessary for economic viability and access to modernity, all of these 
languages became necessary pedagogical tools for decades under the Arabization 
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policy after independence.  French remained influential because the successors to the 
French regime, the elite Arab and Berber students at the French schools, intentionally 
selected from among the noble classes, the “people of leisure or wealth of the cities, 
… functionaries or merchants” (Damis, 1970, p. 29), continued in the familial 
tradition of pursuing social and economic distinction through proximity to the French 
regime.   
In order to preserve or improve their social position during the protectorate, 
these higher social classes were often the most cooperative with French policy, even 
if in conflict with local authentic culture and tradition.  This was especially true of the 
administrative employees whose income depended on successful French authority 
and those with investment in the new modern economy, such as the urban elites.  
These groups sought social mobility through French instruction, whether in the 
French schools for Europeans, the écoles de fils de notables, or the collèges.  This 
explains why French secondary schools for Europeans came to attract first, the 
children of the local aristocracy; then, the children of the bourgeoisie; and finally, the 
children of the middle class (Tselikas & Hayoun, 2004).  French schools were, over 
time, able to gain considerable popularity among local populations by having 
persuaded the most important local clientele.  Even though there were Muslim elites 
who, like the majority of the general masses, rejected French-sponsored schools, 
many more from this class were propelled to pursue French instruction, even if such 
instruction was perceived as in conflict with traditional culture.   
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      Eventually, the dominant cultural knowledge acquired by the elite French-
educated Moroccans distinguished them as natural successors to the ousted French 
regime, enabling them to seamlessly access high levels of government after 
independence.  Those who succeeded in the highest levels of French education at the 
schools for Europeans, the schools for elite Arabs or Berbers, or even at some of the 
free schools were granted the greatest privileges after 1962. 
The great majority of Moroccans who managed to get a European university 
education during the colonial era … [and] joining with the traditional ulama, 
… dominated the leadership and top ministerial posts of the post-colonial 
regime.  … This small cadre of Moroccan [Western-educated] professionals, 
more European even than the settlers in their belief in Western science and 
culture, were now installed in the new monarchical government with 
metropolitan blessings … [and] quickly co-opted into high office. (Paul, 1975, 
pp. 60–66) 
These prominent communities were best positioned for, and most invested in, the 
socioeconomic opportunity and influence gained by acquiring a French education.  
They, in turn, assisted in the reproduction of that knowledge as legitimate and 
dominant. 
All those who have the privilege of investing in the game … accept the tacit 
contract, implied in the fact of participating in the game, of recognizing 
thereby that it is indeed worth playing.  This contract unites them to all the 
other participants by a sort of initial collusion, one far more powerful than all 
open or secret agreements.  This solidarity between all the initiates, linked 
together by the same fundamental commitment to the game and its stakes, by 
the same respect … for the game itself and the unwritten laws which define it, 
by the same fundamental investment in the game of which they have a 
monopoly and which they have to perpetuate in order that their own 
investments are profitable, is never demonstrated so clearly as when the game 
itself is threatened. (Bourdieu, 1991/2001, p. 180) 
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Because of the investment of having acquiring French and French diplomas, French 
education remained the educational standard for years after independence.  In turn, 
French remained a legitimate language for decades after independence and 
guaranteed the future legitimacy and dominance of a new French-speaking governing 
body. 
While Arabic never supplanted French despite Arabization of the curricula in 
Moroccan schools after independence, CA and MSA assumed new social functions 
alongside French, which continued to fill diverse social roles.  As a result, French and 
Arabic were taught but for different uses.  French became the language of instruction 
in the technical disciplines like science and math, whereas Arabic, increasingly MSA, 
was reserved for the humanities, especially those linked to Arabic and Islamic 
disciplines.  Bilingualism in French and Arabic became more widespread, and a new 
form of symbolic domination was imposed by those nationalist leaders who now 
occupied the vacated seats in the administration.  In contrast to the broader public, 
they had completed the highest levels of French or Arabic instruction and had 
mastered these languages.  Of nine nationalist leaders, five had completed a high-
level French education and the other four were fluent in Arabic (Pennell, 2003).  This 
new bilingual standard explains why, paradoxically, the nationalists employed French 
to bring attention to their political cause in the newspaper, L’Action du peuple, and in 
their manifesto, Plan de réformes, at the same time that in those documents they 
advocated for the inclusion of CA or MSA in the new government and school 
programs.   
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Just as most Moroccans were excluded from acquiring French as dominant 
knowledge under colonial rule, for many this continued after independence.  The 
bilingual school system inadequately taught both languages according to subject 
matter and thus the majority of Moroccan students lacked sufficient proficiency in 
either language.  Those who assumed influential positions in the new government, 
many having completed a French education first because it had been more firmly 
established at an earlier date, were the most likely proponents of maintaining French 
as dominant cultural knowledge and, thus, continued to legitimize French cultural 
knowledge in the postcolonial scholastic institutions.  The ascension of the Moroccan 
French-speaking elite to positions of power maintained the status quo with French as 
the dominant language and reinforced the reproduction of like-minded graduates 
(Grandguillaume, 1983).  Under the new bilingual education system after 
independence, symbolic domination and the need to acquire French as a dominant 
language did not disappear.  From the 1960s and for a period lasting over 30 years, 
Moroccans progressively required new kinds of language proficiency in at least two 
languages, French and MSA.  The insertion of MSA in some cycles of the new school 
system alongside the maintenance of French subsequently served as new markers of 
exclusion and dominance, reproducing new kinds of legitimate cultural knowledge 




5.6 Conclusion   
French became a dominant and legitimate language in protectorate Morocco 
after French schools and the diplomas certified by these institutions granted access to 
the higher paying job market, as predicted by the linguistic market theory by 
Bourdieu.  Increasingly, Moroccans from all social groups came to believe in the 
validity of French and of the social progress and economic opportunity this language 
offered, as demonstrated by the accelerated representation in French schools, even 
among those who at first had rejected them.  Such acceptance ensured French as a 
dominant and legitimate language in Morocco.  However, since most non-Jewish 
Moroccans from non-elite social origin were less likely to succeed in French schools, 
if indeed they were admitted in these institutions at all, these Moroccans rarely 
acquired satisfactory proficiency in French and were less likely to find employment in 
the modern sector of the economy or access positions of authority, resulting in their 
symbolic domination.   
The symbolic domination endured by these Moroccans produced different 
reactions to French schools among local community members, from renewed support 
for local traditional institutions alongside the cooperation of French schools to 
complete rejection of French institutions.  One of the most significant factors 
influencing the schools’ success was the role of the teacher as community leader 
within the local environment.  Since the teachers at the schools for Arabs and non-
Jewish Berbers remained foreigners to their local communities, like the curriculum 
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they were supposed to teach, these potential leaders negatively influenced the success 
of these schools.  As a result, many Muslim Moroccans preferred enrollment at many 
of the alternative schools disseminating a more culturally relevant, traditional 
education in CA or MSA.  Such a move to attend alternative schools, both traditional 
and free schools, displayed both solidarity to local ideology and resistance to foreign 
dominance.  However, Bourdieu’s habitus does not allow individuals to contemplate 
resistance in their physical act of solidarity, in this case, seeking a traditional 
education, speaking CA or MSA, or acquiring CA or MSA as a result of both the 
political discontent with French domination and the heightened awareness of group 
identity.  Therefore, the Moroccan example, at least in terms of the rejection of 
French schools among Arabs and Berbers, does not support the predictions of the 
linguistic market theory. 
This chapter examined how Bourdieu’s theory on social reproduction and the 
language market is unable to explain how both Arabic and French came to dominance 
in protectorate and independent Morocco and how a number of Moroccans sought 
alternative educational trajectories to the French colonial schools.  While European 
communities and many Jewish and elite Muslim communities sought French 
assimilation, many Muslim Moroccan communities, whether Berber or Arab, opposed 
or resisted French education and French cultural knowledge.  These Moroccans 
displayed not only coordinated group solidarity but also resistance to the symbolic 
domination that only French as the dominant language ensured by attending 
alternative schools disseminating CA or MSA as additional cultural knowledge.  
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Since French schools continued to offer all Moroccans greater socioeconomic 
advantages, both French and Arabic instruction became important for a number of 
these Moroccans, with the consequence that at least two languages became legitimate 
in Morocco, especially after independence.  With the expansion of bilingual 
instruction and the ascension of former French-speaking students in the new positions 
in the government after 1956, both French and Arabic became required to access the 
new positions of power and prestige vacated by French authorities as a new form of 
symbolic domination in Morocco. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation demonstrated how the French language spread at different 
rates and in different ways among European, Jewish, Arab, and Berber communities 
in protectorate Morocco as a result of inequitable indoctrination at colonial schools.  
As predicted by Bourdieu’s language market theory, those who received the highest 
quality French instruction at the best colonial schools advanced socially and 
economically under the new French authority, because these students acquired the 
skills necessary for the emerging economy and advanced to administrative and 
commercial positions requiring proficient French-speaking professionals.  Students 
from the mostly European, Jewish, and elite non-Jewish Arab and Berber 
communities were most often the few selected to attend these prestigious institutions 
with the best teachers and highest quality French instruction, because colonial 
officials sought their participation as civil servants, in turn, bolstering the relationship 
between French officials and these French-speaking graduates.  On the contrary, 
those without a quality French education, the predominately Muslim Arab and Berber 
Moroccans from lower socioeconomic origin who had been segregated into schools 
with less quality French instruction, were unable to acquire economic capital or 
prestige in the evolving job market.  They maintained professions within the 
traditional economy, excluded from economic, social, and political participation in 
the new government.   
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6.1 Overview of the Dissertation 
To begin this dissertation, Chapter 1 demonstrated how French remains, even 
today, long after independence from France, an important language in Morocco as a 
means towards accessing professional careers and higher education.  The rise of 
French speakers after 1956 despite the efforts to Arabize the national curriculum begs 
the research question:  How did the French colonial school system and French 
language become and remain dominant in Morocco?  Moreover, given the statistics 
illustrating inequities in French acquisition between different social groups in 
Morocco, how did French become more widespread among certain speech 
communities more than others?   
In order to lay the groundwork for this sociohistorical and linguistic study, 
Chapter 2 reviewed the major sociolinguistic notions important to this discussion by 
presenting the definitions of diglossia by both Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967), 
differentiating the notion of diglossia from bilingualism.  Further, I introduced the 
sociohistorical presence of each speech community in protectorate Morocco to 
include their geographical, religious, and linguistic diversity as well as their historical 
significance.  This discussion demonstrated how French officials came to view 
Moroccan communities as heterogeneous, laying the groundwork for Chapter 3 and 
the discussion of creation of a segregated educational system.  Finally, I outlined the 
major points of Bourdieu’s language market theory in order to show how the 
implementation of a hierarchical school system led to the broadening of linguistic and 
socioeconomic disparities between students and communities.  This review of 
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Bourdieu’s theories highlighted the process by which a dominant class, in this case 
the French authorities, creates and reproduces dominant status through mandating 
what, how, when, and to whom the culture is distributed and how schools inculcate 
dominant culture, especially language, as symbolic, economic, and cultural capital.  
Bourdieu’s linguistic market theory applied in the context of Morocco shows how the 
French-speaking graduates of the best French schools in Morocco came to earn a 
greater profit of distinction and socioeconomic prosperity and how their prestige 
lasted for decades after independence, while those without such education underwent 
symbolic domination.   
From the presentation of sociolinguistic definitions, Moroccan speech 
communities, and the theoretical discussion of language as capital and the social 
reproduction of that capital, Chapter 3 showed how social divisions and ideologies 
about social divisions in protectorate Morocco became institutionalized through 
differences of legal status, laying the groundwork for the segregated colonial school 
system.  Important to this discussion were the previous colonial experiences in 
Algeria and Tunisia and the role of religious organizations in emphasizing religious 
and ethnic divisions between Moroccans as Jewish, Christian, or Muslim as well as in 
emphasizing Moroccan ethnic divisions as either Berber or Arab.  Further, I showed 
in this chapter how French officials encouraged policies that segregated Moroccan 
communities on the basis of these divisions through the implementation of the divide-
and-rule strategy and Resident Général Lyautey’s doctrine, which reinforced the 
maintenance of the preexisting social order to the benefit of the elite and Moroccans 
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from noble families.  As a result of these ideologies and the institutionalization of 
legal differences, Moroccan students were sorted into different schools, with only a 
minority receiving preferential access to the highest quality French instruction and, in 
turn, other kinds of socioeconomic privilege. 
Chapter 4 described how the French colonial mission civilisatrice ideology 
justified the effort to “civilize” by educating and investigated the variety of 
educational opportunities that existed for different communities in Morocco.  
According to the principles of this mission, those necessary to the colonial venture, 
the European, Jewish, and elite Arab and Berber communities, were provided 
rigorous educational opportunities in the highest quality metropolitan curricula.  
Nonelite Arab and Berber communities received various kinds of instruction at the 
rural or urban colonial schools for the general populous and at the free or Islamic 
traditional schools.  Then, this chapter showed how differences among teacher 
qualifications and student selection at each of the schools further hindered the 
expansion of French education to the majority of Moroccans and reinforced the 
inequitable distribution of the French language.  Segregated schools and selection of 
students played the largest role in excluding the majority of Moroccans from 
accessing French schools; however, the diminished social role of the foreign teacher 
within local Arab and Berber Moroccan communities and the fear of religious or 
colonial intent contributed to the resistance in acquiring French as dominant cultural 
knowledge among the majority of Arab and non-Jewish Berber communities in 
discrete ways.  As a result, students and families from many of these communities, 
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excluded from the best schools, did not have access to French instruction and instead 
sought multiple educational alternatives in the form of renovated traditional schools 
and free schools, resulting in the diversification of educational curricula for the least 
empowered members of Moroccan society.   
Chapter 5 demonstrated how French became a legitimate language in 
Morocco during the protectorate as a result of the link between colonial schools and 
the job market and how all communities came to accept and seek a French education, 
though at different rates.  The most desirable habitus, or set of learned behaviors, in 
protectorate Morocco was that granted by the highest levels of the French educational 
system, behavior ensured by one’s having gained the baccalauréat, diplomas granted 
by the lycées, and the degrees from French universities, since these most closely 
resembled those belonging to the privileged classes.  After linking a French education 
with the job market and the prosperity that French education secured, certain 
behaviors such as speaking French came to be associated with certain social 
conditions, such as educational attainment and economic prosperity, and therefore 
granted prestige in terms of acquired cultural skills, or cultural capital.  With a French 
baccalauréat, graduates not only were able to advance to careers in the administration 
but also altered their clothes, took French names, tuned into the French media 
sources, and sought professional opportunities abroad.   
As Bourdieu’s linguistic market correctly predicted, proper, standard French 
taught at the prestigious institutions in Morocco became the most distinguished 
variety in the marketplace, granting economic capital as the education system became 
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increasingly linked with the employment market.  In this way, graduates without 
certificats, diplômes, baccalauréats, or other paper documents from the prestigious 
French schools that verified such linguistic competence were disenfranchised from 
the economic opportunities and upward mobility that French offered.  Yet, despite 
socioeconomic exclusion and the symbolic domination that followed from lacking 
French cultural knowledge, all Moroccans came to believe in the legitimacy of the 
educational institution and the French language as dominant cultural knowledge, as 
demonstrated by enrollment trends by the end of the protectorate.  Because this 
language was the best means by which to alter their dominated status, French grew in 
demand and popularity, even among communities with the least access to French 
instruction during the protectorate.  By indoctrinating the near-uniform belief in the 
necessity of this cultural knowledge and in the power of the institution, beliefs shared 
by both dominant and dominated populations, both the power of the dominant class 
and the domination of the dominated class was maintained, reproducing symbolic 
domination for future generations, in accordance with Bourdieu’s theory.   
I also showed in Chapter 5 how, at the same time that nearly all Jewish, 
European, and elite Moroccan communities sought French language and education, 
some Arab and non-Jewish Moroccans denied enrollment at the prestigious French 
schools resisted their symbolic domination, contrary to the predictions of Bourdieu’s 
theory.  Instead, many Moroccans pursued more culturally authentic education at the 
alternative schools, the Islamic traditional schools and the free schools, thereby 
resisting French dominance and socioeconomic disparity. Many of these alternative 
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schools, through the modernized Arabized curriculum, promoted Moroccan tradition, 
identity, and nationalism and in the process reaffirmed a link between this language 
and the Moroccan Independence Movement.  Through the instruction of CA and 
MSA at alternative schools and the new forms of symbolic and cultural capital that 
their graduates received, Moroccans asserted a sense of solidarity, of national 
identity, and of cultural specificity, effectively challenging the dominance of French 
as the only legitimate cultural knowledge in Morocco.  The reproduction of power as 
predicted by Bourdieu’s linguistic market theory, whereby a single language becomes 
a dominant language granting economic, symbolic, and cultural capital and whereby 
the symbolically dominated are unable to resist, was undermined by the development 
of alternative schools and the elevation of CA instruction in protectorate Morocco.   
 
6.2 The Maintenance of French After Independence 
Though French, MSA, and CA became dominant languages in independent 
Morocco, neither CA nor MSA was unable to completely supplant French as a 
dominant language in Morocco.  French remained economically beneficial for all 
communities and enhanced one’s social prestige along with such economic 
prosperity.  Moreover, CA or MSA instruction did not advance one professionally in 
the modern economy and did not offer socioeconomic opportunity because curricula 
at these schools remained for the most part unstandardized and did not lead to any 
diploma or certification.  In response, many students continued to value a French 
education and seek opportunities to learn French by attending any school available to 
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them, sometimes in addition to attending a traditional school, in effect reinforcing the 
legitimacy of French as a dominant language in Morocco.  As a result, CA, MSA, and 
French became dominant languages in Morocco but each for very different 
circumstances and each granting very different kinds of capital.   
After independence, language and education remained linked to employment 
conditions in Morocco in unprecedented ways.  Scholastic, administrative, and 
commercial institutions inherited from the protectorate continued to necessitate 
French-trained professionals.  Therefore, these graduates were the most qualified 
candidates to fill positions vacated after French protectorate officials left Morocco.  
Grandguillaume (1983) confirmed the importance of the French language during and 
after the Moroccan protectorate as it continued to be the language and culture among 
the elite, and it was by virtue of acquiring this language that the elite and the children 
of the elite came to embody power and social stature.  As competency in French 
became more difficult to acquire, French-speaking Moroccans accessed positions of 
power and socioeconomic opportunity over non-French-speaking candidates.  Then, 
as the new government implemented CA and MSA as the official languages within 
national institutions, Moroccans found the number and quality of opportunities to 
study French increasingly restricted and, therefore, the profit of distinction that came 
with French mastery even greater. 
This research demonstrated how historical factors in Morocco encouraged 
four speech communities, European, Jewish, Berber, and Arab, to speak French 
differentially under the French regime and, moreover, the way languages more 
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broadly come to reflect social hierarchies and power structure.  The formation of a 
contemporary nation-state under the French protectorate induced substantial 
transformations throughout Moroccan society.  The demise of tribal leadership, 
Islamic court’s authority in legislative matters, and segregated communities, coupled 
with urbanization, modern education, the rise of a new economy based on technical 
advances, and financial prosperity through new kinds of employment, was 
accomplished through the medium of the French language.  The speech communities 
able to exploit this language, while simultaneously embodying enhanced social status, 
were also the ones able to maximize cultural, economic, and symbolic profit from 
speaking this language.  This language secured profitable advantages and economic 
potential for all communities in Morocco and remained a language of preference for 
those seeking to better their lot in life for decades after independence.  The differing 
levels of access to French among the various speech communities combined with the 
socioeconomic incentives to attain it produced motivation to acquire French as more 
than a purely linguistic preference.  Instead, for many speakers, French mastery 
translated into both imagined wealth as well as real material wealth.  Yet, unlike the 
standardization of one dominant language embodying economic, cultural, and 
symbolic capital as that witnessed in modern-day France and in contrast to the 
predictions of Bourdieu’s linguistic market, many found alternative methods to resist 
French dominance and acquire alternate forms of linguistic capital.  While French 
remained the language of economic capital and symbolic for greater social 
advancement, proficiency in CA or MSA was rewarded with great cultural and 
 
195 
symbolic capital within local communities.  Thus, the segregated education system 
through which CA, MSA, and French were inculcated differently came to reflect not 
only differences in social origin, social class, and power in Morocco but also how 
some communities actively choose to resist dominant authority and act as agents in 
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